AIR-SEA RESCUE
1941-1952

FOREWORD

This monograph examines the development of air-sea rescue in the
Army Air Force through World War Two. The postwar period is briefly
reviewed, and Air Rescue Service operations in Korea are studied
through June 1952. This history was written by Frank E. Ransom, of
the College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota.

Like other Historical Division studies, this monograph is subject
to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will
be welcomed.

CONTENTS

Page

I INTRODUCTION 1

II ZONE OF INTERIOR

Planning 3
Operations 7
Training 16

III THE EUROPEAN THEATER

British Air-Sea Rescue 23
AAF Air-Sea Rescue
Early Lack of Action 33
Establishment of an AAF Air-Sea Rescue Service 34
Inauguration of "Spotter" Service 34
The 5th Emergency Rescue Squadron 38
Training Defects 42
Conclusion and Recommendations 44

IV THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

Introduction 46
British Air-Sea Rescue 47
AAF Air-Sea Rescue
OA-10 Detachment 48
The 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron 51
Emergency Rescue Boar Crews 52
Operations 54
Rescue Statistics 63
Conclusion 63

V THE PACIFIC THEATERS AND THE CBI

Introduction 66
The Southwest Pacific Theater
Organization 68
Personnel and Equipment 70
Operations 72
Statistics 80
The Central Pacific Theater
Organization 81
Personnel and Equipment 83
Operations 83
Statistics 90

Naval Air-Sea Rescue in the Pacific 90
The China Burma India Theater
Introduction 92
British Facilities in India 92
AAF Air-Sea Rescue in India 93
China 97

Conclusion 98

VI OTHER AREAS
Introduction 100
The Caribbean 101
The Isthmus of Panama 104
The South Atlantic 105
The Hawaiian Islands 107
Alaska and the North Atlantic 112
Introduction 112
Alaska 113
North Atlantic 117

VII Rescue Equipment and Emergency Procedure
Introduction 121
Rescue Equipment 121
Personnel Equipment 122
Aircraft Equipment 123
Rescue Organization Equipment:
Airborne 127
Aircraft and Boats 133
Emergency Procedure 139

VIII Postwar Plans, Operations, and Training
Planning 145
Organization 149
Training 155
Operations 156
Problems 156

IX Air-Sea Rescue in Korea
Rescue Organization and Equipment 160
Operations 162
Organization 162
Medical Evacuation 163
Other Helicopter Missions 166
Problems of Helicopter Operations 168
Helicopter Losses 170
Other Rescue Aircraft 172
Statistics 173

X CONCLUSION

Summary 175
Recommendations 179

FOOTNOTES 181

BIBLIOGRAPHY 201

INDEX 209

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The history of air rescue began in World War II. Prior to the
advent of large bomber and fighter fleets, little consideration had
been given to the search for and, retrieving of, missing or crashed
airmen. The distressed aviator was searched for in a haphazard
fashion, utilizing the means available with little thought to organized
protection such as mariners then enjoyed. *(l)

The enemy in Europe could first be reached only by over-water
flight. The air war in the Pacific presented a similar situation in
exaggerated form. Accelerated training; in the Zone of Interior,
over-water flights by tactical aircraft en route to the theaters of
war, transportation of personnel and supplies by air, antisubmarine
activity, convey defense, and patrol duty were additional factors
creating; a need for a world wide air-sea rescue service. *(2)

Under the personal guidance of General. H. H. Arnold, a rescue
program was initiated, crews trained, equipment procured, and rescue
squadrons activated.

Needless to say, the morale of personnel of operational flights
increased many-fold when they realized that their chances of being
saved after crashing; were good. Not only did the efficiency of the
flyer improve by the realization that he had a chance of being rescued,
but a considerable saving in valuable manpower resulted. The rescue of
one highly trained airman not only saved his life, but also the time
and expense of training; his replacement.

Early AAF attempts at air-sea rescue leaned heavily upon the RAF
for guidance and support. British-operated rescue control centers
served as models for those established by the AAF, and British air and
sea craft carried the major burden of rescue responsibility in the
European and Mediterranean theaters of war, as they also did for
flights originating in India.

In the Pacific theaters little aid was received from the British,
and for that reason the greatest amount of AAF air-sea rescue effort
was expended in that region. Rescue attempts in the Pacific were at
first limited by lack of knowledge, manpower, and equipment, but as
the importance of rescue operations was recognized, these obstacles
were overcome and an efficient policy for air-sea operations was
developed.

Inter-service cooperation was early recognized as essential to
efficient rescue operations. It was often achieved between
operational units and sometimes even at higher command levels but
during all of World War II efficient planning was hampered by the
failure of the Army and Navy to agree on rescue responsibility. This
basic question was not settled until the postwar period, when the AAF
delegated its responsibility for rescue to the Air Transport Command.
The Air Rescue Service (ARS) which was then formed gradually extended
its range until it became a world-wide organization.

In the Korean war ARS assumed the additional responsibility of
evacuating wounded by air from front-line positions. Use of ARS
helicopters was a major factor in reducing the mortality rate of
wounded soldiers to one-half that of World War 11 figures.

Chapter II

ZONE OF INTERIOR

Planning. The Battle of Britain first established the need for an
organized rescue effort. Observation of British rescue activity
eventually led to discussion of air-sea rescue among the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) in December 1942(1). The original problem--that of
coordinating the supply and distribution of emergency rescue
equipment--developed into a controversy on whether a separate agency
for rescue service should be established, or whether primary
responsibility should be delegated to one of the services.
For a time it was thought that the Coast Guard, because of its
Traditional rescue mission, should be the agency to control air-sea
rescue. In a letter of 23 July 1943, Coast Guard commandant Adm.
Russell R. Waesche presented the factors qualifying the Coast Guard
for this responsibility, stating that he regarded air-sea rescue as "a
most proper function of the Coast Guard"(2). A subcommittee of the JCS
Joint Administrative Committee, set up to study Admiral Weesche's
recommendation, felt, however, that the Coast Guard would face
"insuperable obstacles if it attempted to expand" into all types of
rescue activity(3). It concluded that each service should be primarily
responsible for rescue of its own crews, and that therefore each
should continue its separate activities, delegating immediate
authority to the theater commanders. Because of the lack of
coordination between existing rescue services, it recommended that a
central coordinating body be established in Washington with
representatives from each service. The result of the subcommittee's
recommendation was the establishment of the Air-Sea Rescue Agency
early in 1944 by request of the JCS. The directive establishing the
Agency stated its function as follows.(4)

The Agency will conduct joint studies and assemble
information, disseminate that information with appropriate
recommendations for action to all interested agencies of
the United States, and maintain liaison with agencies of
other United Nations, on two phases of Air Sea Rescue. One
of these phases embraces work with technical data
concerning research, development, and design of air-sea
rescue equipment; the other involves methods, techniques,
and procedures involving the adequacy for facilities for
Air Sea Rescue.

In anticipation of the subcommittee's decision, the AAF had
established an Emergency Rescue Branch in the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements Division
on 25 August 1943. The branch, whose authority had formerly been
exercised by the Director of Flight Control, planned and supervised
the AAF emergency rescue program, determined the tactics and
techniques of emergency rescue, established training standards, and
allocated rescue units to the various theaters. Once the units were
assigned, the Emergency Rescue Branch had no control over them.(5)

Meanwhile by the summer of 1943 AAF planning for air-sea rescue on
a world-wide basis had reached the point where definite
recommendations could be made. The world-wide rescue plan sent to
Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for his
approval on 6 July 1943 recommended that two squadrons be activated
immediately, that in order to save time the personnel requirements be
met from the men that had been made available for the dive-bomber
program, that the program be irritated and monitored by the newly
established Flight Control Command, and that command of air-sea rescue
units and operations in theaters be under the theater commanders. On
Air Transport Command routes ATC wing commanders would be in
Control.(6)

By 28 August the planning for air-sea rescue had broadened so as
To envisage 7 squadrons, each equipped with 12 PBY's and 4 liaison-
Type planes.(7) Equipment and personnel shortages and the lack of
Training facilities made these objectives difficult to attain. The
1st Emergency Rescue Squadron was not activated until December 1943,
despite a request from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower for speedy action in
sending rescue squadrons to his theater.(8)

In August 1944 centralized planning for emergency rescue in the
Zone of Interior (ZI) was the subject of a high-level AAF conference
attended by representatives of the Training Command, the Air
Transport Command, the numbered air forces in the United States, and
I Troop Carrier Command; by training and flight control officers of
various sections in AAF Headquarters: AC/AS, Management Control; the
Emergency Rescue branch; and the office of the Air Communications
Officer.(9) The policy discussed was that proposed by Maj. Gen.
Laurence S. Kuter, AC/AS Plans, in a memorandum dated 5 August 1944.
This proposal envisaged standardization of distress procedure, the
designation of one responsible agency within each area of, operation,
with that position delegated to each of the numbered air forces
within the United States, the formation of composite squadrons to
answer all rescue needs, inclusion of the Air Transport Command as a
responsible agency for emergency rescue when the theater programs
proved insufficient, close coordination of rescue activities
accomplished through joint control centers, and continuation of the
joint Air-Sea Rescue Agency to insure cooperation on the highest
levels. The memorandum concluded with a reiteration of the interest
of the AAF in air-sea rescue. Emergency rescue was "as necessary a
part of the Air Force as any other supporting combat units". (10)

All present agreed with most of the proposals in principle, but
representatives of the First, Second, and Third Air Forces raised a
number of specific objections. First Air Force representatives
objected to inclusion of any region west of the Appalachians in their
area of responsibility on the grounds that their training interests did not
extend in that direction. On the other hand, they felt acute interest in
the Savannah-Charleston region, which was under the control of Third Air Force.
They also expressed fear that duplication of existing Navy and Coast Guard
organization would result from adaptation of any extensive AAF rescue
system.(11)

Third Air Force objected to its area of responsibility with the
plea that it was too large, pointing out that flying conditions in the
south-eastern states (the Third Air Force area) led other air forces
to schedule many training flights into that region. Thus Third Air
Force would bear more than it's proportionate share of the burden of
rescue responsibility. They offered an alternative plan-that all Zone
of Interior commands share the responsibility for establishing an
emergency rescue system. The component parts of this system would be
responsible to one emergency rescue command to be located at one of
the airway traffic control centers.(12)

Fourth Air Force had no objection to the proposals, but Second Air
Force raised the question whether base commands could not continue to
do the job and do it better.(13) Despite all of these objections, the
continental air forces were directed to submit their individual rescue
plans by 1 September 1944, but no action resulted until the following
spring, when the original plan was modified in the light of postwar
planning. (see chapter VIII.)

Operations. Although high-level planning for air-sea rescue did
not begin until late 1942, some continental air force commands began
rescue activities earlier. Because of its large number of training
and administrative missions involving over-water flight, Third Air
Force was particularly concerned with problem of sea rescue. As early
as 1941 a program emphasizing rescue by boat was launched. Base
operations officers were given additional duties as air0sea rescue
officers, and made responsible for all rescue operations. Civilians
who could handle small boats and launches were hired to supplement the
available military personnel, and the mixed crews often used civilian
pleasure boats, poorly equipped for the job. These conditions
produced less than satisfactory results; they were partially corrected
in the fall of 1942 by the commissioning of eligible citizens as
warrant officers and discharging of all others.(14)

Each Third Air Force base operated its own service, and little
coordination between bases or with naval and Coast Guard facilities
was effected. The inefficiency resulted from this lack of
centralization and coordination finally inspired Third Air Force to
develop a plan for integrating all of its rescue services. This
program, which was put into effect on 15 July 1944, divided Third Air
Force bases into four geographic groups, each with a control center
which was responsible for all rescue within its assigned area. The
control centers were to establish and organize air-sea rescue
facilities within their designated areas in conformity with the Third
Air Force air-sea rescue plan, and were made responsible for obtaining
the equipment which might be necessary for their operations. The
control officer in each center was to coordinate the activities of
crash boats and search planes during an air-sea search and pickup
mission, and was required to maintain direct contact with the Navy,
Coast Guard, and any other domestic air force and command having
rescue facilities in the Third Air Force flying area.(15)

While this plan was being formulated, a greater degree of
Cooperation with the Navy and Coast Guard was in the making,
aided by a series of conferences between Third Air Force, Navy,
and Coast Guard representatives in the Third Air Force region of
responsibility.(16)

In the fall of 1944 a further revision of Third Air Force
Rescue organization was made, and additional equipment assigned
for rescue purposes. The most important change was the
appointment of full-time emergency rescue officers to discharge
the task previously assigned as an additional duty to the base
operations officer. Additional equipment consisting of 40
liaison-type aircraft was secured. These planes were to be used
exclusively for rescue purposes, and were plainly designated as
such.(17)

The efficiency of the revised air-sea rescue organization of
Third Air Force was demonstrated by statistics complied for
November-December 1944. Twenty-one rescue missions, both land and
sea, occurred in those months. In each case the plane and
personnel were located and survivors or bodies recovered. There
were 8 water incidents involving 31 men - 14 of whom were
rescued.(18)

In February 1945 an AAF regulation which included a uniform
plan for air-sea rescue in the ZI was published.(19) The
regulation defined and assigned areas of responsibility for
emergency rescue, prescribed the establishment of emergency rescue
control centers by each continental air force, and delegated
authority for emergency rescue services along foreign routes of air
travel to the Air Transport Command. In accordance with the new
plan, Third Air Force established seven control centers, with area
control centers at MacDill Field, Tampa, Florida. Each center was
relatively autonomous within its own geographic areas, but matters
of broad policy or incidents involving more than one control center
area were the province of area headquarters at MacDill Field. In
addition, a Search and Rescue Branch was established within the
Division of Operations and Training, Headquarters, Third Air Force
to exercise over-all supervision. Staffing these centers proved a
problem, but by 1 April all except one were adequately manned.(20)

Although Third Air Force had accepted its share of the
responsibility for continental emergency rescue and had altered its
organization to conform with the new regulation, its arrangements
were not entirely satisfactory to Headquarters, AAF. The Third Air
Force plan did not provide for units made up exclusively of rescue
personnel, and was therefore deemed unsuited for the rescue needs
of the area. The air force was so informed in the spring of 1945,
but no remedial action was taken until 22 August, when the 303d AAF
Base Unit for Search and Rescue was activated.(21)

With the creation of this specialized search and rescue unit,
Third Air Force brought its rescue organization into line with
those already formed in the Second and Fourth Air Force and the
Alaskan Division of the Air Transport Command. Earlier, in a
conference held at Washington in *May 1945, representatives of
Third Air Force, Second Air Force, Air Transport Command, Antilles
Air Command, and Caribbean Defense Command had argued the question
of rescue responsibility in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean,
and agreed on definite areas of responsibility.(22)

Until the late summer of 1945 Third Air Force equipment for
air-sea rescue was largely restricted to L-5's (small liaison
aircraft), operational aircraft not assigned to rescue facilities,
rescue boats, and some naval and Coast Guard equipment. Although
two B-17 aircraft with droppable lifeboats had been obtained from
the Second Air Force in June, no crews with the requisite training
were available by September. Nor had requests for helicopters to
aid in air-sea rescue been fulfilled by that time.(23)

Despite these difficulties in obtaining manpower and equipment,
an impressive total of 287 persons were saved by Third Air Force
rescue units in 129 searches in the 5-month period ending 2
September 1945. This total included both land and sea rescue. The
importance of radio homing aids was emphasized by the fact that
missing aircraft in 93 incidents were located through preliminary
radio search from direction-finder stations. A waste of time,
manpower and equipment was revealed, however, in the 1,047 searches
induced by false information. Disregard of flight directives and
misuse of emergency equipment were directly responsible for the
majority of these false alerts.(24)

Although in Third Air Force the need for air-sea rescue had
been foreseen at an early date (1941), the organization for its
successful prosecution was not achieved until the last year of the
war. It was late in 1944 before rescue became sufficiently
important to those responsible for training activities to warrant
the appointment of full-time rescue officers, and the organization
suffered from lack of coordination until centralization was forced
by higher authority. Full-time rescue equipment, with the
exception of boats, was scarce until autumn 1944. From Charleston,
South Carolina, along the coast to Corpus Christi, Texas, Coast
Guard and AAF agencies could provide, in 1943 approximately 60
rescue boats, but only 5 aircraft, amphibians and seaplanes, used
exclusively for rescue purposes. Off shore, in the Bahama Islands
area, there were 1 PBY (Navy patrol bomber SD/TS-133) and 2 rescue boats with
range up to 500 miles which could be added to this total.(25)

AAF air-sea rescue along the pacific coast was the
responsibility of Fourth Air Force, but a working agreement between
Western Sea Frontier (a Navy Command) and Fourth Air Force gave the
former operational control over sea rescue, and assigned Fourth Air
Force a similar position in regard to land rescue.(26) The Fourth
Air Force search and rescue plan formulated in 1944 envisaged an
air force controller and three base organizations: the 410th, 411th,
and 412th AAF Base Units. These units were responsible for control
and coordination of search and rescue functions within their
respective areas. Initiation of local action was the duty of base
emergency officers. The memorandum directed cooperation and
coordination with the Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Second Air
Force, Army Airways Communication System, ATC, and Army Flight
Control. No fourth Air Force aircraft were specifically earmarked
for search and rescue, but eight detachments were designated for
this purpose: two in Puget Sound, three on the California coast,
one on San Francisco Bay, one on the Columbia River, and one at
Moses Lake, Washington.(27)

In the first 5 months of its existence (September 1944-January
1945) the Fourth Air Force rescue organizations received 259
alerts, of which 152 were false, and assisted in the rescue of 179
survivors (54 of these, almost one-third, were rescued from a
burning tanker in January 1945). Fourth Air Force aircraft and
base crash equipment were involved 31 times. Radio facilities of
the Fourth Air Force were used 167 times in search and rescue
incidents, and rescue boats 27 times. Emergency Identification
Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment proved especially valuable as an aid
in the location of missing planes. In January alone 9 crashes were
found by this means, and IFF gave the first indication of an
emergency in11 cases out of the total of 87 for the month.(28)

In 1944 Navy agencies on the Pacific coast were employing PBM's
(patrol bombers) and JRF's (amphibious aircraft) for air-sea
rescue. The Hawaii-mainland route had been rendered safer when
three plane-guard vessel's were stationed along the path of air
travel. It was hoped that the number of these ships could eventually
be increased to 23.(29) In April 1945 a primary air-sea rescue
intercommunication frequency, 3,000 kilocycles, was adopted and by May
of that same year the Navy was using airborne lifeboats based at San
Diego and San Francisco.(30)

Air-sea rescue on the Atlantic coast was largely the function of
Navy and Coast Guard facilities, although First Air Force units at
Five locations cooperated in search and rescue activities. The
presence of Navy equipment in large quantities (including three PBY's,
one PBM, one JRF, one helicopter, one blimp, seven 104-foot and ten
63-foot rescue boats) and of 41 Coast Guard lifeboat stations made an
extensive AAF organization quite unnecessary.(31)

Responsibility for air-sea rescue was vested in the Commander,
Eastern Sea Frontier, who delegated the authority for action to task
unit commanders through the five task group commanders (Southern,
Chesapeake, Delaware, New York, and Northern). The task units were
teams of rescue planes and boats kept continually on the alert. When
notified of an emergency, the task unit commander dispatched rescue
equipment to the scene and notified the group commander. The latter
dispatched additional aid if necessary, forwarded the information to
the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, and could request further help
from that source.(32)

Headquarters, Eastern Sea Frontier and each group headquarters
maintained a control center, which included an operations control
room where a 24-hour watch was held. All ship and plane movements in
each area were plotted on a steel-backed chart. Magnetic "blips" were
used to indicate ship and plane positions. When a craft was in
trouble, its position was plotted and the air-sea rescue unit nearest
the point of emergency was instructed to dispatch rescue planes and
vessels. Since the position of all air-sea craft within the area was
constantly checked, it was also possible to call on naval and merchant
vessels, patrol planes, and fishing craft, any craft that could be
reached by radio was considered a potential rescue agent.(33)

An elaborate plan for communications procedure was established by
Headquarters, Eastern Sea Frontier. Communication services available
included.(34)

1) The Navy and Coast Guard networks.

2) The Coast Guard safety and distress radio organization.

3) Medium frequency (MF), high frequency (HM), very high
frequency (VHM), and direction-finding frequency (D/F).

4) Radar stations.

5) Plotting centers, surface and air.

6) Weather services.

7) Army and Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) services as
made available by agreement.

8) Aids to navigation (radio ranges, homing beacons, IFF, CAA
interphone, flight control centers, Instrument approach
systems, searchlights, etc.)

Direct lines, known as Commands circuits, were also maintained
between Eastern Sea Frontier headquarters and each group headquarters
and between group headquarters, Task Unit headquarters, Air stations
within the group and any other organization with air-sea rescue
facilities.(35)

Available communication frequencies included:(36)

1) Regularly assigned frequencies for aircraft to base
and surface vessel to shore.

2) 385 kilocycles--Secondary bombing frequency.

3) 414 kcs--Preferred homing frequency.

4) 500 kcs-International distress frequency,
continuously guarded.

5) 2,670 kcs-Coast Guard primary frequency for vessels
in distress.

6) 2,716 kcs--Navy frequency for bases and boats.

7) 3,000 kcs--Voice only, used by air and surface craft
for intercommunication regardless of service
affiliation.

8) 3,105 kcs--Guarded by most towers, reserved for
aircraft.

9) 4,200 kcs--Army ground stations.

10) 4,495 kcs--General air-ground frequency for Navy,
Army, and CAA.

11) 4,595 kcs--Army air-ground frequency.

12) 6,210 kcs---International aircraft frequency.

13) 8,200 kcs--Army primary airfields.

14) 8,280 kcs--U.S. emergency and safety frequency,
continuously guarded.

15) 116.10 megacycles--World -wide airport VHF.

16) 126.18 mcs-Army common VHF.

17) 140.58 mcs--Command, air-sea rescue and emergency
frequency; prescribed by Commander, Aircraft Atlantic
on 1 February 1945.

18) 142.74 mcs--Airport traffic control frequency;
prescribed by Chief of Naval Operations on 1 February
1945.

Detailed communications instructions for personnel in distress
were also issued by Eastern Sea Frontier. In brief, distress
procedure consisted of:(37)

1) Turning on the IFF emergency switch to transmit an automatic
distress signal.

2) Sending an SOS, or "Mayday," by signal or by voice.

3) Following each transmission with a 20-second dash so that
the position could be plotted from direction-finding
bearings.

4) Giving information on position, course, speed, altitude,
nature of trouble, future intentions, and identification.

5) Tying down the transmitter key if a ditching or bail-out was
inevitable, so that a continuing signal would be sent on
which an accurate fix could be obtained.

Training. As air-sea rescue organizations grew in the United
States, and in overseas areas as well, plans were made for training
personnel to carry out the rescue mission. In March 1943, 40 AAF
pilots were sent from the advanced flying school at Stockton,
California to the Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida for
transition train in PBY aircraft. The necessary orders were issued
by headquarters, AAF on 11 March 1943.(38) This group of 40 pilots
formed the nucleus for three rescue detachments which served in the
Mediterranean and the Southwest Pacific. The first detachment,
originally composed of three crews, saw action in the summer and
autumn of 1943 in the Mediterranean as a part of the XII Fighter
Command Rescue Service; the second, also three crews, reached the
Southwest Pacific in the late summer of 1943 and served with the
Fifth Air Force Rescue Service; the third organization, the 1st
Emergency Rescue Squadron, was sent to the Mediterranean in 1944.(39)

Activation o£ the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron took place at
Boca Raton, Florida on 1 December 1943, in compliance with General
Arnold's order that such a unit be trained and sent to the
Mediterranean theater.(40) Training was conducted at that base until
18 February 1944, when the squadron began its overseas move. The
training program, devised by Maj. Ernest S. Hensley and his staff,
emphasized cross-country and night flying, water landings,
instrument flying, and gunnery practice. Two British air-sea
rescue instructors who were made available gave advice and lectures.
Three operational missions, none o£ them successful, were flown for
aircraft missing in the Caribbean. Training was hampered by the
shortage of training aircraft; of the 11 PBY's available, 4 were
unserviceable. The crew personnel were exceptionally capable,
however; the navigators of the original seven crews, for example,
were all former navigation instructors.(41)

The overseas success attained by these early crown spurred efforts
to establish a rescue school with a fixed location, experienced
teachers, and a planned curriculum. The opening of the AAF Air-Sea
Rescue and Emergency Rescue School at Keesler Field, Mississippi, in
the spring of 1944 fulfilled these objectives.(42) The school was
under the Eastern Flying Training Command until July 1944, when
control was transferred to the Western Technical Training Command.
Authority for its administration and operation was delegated to
Keesler Field. Personnel for the first group of instructors were
obtained from surplus personnel of the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron
and from crews which had returned from overseas.(43)

Ground air training was carried on concurrently through a five or
six-week period. All crew members received instruction in altitude
adjustment, camouflage, use of emergency equipment, emergency landing
procedures, ground gunnery, collection of intelligence, physical
training and swimming, aircraft and naval recognition, seamanship,
rescue techniques, and sanitation. Individuals were trained in the
skills required for their particular jobs. Pilots, for instance,
received 30 hours of instruction in the operation of their particular
aircraft, the OA-10; 17 hours in the operation of communications
equipment; 10 hours of navigation; 5 hours of weather problems; 4
hours of weights and balances; and 18 hours of instrument study. The
co-pilot, navigator, engineer, radio operator and radar observer
received similar intensive training for their particular jobs.
During the course the crew flew over 100 hours on 20 practice
Missions averaging 5 hours in length. These exercises were designed
to perfect crew performance in rescue missions and search procedures
both independently and in coordination with rescue boats.(44

Lack of aircraft, maintenance problems, and uncertainty of
requirements slowed down the training program. Less than half the
airplanes needed for processing the desired number of crews were
available.(45) This deficiency was further complicated by the
unsatisfactory performance of the OA-10's used for flying training;
water landings were almost impossible without to the aircraft. It
was finally discovered that Canadian Vickers Limited, which
manufactured the planes, had altered the original specifications by
placing fever stringers in the rear step. This could be corrected,
but the nose section still remained weak.(46) In a desperate attempt
to secure seaworthy aircraft, the use of Navy PBY's was suggested,
but no action was taken, and water landings were discontinued late in
1944.(47) Lack of a suitable landing area prevented the use of
seaplanes for this phase of training, and when approval was finally
obtained for construction of a landing stage in 1945, postwar
cutbacks caused the abandonment of the project.(48)

Meantime the idea of using B-17 airplanes equipped with rigid
droppable lifeboats was beginning to be accepted with a consequent
lessening of emphasis on both boat training and instruction of crews
using amphibious aircraft. The use of B-17's with lifeboats was
discussed during the summer of 1944, and training plans were made in
September of that year. It was hoped that the first class of 12
crews would graduate on 15 October 1944. Although authorities at
Keesler Field felt that there were not sufficient facilities available
for such training, tests with the A-1 type airborne lifeboat were
conducted there in September 1944.(49)

When it became evident, despite local objections, that the new
rescue program would be taught at Keesler Field, requests were made for
adequate lifeboats and parachute assemblies. By 13 December 1944, 13
airborne lifeboats were available, but lack of carbon dioxide
chambers, necessary to the buoyancy of the lifeboats, caused further
delay in completing the training of the first crews. Finally, in the
last week of February 1945, the first group of B-17 crews, eight in
number, completed their preparation for combat. Training of OA-10
crews still continued, and a group of 12 finished simultaneously with
the graduation of the first B-17 crews, The two groups constituted
the newly formed 6th Emergency Rescue Squadron.(50)

While air training was carried on at Keesler Field, boat rescue
crews were receiving instruction at nearby Gulfport. Rescue boat
crew training had been inaugurated at New Orleans by the 1007th
Quartermaster Rescue Boat Overseas Training Unit under the Air
Quartermaster. In the fall of 1943 responsibility for this training
was shifted to the AAF and became part of the mission of the Training
Command. The next spring the school was moved to Gulfport to become
a part of the Emergency Rescue School.(51)

During the training period each prospective rescue boat crew
member was instructed in a specific set of duties. Separate classes
were held for masters, mates, chief engineers, oilers, boatswains,
radio operators, surgical technicians, cooks, and able seamen. All
crew members received 144 hours of instruction in the basic courses
of seamanship, aircraft and ship recognition, rescue procedures,
swimming, sanitation and decontamination, gunnery, and small boat
handling. After 25 August 1944 training in smaller boats was
discontinued because they could not be used for open sea rescue, and
only type II (85-foot boats) and type III (63-foot boats) crews were
trained. The personnel were then divided into crews-7 on the smaller
boats, 13 on the larger and given operational training. Search
operations, rescue procedures, and rendezvous missions, including
joint operations with aircraft, were included in this phase. The
training ended with a three or four day sea voyage.(52)

Boat crew training did not always run smoothly as could be
desired; maintenance problems in particular were present here as at
Keesler Field. There were 60 boats available by the first of
September 1944, but approximately one-third were out of commission.
The lack of a fueling ship made it impossible for the trainees to
practice fueling at sea. Criticism of the training program itself
was received from graduates, who felt that not all necessary skills
were taught-for example, the transfer of personnel from a wrecked
vessel to the shore-and that some of the training was unrealistic
because it presupposed the use of specialized equipment often
unavailable in combat areas. To remedy these and other faults, the
school officials tried to obtain confidential intelligence reports of
rescue activity overseas, but they were not successful.(53)

As a result of the interest in training crews for use with the B-
17 equipped with a droppable lifeboat, boat-crew training was
discontinued on 27 October 1944. During its short life the marine
section of the Emergency Rescue School had trained a total of 95
crews.(54)

The increasing importance of air-sea rescue was reflected in its
elevation to a position of first priority in Keesler Field activities
on 4 January 1945.(55) Training progressed more smoothly thereafter,
but the victories in Europe and Japan seemed to remove the need for
continuance of the school. During the fall of 1945 training
activities came to a standstill, and the Emergency Rescue School was
finely disbanded on 22 April 1946.(56)

To mid-February 1945 the Emergency Rescue School had sent out
four emergency rescue squadrons for overseas duty. In addition, 60
replacement OA-10 crews had been trained at Keesler Field, as well as
other crews for the Air Transport Command.(57)

The history of the school is a replica in miniature of the record
of air-sea rescue in all areas of activity. It began on a
provisional basis as a minor part of the activity of a large training
center, and grew without much forethought or planning. The personnel
were uncertain as to what was expected of them, and were equipped
with materials poorly suited to the task. By the time the importance
of the school's work was recognized the immediate need for the
product was dwindling.

Chapter III

THE EUROPEAN THEATER

British Air-Sea Rescue

When the first AAF units arrived in England in 1942, the British
had a complete air-sea rescue organization which had saved over one-
third of the airmen who ditched or bailed out over water in the last
quarter of 1941. The same percentage of rescues was maintained
through 1942.(1) The British organization had been developed since
the outbreak of the war, although some use of rescue equipment dated
back to the First World War. In that earlier conflict aircrews were
issued lifebelts or other floatation equipment, but rescue was
dependent on passing ships. In the 1920's British naval shipborne
aircraft were equipped with some form of floatation gear, but the
only RAF aircrews with equipment were the flying-boat crews, who were
provided with a triangular inflatable dinghy as early as 1925.(2)

Before 1935 there were marine rescue craft with limited
operational ability at bombing and air gunnery ranges, but in that
year British Air Staff approval was given to the building of an
experimental high-speed launch. This boat was tested in 1936 proved
successful, and 15 were ordered for use by the Coastal Command's
general reconnaissance squadrons and at such points as Malta, Aden,
Basra, Ceylon, Penang, and Hong Kong. From 1936 on floatation
equipment for land planes and their crews was considered by the Air
Staff, and in 1938 approval was obtained for storing some type of
pneumatic dinghy in land planes that might be called for overwater
flights.(3)

On specific occasions special arrangements were made to afford
air-sea rescue protection. Thus in August 1938 and July-August 1939,
when extensive home defense exercises were being held, special safety
boats were supplied by the RAF and attendant destroyers by the Royal
Navy (RN). Coastguardsmen were also instructed to keep special watch
for aircraft distress signals during these maneuvers.(4)

Increasing concerns over the possibility of a war which would
entail long-distance flights over water led to the decision early in
1939 to place the whole high-speed launch organization in home waters
under the control of Coastal Command. In addition 13 more high-speed
launches were ordered. Just prior to the beginning of the war in
July 1939 the Air Ministry issued amended instructions outlining the
rescue responsibility of Costal reconnaissance group commanders.

Included in their mission was the coordination of aircraft and marine
craft engaged in rescue, and the responsibility for calling upon
high-speed launches and requesting naval assistance when necessary.(5)

In the early months of the war these peacetime rescue
arrangements were continued. Aircraft down at sea were searched for
by operational air-craft from their own units, and impromptu
arrangements were made direct surface craft to the rescue point if
the downed airplane was located. Communication delays-the results of
wartime security measures and congestion of the public telephone
system-soon became a problem, however. A revised chain of
communication system was therefore set up in March 1940. When a
distressed aircraft broadcast an SOS or Mayday, the RAF station which
received the signal transmitted a priority message to the Movements
Liaison Section of Fighter Command. The information was then passed
on to naval authorities, the appropriate reconnaissance group of
Coastal Command, and to the group distress area headquarters for
action by air and marine craft.(6)

During the summer and autumn of 1940 the rescue of fighter pilots
from the English Channel was a particularly difficult problem.
"During the last 21 days of July over 220 aircrew were killed or
missing, the majority over the sea."(7) In an attempted solution the
RAF Fighter Command borrowed Lysander planes from the Army Co-
operation Command and placed them under the operational control of
Fighter Command. These planes were given a fighter escort and sent
out after each air battle. Their chief rescue equipment was a rubber
dinghy carried in the bomb rack. Although with close cooperation
with the Royal Navy some success was achieved, it was felt that too
many airmen were still being lost.(8)

After British air operations shifted to the interior of Europe,
losses soared. Especially high losses in October 1940 prompted the
Chief of Air Staff to propose a drastic reorganization and expansion
of the sea rescue organization. Accordingly the Air/Sea Rescue
Services was formed at a meeting held at the Air Ministry on 14
January 1941 under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Air Staff
and composed of representatives of the Royal Navy and of RAF
operational commands. It was agreed that sea rescue of RAF personnel
had become of such importance that it required the full-time
attention of an air commodore (a rank equivalent to that of an
American brigadier general) as director and a naval officer as deputy
director. However, despite the important function of the new
directorate, no aircraft or aircrews could be spared specifically for
rescue purposes, and the operation of the rescue service was to
remain the responsibility of the operational commands.(9)

After the initial meeting, a period of several months passed in
which the functions of the Directorate of Air/Sea Rescue were
clarified and the organization completed. It was decided that the
directorate was to be responsible directly to the Deputy Chief of Air
Staff, but the director and his staff were to be attached to Coastal
Command for close coordination with sea and air authorities concerned
with search activities. In addition, officers of the directorate
were to be attached to the area combined headquarters of Groups No.
15, 16, 18, and 19, whose functions were to control sea rescue
activities and coordinate air and sea search. The British Isles were
divided into four geographic areas coinciding with the regions of
responsibility of the Coastal Command groups. Close-in search, to a
distance of 20 miles from shore, became the responsibilities of the
Directorate of Air/Sea Rescue were to include:(10)

1) The coordination of all sea rescue operations for aircraft
and aircrews.

2) The provision of ancillary equipment to be dropped by
aircraft at the scene of distress to provide aircrews with a
chance of survival until the arrival of the rescue craft.

3) The provision of adequate marine craft, moored buoys, and
similar aids to rescue.

Through the Directorate of Operational Requirements, the
Directorate of Air/Sea Rescue was also responsible for the
"development, improvement, and introduction of all life-saving
equipment and safety devices for aircraft which might land at
sea."(11)

In accord with its functions, the directorate interested itself
in drop-survival equipment. In this category the Lindholme Dinghy
Dropping Gear, the Thornaby Bag, the Bircham Barrel, and the Lysander
Rescue Outfit were of particular importance. All of these contained
food, water, distress signals, and first-aid kits. In addition, the
Lindholme Outfit held a dinghy in one of its five parts. Visual and
radio aids were other matters of constant concern. The difficulty of
spotting an object as small as a man in a lifevest, or even a dinghy
bearing several passengers, led to continuing search for a better
signaling equipment, more distinctive coloration, and more efficient
communications apparatus. Pyrotechnic signals, signal torches, and
whistles were among the devices perfected for attracting the
attention of would-be rescuers. It was discovered that yellow was
the color which contrasted to the greatest extent with the sea, and
skull caps, life vests, and other items of rescue equipment were
painted a glaring yellow. Fluorescine bags containing green sea dye
became common articles of identification equipment. Balloons and
kites were included in the dinghy equipment, and "K"-type dinghies
were equipped with a telescopic mast and flag. The most important
aid to location was the dinghy wireless set, but not until September
1941 were the first of these ready for trail. Meanwhile many multi-
seater aircraft attempted to meet their needs by carrying a cage of
homing pigeons to be released with a position report if no radio SOS
was possible before a ditching.(12)

The directorate started to function with only 12 Lysanders
available on temporary loan. Furthermore, the Deputy Chief of Air
Staff had stated at the time of formation that no aircraft could be
made available for permanent assignment. However, the directorate
continually emphasized the value of air-sea rescue in building morale
and conserving manpower and finally convinced the Air Staff of the
need for additional aircraft. Heavy losses of personnel in the sea,
an average of 200 per month during 1941, was probably the deciding
factor. Accordingly, in May 1941 the Lysanders were transferred to
the complete control of Fighter Command and six more were added to
the total. In September this number was further increased to a total
of 36 aircraft divided into 4 squadrons. The recommendations
concerning the need for amphibious aircraft were also finally
accorded recognition, and in July 1941 three Walruses were authorized
for use as rescue aircraft. The following month six more were
obtained. These additional aircraft were assigned to the four
squadrons which became composite units designated as Air/Sea Rescue
Squadrons Nos. 275, 276, 277, and 278.(13)

Until late in 1941 operations of the Air/Sea Rescue Services were
restricted to an area within 20 miles of the English coast. Search
beyond this point, known as deep search, was handled by those
aircraft which could be spared from operational missions. The loss
of time involved and the uncertainty of having enough search aircraft
reduced the efficiency of deep search below that which prevailed
within the Air/Sea Rescue Services sphere of operational
responsibility. In September 1941 the allocation of enough long-
range aircraft to form two squadrons was approved by an Air Staff
conference, but previous commitments for the delivery of this type of
plane made the immediate implementation of this decision impossible.
By October, however, it was decided that enough Hudsons were
available for the formation of one deep search squadron, and a second
was authorized in November. Continued shortages of aircraft,
however, prevented the quick entry of these new squadrons (Nos. 279
and 280) into rescue work. The first did not become fully operational
until March 1942, and No. 280 flew no missions until June of the same
year.(14)

One logical way to rescue aircrews in the sea far from their home
base was to provide them with the means of self-rescue. The most
practicable equipment for this purpose seemed to be self-propelling
marine craft that would be carried to the scene by a rescue plane and
dropped to the survivors. As early as 1940 a glider-type boat had
been visualized, but its construction involved technical problems too
difficult to solve. In the same year plans for a 32-foot motor
dinghy were also abandoned, although a great deal of experimentation
and discussion had gone into them. Finally, in January 1942
preparations were begun for the production of a 20-foot wooden boat
fitted with sails, oars, and a motor to be carried under the fuselage
of a Hudson aircraft and dropped by parachute. The possibility of
capsizing was eliminated by the installation of buoyancy chambers,
inflated by carbon-dioxide bottles whose caps were "triggered" by the
opening parachutes. To aid the distressed crew in finding and
reaching the boat, a rocket which would fire on contact with the sea
was placed on either side. Each rocket carried 200 feet of buoyant
line which the survivors could seize and thus get aboard. The
lifeboat was fitted with a rocket-fired sea anchor to keep it from
floating away from the survivors. Production of 24 of these boats
was authorized in November 1942.(15)

Communication between rescue aircraft and rescue boats was made
easier by the authorization of the two Hudson deep search squadrons.
Adequate communication between aircraft and boat was impossible when
operational aircraft with varying radio frequencies were used. The
decision was therefore reached in September 1941 to equip all rescue
craft, air and sea, with VHF radio sets and high frequency radio
telephone (HF/RT). Barring static, communication was direct and
instantaneous.(16)

After studying requirements for rescue boats, the Directorate of
Air/Sea Rescue in 1941 concluded that there were two major
requisites: boats capable of low-speed prolonged cruising, but with
an available speed of 25 knots; and high-speed boats capable of rough
sea operation. It was considered necessary that these boats,
designed for open-sea operation, be 60 feet or more in length,
although 40-foot seaplane tenders could be used close to shore. The
difficulty of combining high speed and sea-worthiness finally led to
the conclusion that the first should be sacrificed in order to attain
the second. Efforts to obtain boats for rescue service met with the
same difficulties of equipment shortages as those concerning
aircraft, but by 1942 more than 150 sea rescue boats-high-speed
launches, seaplane tenders and RAF pinnaces-were available for rescue
operations.(17)

Crew survival, dependent on knowledge and practice of proper
ditching and escape procedure, was a major concern of Air/Sea Rescue
Service. A syllabus was accordingly prepared, pamphlets issued,
lectures given, and practice encouraged.(18)

The RAF, and later the AAF, benefited from observation of German
equipment. The German rescue service perfected a one-man dinghy
before it was a feature of British fighter planes. They were the
first to use fluorescine as a sea coloring to aid searchers in
finding downed airmen, and the first to discover that yellow was the
best color for sea-rescue equipment. In the fall of 1940 German sea
rescue floats began to appear in the English Channel. These had
bunks for four men, blankets, food, water and distress signals. The
RAF copied the example.(19)

Through the autumn of 1941 and the year of 1942 British air-sea
rescue was able to save more than a third of those who ditched or
bailed out over water. In the fourth quarter of 1941, 160 out of 473
aircrew members, or 33.8 percent, were saved; in the same period in
1942, there were 205 out of 568, or 36 percent.(20)

When the United States air units arrived in England in 1942, the
British had completed their air-sea rescue organization. There were
air-sea rescue liaison officers at each area combined headquarters,
Coastal Command headquarters, and Fighter Command headquarters.
Fighter Command was responsible for the area within 40 miles of the
English coast, and provided planes for search in its zone and fighter
cover for search planes and rescue craft. Coastal Command covered
all other areas, detailed a flying-control officer in each area
combined headquarters to initiate air-sea rescue action, provided
planes for extended search, maintained liaison with the Royal Navy,
and coordinated all activities not under the direct jurisdiction of
Fighter Command. Any RAF operational group could be called on for
assistance. For instance, Bomber Command might provide long-range
planes, and naval surface craft often participated in search and
rescue.(21)

British air-sea rescue control techniques were also well
developed by August 1942, when the first AAF heavy bombing mission
was flown. Communication procedure was standardized and fixer
stations and central rooms were in operation. When a distress signal
was received at a fixer station, the position was plotted and the
information phoned to the control staff of the nearest area combined
headquarters, which in turn notified the controller of the group in
whose area the plane had fallen. The controller informed the nearest
Coastal Command station, and a reconnaissance plane was immediately
dispatched (Fighter planes known as "spotters" were often used for
this purpose). In addition, the area combined headquarters notified
the nearest naval station at which rescue boats were based. These
put to sea and were directed to the survivors by the reconnaissance
plane if and when the survivors were found. Besides leading rescue
boats to the downed crews, and circled them constantly to insure that
their position would not be lost. If rescue craft were not able to
reach the survivors immediately, relays of planes might relieve each
other, and, if the delay was prolonged, drop further supplies.(22)

For nearly a year AAF planes used the facilities of the British
Air/Sea Rescue Services. During that time individual groups used
some of their own equipment, but the emphasis within the AAF was on
escape and survival rather than rescue. Some groups devised ditching
procedures and modified equipment, but in general they did not know
enough about the job to do it well.(23)

AAF Air-Sea Rescue

Early lack of action. The RAF Air/Sea Rescue Services suggested
in November 1942 that one senior officer in each command of the
American Eighth Air Force be appointed a full time air-sea rescue
officer. His duties would include liaison with the RAF, and RN and
American combat units; responsibility for equipment; and the
dissoniastion of air-sea rescue information. In addition, it was
recommended that each AAF station have a part-time air-sea rescue
officer, and that a small central controlling agency be established
at Eighth Air Force Headquarters. To assist in their orientation,
the RAF offered to open their Air/Sea Rescue School to selected
Eighth Air Force officers.(24)

In January 1943 a conference was held to discuss the suggested
plan, but because of the shortage of AAF officer, it was not adopted.
Instead, air-sea rescue was assigned as an additional duty to the
flight-control officer of the Eighth Air Force. The RAF
representative predicted failure for this solution, and his forecast
proved to be accurate. Air-sea rescue was too large and complicated
a task to be assigned as part-time duty to an officer who was usually
not rated and who had no agency available to maintain liaison,
disseminate information, inspect equipment, set up procedures, and
carry on all other necessary functions. In view of the lives still
being lost, the office of the Eighth Air Force Surgeon recommended in
March 1943 that the RAF's proposals for American air-sea rescue be
adopted, that our air-sea rescue officers be sent to the RAF school,
and that appropriate training of combat crews begin at once.(25)

Establishment of an AAF air-sea rescue service. Not until June
1943, however, was a move made toward establishing an American air-
sea rescue service. In that month the first American air-sea rescue
fixer net, copying similar RAF installations, was laid out with a
triangulation table in the sector operations room of the RAF 11
Group. Whenever an aircraft gave a distress signal or requested
information on its location, three fixer stations read the bearing
from which they received the signal. The reading was passed on to
the triangulation room where a string was pulled across the map for
each bearing given. The intersection of the strings indicated the
position of the aircraft. The position thus determined was passed on
to the air-sea rescue control room where the fix was plotted and the
pilot informed of his position; if it were a distress call, rescue
facilities were dispatched to begin the search and, if possible, to
complete the rescue. When the 4th Air Defense Wing (later the 65th
Fighter Wing), arrived in England, it was trained by the RAF at
Saffron Walden, a small Essex town, for its future duty of carrying
on American sea rescue operations.(26)

By 14 June American air-sea rescue control was in partial
operation. On 15 June, at 0845, a fighter pilot of the 4th Fighter
Group was located by American rescue controllers and picked up within
an hour by a British Walrus. On 4 July training of AAF personnel in
sufficient numbers to operate an entire rescue-control system was
completed. The first AAF mission with air-sea rescue control
facilities serviced entirely by American personnel was flown on that
day.(27)

Inauguration of "spotter" service. American air-sea rescue
expended continually; by autumn of 1943 there were 11 fixer stations
in the U.S. network, and in late months of 1943 the "spotter"
technique for locating downed aircraft was initiated. This method,
first developed by the RAF, consisted of dispatching fighter planes
as soon as a ditching was reported. These could reach the scene
quickly, and if successful in locating the survivors, hover over them
while reporting their location to the slower rescue aircraft and
boats. Besides aiding in location of the survivors and raising
morale by their presence, the spotter planes carried dinghies and
flares which they could drop to the stricken aircrew. Spotter planes
were sometimes not available, however, because they were supplied by
operational units, and it was soon realized that a specialized
organization was needed for this purpose.

Other problems became apparent in the autumn of 1943.
Communication facilities were faulty, especially those used with
surface rescue craft. Requests for RAF and RN boats had to be made
through regular channels, and telephone lines were overloaded. The
installation of VHF radios in all American bombers early in 1944 made
possible the use of a common rescue frequency for all aircraft, but
only certain channels within the frequency were available and some of
those had to be used jointly by AAF and RAF. Occasional
jurisdictional disputes among RAF coastal agencies were another cause
of delay. An additional problem was that of obtaining sufficient
emergency equipment.(28)

A conference was held at the Air Ministry on 8 May 1944, at which
these problems were discussed, and representatives of the RAF were
able to reach amicable agreement on several fundamental points. An
independent AAF air-sea rescue spotter squadron equipped with 42 P-
47's was established, and direct radio contact from AAF units to RAF
and RN surface craft was arranged. The problem of emergency
equipment was partially solved by the RAF's promises to "do as much
as possible" to furnish such items as dinghies, floats, and flares.
Two squadrons of Warwicks equipped with airborne lifeboats were also
to be fitted with communications equipment, allowing control by AAF
air-sea rescue headquarters at Saffron Walden. A new use of surface
ships for rescue work was implicit in the decision to position RAF
and RN boats at certain rendezvous points and direct distressed
aircraft toward these areas.(29)

The spotter squadron (Detachment B, Flight Section, Headquarters,
65th Fighter Wing) began operations the next day. At first only 25
"war-weary" planes were available. The 20 officers on temporary duty
and 90-odd enlisted men on detached service found that their
organization had no hanger and very little equipment. Fortunately,
the American soldier's traditional energy and determination to
overcome obstacles prevailed-tools were borrowed, a hanger built, and
other necessary facilities obtained.(30)

The squadron's mission, as its personnel understood it, was a
fourfold one:(32) to intercept aircraft in distress while in the air
and lead them to land or to the nearest boat; to locate downed
aircraft; to maintain contact, act as the eyes of the controller, and
relay information; and to escort the heavier rescue aircraft.

The P-47 pilots early learned the difficulties of spotting an
object the size of a life raft, even a large one, in the sea. Slow
speed and low altitude were recognized as prime necessities for
successful search. However, since VHF communication follows a
straight line and does not bend with the earth, maintaining radio
contact was difficult at low altitudes. This difficulty was often
surmounted by hunting in pairs, with one plane near the water and one
at high to maintain contact. Search patterns were established, each
of which was adapted to a different set of circumstances-the number
of search planes available, the weather, and the accuracy of the
radio fix or other position determinant. The most satisfactory
pattern was the "square," but this required a number of planes, each
assigned to one particular search area, clear weather, a maximum of
navigational efficiency, and knowledge of the ditching position. If
only one or two planes were available and the point at which the
plane entered the sea was not definitely known, the search plane(s)
followed its probable path, flying back and forth in a series of
adjacent oblong figures. If the point of ditching was not known, and
a sufficient number of planes were available, the search was carried
on by several planes flying parallel to each other along the probable
path of the distressed plane. The importance of searching all of a
fixed area before going on to another was impressed on all
personnel.(33)

Two functions of spotter aircraft-search and protection of other
rescue craft-were illustrated in an incident of 29 June 1944. On
that date a man in a dinghy was reported 10 miles west of the Hook of
Holland. A British Warwick with an airborne lifeboat, accompanied by
two AAF P-47's, was dispatched in search of him. The Warwick was hit
by antiaircraft fire near the enemy coast, but the P-47's continued
on, spotted the survivor, radioed the location. Two Air/Sea Rescue
Service Hudsons with two more P-47's were then dispatched. A high-
speed launch reached the scene, and more P-47's arrived to give
additional cover. The dinghy occupant, an Australian fighter pilot,
was finally rescued after 7 hours of effort involving 15 aircraft.(34)

The introduction of rendezvous points was another aid to rescue
operations. Boats were positioned out in the sea at certain points
selected by air-sea rescue control. These positions were marked on
the control board, and planes in distress were whenever possible,
directed to a rendezvous point, a method which often considerably
shortened the length of time that crews were forced to spend in the
water. On one occasion a plane was successfully ditched so near the
rescue launch that the crew "walked from the bomber's wing into an
HSL (high-speed launch) without getting their feet wet."(35)

Control of air-sea rescue from England continued after the
invasion of France in June 1944 since heavy bombardment missions were
still being flown on the northern route crossing the Channel. The
most important changes resulting from invasion were that planes in
distress could be directed to land at continental fields, and the
decreasing frequency of enemy fighter action over the Channel.(36)

The 5th Emergency Rescue Squadron. Early in 1945 Detachment B was
redesignated the 5th Emergency Rescue Squadron. The new organization
was equipped with P-47's, OA-10's, and B-17's with airborne
lifeboats.(37) The OA-10's were immediately pressed into use. One of
them was directed to attempt a difficult rescue on the day of its
arrival, although it was flying an indoctrination flight along the
English coast.(38)

. . . a bomber ditched near Holland, and the controller knew the
Catalina / OA-10 / was the crew's only hope before dark. So away
lumbered the big flying boat to the east.

The crew spotted eight men in two dinghies, tossing in ten-foot
seas. A ninth man was struggling desperately to reach one of the
rafts. Unhesitatingly the young pilot of the OA-10 set her down.
They couldn't get to the ninth man in time, but they rescued the
other eight.

Overloaded, the ship crashed through the waves and into the air,
water pouring into the nose through a bashed-in part, knocking
the crew down like a stream from a fire hose. The water also
shorted out the radio. They had no map extending that far east,
but the navigator took them back with a homemade chart, and the
pilot made the first night landing he ever made in England,
successfully settling into Halesworth on the third attempt.

On 23 February 1945 another incident involving an OA-10
demonstrated the speed with which rescue operations could be
accomplished with this type of plane. Three men in a dinghy were
sighted in the late afternoon by a bomber returning from a daylight
raid. The distressed men were 18 miles from the English coast, and
the nearest rescue launch was 7 hours away. An OA-10 was assigned
the mission, landed beside the survivors just at dark, made the
pickup, and brought the rescued men back to Halesworth. "In no other
way could these men have been spared a dangerous night on the winter
sea."(39)

The first operational drop of an AAF airborne lifeboat in any
theater was made in the North Sea in the first week of April 1945.
Six men in a dinghy were sighted, and RAF planes on patrol in the
area tried three times to drop lifeboats to them. The boats were
either blown away by the 50-knot wind or demolished by the rough
seas. A 5th Emergency Rescue Squadron B-17 was thereupon called an
succeeded in dropping its lifeboat, enabling the rescue to be
satisfactorily completed.(40)

By 8 April 1945 the 5th Squadron was sufficiently oriented to
assume all rescue responsibility for all Eighth Air Force operations
and to lend a hand when called on by the RAF.(41) Typical rescue
procedure included the following steps:(42)

1. Preliminary arrangements for which air-sea rescue control
personnel were responsible.

a. Determination of bomber and fighter over water routes from
the field order, decisions on rescue boat positions,
spotter squadron assignments, and OA-10 patrol areas.

b. Informing rescue launch bases and aircraft rescue squadron
of their assignments. Launches required three hours
notice, aircraft one hour.

c. Clearance of all air-sea rescue flights with proper
headquarters, alert of all fixer stations, arrangements
for radio and airborne relays (aircraft stationed along
route to pass on messages).

d. Coordination of AAF with RAF mission if the latter was
scheduled.

2. When emergency occurred.

a. Pilot sent distress signal.

b. Direction-finding stations took bearings on distress
transmission and called the bearing in to the
triangulation room, where the position was determined.

c. The position, or fix, was plotted on a chart of the area;
the course to the nearest rescue launch or point of land
was determined and transmitted to the distressed pilot.

d. Simultaneously, rescue launches and aircraft were alerted.
There respective bases were also warned that additional
rescue craft might be needed.

e. Spotter planes were directed to the distressed aircraft
while the control center maintained contact with the
pilot, following his course constantly by radio fix and
dead reckoning.

3. When bail-out or ditching occurred.

a. Control center continued to maintain fix and directed
spotter planes to position.

b. Spotter planes (one high for control on fixing, one low to
keep dinghy in sight) obtained call sign and location of
nearest launch and called nearest boat to the scene.

c. Launch completed rescue, gave aircrew dry clothing,
rubdown, hot drink, and first aid, notified control center
of rescue, and transmitted crew's names, condition, and
time of arrival in harbor.

d. Spotter planes relayed above information and returned to
original assigned positions.

e. Control center informed rescued crew's base and arranged
for transportation when crew reached land.

Instead of rescue launches, OA-10's or B-17's might be used if
time or distance was a factor to be considered. The decision on
which of the two to call for the rescue was influenced by their
availability and wind and sea conditions. If the weather made an OA-
10 landing impossible, the choice fell on the B-17.

Training defects. The omission of instruction in ditching
procedure, use of emergency equipment, and rescue techniques was a
serious defect in the training of AAF crews. There were many
illustrations in action of these defects, but the following are
sufficient to indicate their serious consequences.(43)

A fortress returning from a bombing raid on Germany (4 March
1943) was engaged by enemy aircraft. In the ensuing action three
engines and the radio were put out of action. The aircraft
proceeded on its course, losing height rapidly, and at 5,000 feet
the pilot decided that a ditching was imminent. No S.O.S. could
be transmitted as the wireless was out of order. The pilot and
second pilot remained in their flying positions, the eight
remaining members of the crew taking up positions in the radio
room. On ditching the aircraft broke immediately into four
pieces but all ten members of the crew managed to get out of the
wreckage. The dinghies floated out and attempts were made to
inflate them. As these had not been stowed in their official
stowage but had been wrapped in string and carried loose in the
fuselage, great difficulty was experienced in inflating them and
in the thirty minutes before the first one could be inflated
three members of the crew were drowned although they all wore Mae
Wests.

One man saw an object floating in the sea and grabbed hold of
it to give himself buoyancy. All seven surviving members of the
crew managed to get aboard the first dinghy whilst the second one
was being inflated and it was then found that the floating object
was the radio. Although no one had any previous experience of
this transmitter they managed to launch the kite aerial and an
S.O.S. was automatically transmitted. A fix was made on this
S.O.S. and six hours later search aircraft sighted the distressed
crew and dropped a Lindholwe gear to them. This they managed to
reach and availed themselves of the comforts and pyrotechnics in
the containers. Two hours later they were rescued by a
minesweeper diverted for the purpose.

Subsequent interrogation revealed that no dinghy drill had
ever been carried out in their squadron and although some of the
crew remembered seeing the dinghy drill and diagram for a B-17
they had never taken the trouble to study it. Their faulty
ditching procedure caused them to land into the swell instead of
across the top and parallel to it and it was miraculous that none
of the crew was drowned in the resultant break up of the
aircraft.

An example of ignorance of correct rescue procedure was afforded
by the following incident which occurred in January 1943:(44)

A United States crew returning from a flight over the sea
sighted two men afloat in a dinghy a few miles off the English
coast. They obtained no fix when over the dinghy and only after
landing passed the information on to the rescue services. A
search plane was dispatched on the general directions obtained
from the United States crew but failed to return, resulting in
the loss of the two men in the dinghy as well as the rescue
planes and its crew.

In view of the accelerated pace of aircrew training in the early
years of the war these training defects were understandable if
regrettable. As early as 20 March 1942, however, General Eaker
mentioned the necessity for training in air-sea rescue procedures in
his initial report to AAF Headquarters.(45) By June of that year an
Eighth Air Force training syllabus on the Subject had been prepared,
and on 15 September all commands of the Eighth Air Force were
instructed to familiarize their crews with rescue procedure and
channels of communication. Station air-sea rescue officers were made
responsible for this instruction. As is so often the case, however,
fulfillment of these directives by lower echelons of command was far
from complete.(46)

Besides the satisfactory manner in which these orders were
handled, two factors hampered training in rescue procedure. One was
the previous training of all AAF crews, which emphasized bailing out
whenever their aircraft was in distress; the other was the poor
ditching qualities of AAF planes. They not only sank rapidly, but
they were poorly equipped with escape facilities, the emergency
equipment was not standardized, and there was no provision for
standard stowage. Dinghies were carried in most planes, but ejected
manually rather than automatically, and other equipment, such as the
dinghy radio, was stowed separately and had to be taken from the
aircraft by the aircrew.(47)

During the spring of 1943 a training drive in rescue procedure
was carried on in the Eighth Air Force. Some standardization of
equipment was also achieved through extensive loans of British
equipment. As a result of these and other factors rescue figures for
AAF crews began to improve in the summer of 1943. In June 71 of 255
were saved, and in July 139 out of 196. Included among these was the
remarkable total of 78 out of 80 on 25 July.(48) From July to
December 1943 nearly 40 percent were saved, as compared with only 6
percent for the first half of the year.(49)

Conclusion and recommendations. Although the AAF air-sea rescue
organization in England had the advantage of British experience, a
process of trial and error was followed before efficiency of
operations and control was achieved. By 1945 the personnel were able
to evaluate their experiences and draw conclusions which were
included in the official history of air-sea rescue activities in the
Eighth Air Force:(50)

1. Time was of primary importance in rescue work. When an
aircraft was in distress, the delay in coding and decoding distress
messages meant the difference between life and death; transmission
"in the clear" was therefore essential. The same element--time--made
it vital that the rescue organization have the fastest planes and
ships available and be located as close to the battle area as
possible.

2. Single control for any rescue operation was another
essential. Attempted coordination by two or more controllers often
caused confusion; it always created delay. For most efficient
operation centralized administration and operational control of
rescue units was mandatory.

3. To achieve maximum results, air-sea rescue should be included
in permission planning, not called in only when in trouble was
encountered. Routes affording maximum rescue possibilities could
then be chosen, and facilities used more efficiently.

4. Rescue personnel had to be superbly trained in their jobs,
since the equipment needed expert maintenance and had to be handled
with skill. Communication were particularly important. The fastest
rescue aircraft could not reach a rescue scene in time if
communication facilities were for any reason inefficient.

5. Rescue personnel had to be cooperation minded. No matter how
large the rescue organization, other agencies could render assistance
on countless occasions.

6. Only part of the job could be accomplished by rescue
personnel. The responsibility fell with equal weight on those in
distress. Intensive training in ditching and bail-out procedures was
needed to allow members of the aircrew to act instinctively.
Knowledge of the required techniques, of when to ditch and when to
bail-out, of the methods of escape from various types of aircraft,
and of the emergency equipment and its uses could only be gained
through training and practice.

The achievements of air-sea rescue in the Eighth Air Force are
illustrated by the accompanying graphs. The most significant fact is
that by late 1943 flying personnel had better than a one-in-three
chance of survival if they were forced to descend to a watery
landing.

Chapter IV

THE THEATER
Introduction. In the Mediterranean the British and American air
forces were included in one over-all command system, which took final
shape as the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) in the beginning
of 1944.(1) Air-sea rescue in the theater was a part of this joint
action. British rescue organizations were active before the American
landing In North Africa in 1942, and the. were continuously present
until the last stages of the war. American rescue units, activated in
1943 and 1944, operated as a part of the larger British organization.

The story of air-sea rescue in the Mediterranean would be
misleading unless emphasis were placed upon the greater importance of
the British contribution. After February 1943, there were always
British units affording rescue cover for Allied aircraft operating
over the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Aegean seas. In contrast, AAF
units were active only from June to December 1943, and from April 1944
to the end of the war. From December 1943 to April 1944 the sole
rescue, cover was that provided by the RAF if it be recalled that the
amphibious landings at Anzio occurred during this period the
importance of, the British rescue organization becomes apparent. In
the Sicily and Salerno landings, which called forth 25,000 and 29,000
support sorties respectively by Allied aircraft, some AAF air-sea
rescue help was available, but for the landings at Anzio, when 54,000
sorties were flown, the only rescue effort was that provided by the
British.(2) Further the British had four air-sea rescue squadrons in
the Mediterranean by 1944, as well as a number of rescue units quipped
with high-speed launches and pinnaces.(3) The AAF, on the other hand,
had only a detachment of three planes during 1943, and AAF air-sea
rescue facilities never exceeded one squadron and four boat crews.

British Air-Sea Rescue

The British paid little attention to air-sea rescue in the
Mediterranean during the first year of the war (1939-1940), but the
Italian attack on France in June 1940 drew attention to the
desirability of rescue facilities. However, the need for aircraft and
boats in British homewaters made the development of air-sea rescue
organizations in other parts of the world a difficult task.

The first air-sea rescue unit in the Mediterranean area was
authorized in August 1941 when an air-sea rescue flight attached to
No. 201 Group was formed, becoming operational in September. This
flight, under Middle East Command (MEC), was based at various North
African points, depending on the fortunes of British armies in their
desert campaigns. At one time (9 January 1942) they were as far west
at Tobruk, but as the ground situation deteriorated they were forced
to fall back. Their original equipment, consisting of three aircraft
and seven launches, was augmented by six more aircraft and an equal
number of launches in August, September, and October of 1942. In
November 1941, an air-sea rescue unit with three high-speed launches
was formed at Malta. By the following November the number of launches
had been increased considerably, and more arrived in the following
months.(4)

In February 1943 a British air-sea rescue unit was formed in North
Africa to provide rescue cover for the western Mediterranean area.
Designated as No. 283 Air/Sea Rescue Squadron, this organization was
equipped with six amphibious aircraft and four launches. Besides this
group a number of air-sea rescue units, each consisting of two
launches with their crews, were stationed at various points throughout
the Mediterranean during 1943. By July of that year there were 32 of
these units with a total strength of 55 boats (43 launches and 12
pinnaces). In addition, rescue activities were supplemented by
aircraft when they could be spared, and naval assistance if it was
available.(5)

In 1944 the British had four air-sea rescue squadrons in the
Mediterranean-three under MAAF, and one under MEC. The squadrons of
the Mediterranean command were all equipped with Warwick aircraft
(with the airborne lifeboat), but in the Middle East similar aircraft
were not received until September 1944. Amphibious aircraft were
still retained in each squadron, fortunately, since no successful
lifeboat drop was completed during the entire year of 1944. Forty-
five high-speed launches were in MAAF's possession and MEC had 21.
Early in 1944, 68-foot launches, larger than those previously used,
began to arrive. Their extra range and greater seaworthiness made
them distinctly preferable to the older boats.(6)

AAF Air-Sea Rescue

OA-10 detachment. Although AAF aircrews were initially dependent
upon the British organization for rescue service, an AAF air-sea
rescue unit of three planes was formed in June 1943. Operational
control of the detachment was placed in the British rescue
organization.(7) No other AAF flying rescue organization was present
in the Mediterranean until the arrival of the 1st Emergency Rescue
Squadron at Casablanca on 12 March 1944. The squadron was assigned to
the XII Fighter Command, but its operations were coordinated with
those of British air-sea rescue units.(8) Besides the facilities
afforded by these two AAF units, there were quartermaster (later AAF)
boat crews in action from August 1943.(9)

The first AAF rescue detachment mentioned above was the result of
efforts by XII Fighter Command to activate American air-sea rescue
units to augment British rescue activities. Three OA-10 pilots were
finally obtained from among those in training at Pensacola, and old
amphibious training planes (OA-10's) were ferried from the United
States. Air Transport Command pilots flew the ships, originally five
in number, to Malta by way of South America and west Africa. Only
three arrived, since one was damaged at Puerto Rico, and one landed in
Spanish Morocco, where the crew was interned. The crews and planes
were assigned to Headquarters, XII Fighter Command, but placed under
the operational control of RAF Group No. 242 based at Malta. Since
there were no other OA-10's on Malta, maintenance suffered, and the
detachment was transferred to Bizerte, Tunisia. Even at that base,
however, spare parts were hard to obtain, and the U.S. naval air
station at Port Lyautey, in French Morocco, was often appealed to for
assistance. Because the planes were old, and were further abused by
the inexpert handling of the pilots, it was difficult to keep them in
operation. It was found necessary to ground a plane after each open-
sea landing to replace rivets, sheet metal, and plexiglass damaged or
broken in the landing.(10)

American interest in air-sea rescue was increased with the July
1943 landings in Sicily. A squadron-type organization was built
around the OA-10 crews at Bizerte, gathering personnel and equipment
from "any and every possible source." Although the RAF, with its
high-speed launches and Walrus squadrons, carried the heaviest burden
of rescue responsibility during the invasion, the AAF unit rescued 40
Allied and 5 Axis airmen during July and August 1943. In the course
of these operations 11 open-sea landings were effected, and almost 200
hours flown.(11)

Despite their lack of thorough training in rescue techniques, the
antiquated nature of their aircraft, and the absence of formal
organization, the personnel of the AAF detachment demonstrated a zeal
in the performance of their duty that is worthy of comment. Two
successful rescue incidents were outstanding. On 30 July 1943 an OA-
10 was guided by a circling Wellington to a dinghy containing five men
of a B-26 crew. The landing and rescue accomplished, but the rescue
plane was so badly damaged in the landing that a take-off was possible
only after crew members had for eight hours on their planes. On 18
August there was a similar incident involving the pickup of 20 airmen,
survivors of 2 B-17 crews. On this occasion the landing damage could
not be repaired, and the pilot elected to taxi to port. High-speed
launches eventually removed the passengers and towed the OA-10 to
land.(12)

The loss of two aircraft from enemy action, one strafed while in
the water in the act of attempting a rescue, and the other shot down
by enemy aircraft while on a mission, was another indication of the
rescue crews devotion to duty.(13) Flying slow, clumsy aircraft that
were usually damaged in an open-sea landing, they did not hesitate to
land whenever necessary to effect a rescue.

This original unit continued activities in the Mediterranean
through the fall of 1943. Its last operational mission, after which
the flight crews returned to the United States, was on 13 December
1943.(14) From December 1943 until the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron
arrived in March 1944, there was no AAF rescue unit equipped with
planes in the Mediterranean.

The 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron. The 1st Emergency Rescue
Squadron, commanded by Lt. Col. Littleton J Pardue, consisted of 52
officers and 147 enlisted men assigned to 3 operational flights (A,
B, and C), and 1 headquarters flight. They were issued nine OA-10
aircraft and six other planes. Arriving in Casablanca on 12 March
1944, the squadron on 1 April began its move to Ajaccio, Corsica,
from which it flew its first overseas mission. Early in May Flights
A and B were moved to Grottaglie and Foggia, Italy, to give rescue
cover to Allied bombers flying across the Adriatic. Flights C
remained at Ajaccio. Flight A was then brought back to Corsica to
provide rescue cover for the invasion of southern France, Flight B
remaining in Italy to cover diversionary operations. On 12 October
Flight A was transferred to Cuers, France. Headquarters of the
squadron was later transferred to Foggia, and Flight B to
Falconara.(15)

On January 1945 the squadron received word that two of the three
flights were to be sent to India, and the following day a squadron
operations order to that effect was issued. By 8 January all
personnel and planes destined for India had departed, with the
exception of four B-17's and their crews. All that remained of the
squadron was Flight Bat Falconara and squadron headquarters at
Foggia.(16) The squadron's quiescence after that time was well
described by its historian in his report for January 1945:(17)

Avery, very, quiet. Absolutely no action at any place.
At Falconara just a skeleton organization holding a base for
further operations; they have no planes at all. Here at Foggia
we have five planes, no activity, plenty of personnel, but no
aircraft.

On 20 February 1945 the 1ST Emergency Rescue Squadron was
reorganized. The unit retained its original designation, but only
two flights, A and B, plus a headquarters flight, were authorized.
The revised organization was allotted 51 officers and 174 enlisted
men under the provisions of T/O and E 1-987. Headquarters and Flight
B were located in Foggia, and Flight A operated from Falconara.(18)

The principal rescue aircraft used by the 1st Emergency Rescue
Squadron was the OA-10, although a few L-5's (liaison aircraft) and
B-25's (medium bombers) were also assigned. Late in 1944, four B-
17's equipped to carry lifeboats were assigned, but since no
lifeboats were ever available as long as those planes remained with
the squadron, their use was limited. On 1 March 1945 these B-17's
departed with their crews for India and assignment to the newly
constituted 7th Emergency Rescue Squadron.(19)

Emergency rescue boat crews. Quartermaster emergency rescue (ER)
boat crews (later redesignated as AAF ER boat crews) began arriving
in North Africa in the last days of August 1943 after completing
their training at New Orleans. Four crews in all were assigned, 5th,
8th, 11th, and 12th. The size of the boats assigned (36 feet)
precluded any substantial amount of open-sea operation and their
rescue abilities were thereby limited. They were used primarily as
tow-target ships at such African ports as Bizerte, Tunis, and
Algiers. This duty was enlivened by occasional assignments to carry
messages, or to ferry passengers from shore to a waiting ship. While
assigned to the XII Fighter Command they cooperated closely with
British air-sea rescue boats, and the 11th was transferred to the RAF
for a month's operational control in the autumn of 1943.(20)

In the spring of 1944 the rescue boat crews were moved to Naples,
Italy. The 5th and 8th remained at that station until returned to the
ZI. The 11th and 12th were both assigned for a time to operational
duty with Flight C of the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron in Corsica,
the 11th from 30 May to 11 November 1944, the 12th for less than a
month, from 28 October to 23 November 1944.(21)

Besides the duties already mentioned, the boat crews carried out
various other functions. At Naples, transportation of supplies and
personnel was a major part of their activity, and the boats were
often requisitioned as pleasure craft to carry soldiers on
recreational trips to the Isle of Capri. Preparation for inspections
played a large part in each crew's life. The 5th AAF Emergency Rescue
Boat Crew, for instance, painted their craft at least five times in
one year. The importance attached to the appearance of their boat is
indicated by the historian of the 5th, who complained:(22)

Our craft looks fine and we are proud of our paint job when
we receive orders that we have an emergency trip to Naples. We
sweat and scratch our new paint job bringing the patient aboard
and as soon as we start the engine the patient is up and running
around bumming smokes. What a life, war a war, and no chaplain.

Crew historian for the 5th and 8th recorded no rescue activity, but
the 11th and 12th participated in 11 rescue attempts during their
assignment to 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron. In addition, they
cleared the water of debris, search for mines, towed seaplanes,
ferried flight personnel, and guided seaplanes landings with their
searchlights.(23)

The work of the boat crews was restricted by the size of their
boats and lack of equipment. The first boats to arrive had no
radios, which made coordination of their operation with other rescue
craft difficult if not impossible. Later, radios were installed by
several of the crews.(24) Maintenance and securing spare parts were
vexing problems. On one occasion the crew of the 11th waited several
weeks for spare engine parts. When three large boxes were finally
received, they were found to be packed to the brim with parts for a
Scripps engine -their boat had a Continental Cammando.(25) The plight
of the 8th was even more serious. Arriving at Bizerte at the same
time as the 5th, in August 1943, they found their assigned boat
irreparably damaged because a light grade of engine oil had been used
in the transmission. After what seemed endless months of
miscellaneous and irksome shore duties, the crew was transferred to
Naples in May 1944 where it was finally assigned another boat.(26) It
might be an understatement to say that the AAF emergency rescue boat
crews in the Mediterranean were not used in the most efficient
manner.

Operations. While air-sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean
generally implied waiting for an S.O.S. and then sending out rescue
craft, and air-sea rescue plan was formulated in advance on four
occasions. The first three-during the invasions of Sicily, Italy,
and southern France-were under the control of the British Air/Sea
Rescue Service. The fourth-rescue cover for air transport to the
Yalta conference-was originally planned by the Air Transport Command.

Before the invasion of Sicily (July 1943) the British established
Three zones for which Northwest African Coastal Air Force, Malta Air
Command, and Middle East Air Command were each responsible, and exact
arrangements were made for rescue cover within these areas. British
and American aircraft (OA-10's) were stationed at Bizerte for deep
search; British aircraft were at Malta; arrangements were made to
attach the British No. 230 Squadron for rescue duties; and the
British No. 283 Squadron operated from Tunis with a detachment at
Pantelleria. British air0sea rescue units (surface craft consisting
of eight high-speed launches, four pinnaces, and six seaplanes
tenders) were stationed at Malta and in northwest Africa. There were
35½ squadrons based on Malta for the initial assault, but only 30
pilots were lost in the first seven days. From 3 July to 10 July,
the period immediately preceding the main invasion of Sicily, 45
lives were saved by the continuous search for missing aircrews by
air-sea rescue craft.(27)

Rescue cover for the invasion of Italy (September, 1943) was
undertaken by the British Northwest African Coastal Air Force.
Tactical air forces assumed responsibility for rescue within 40 miles
of the beaches as soon as they were established in the Salerno area.
A depot ship, equipped with VHF and equipment for refueling launches
and flying boats, was provided for the assault period. The British
No. 614 Squadron was based at Borizzo, launches and amphibious
aircraft operated from Salerno and Milazzo, Sicily, other launches
were at Ustica and Salina in the Lipari Islands, and AAF OA-10's
covered operations from the north African coast. The Allied air
force flew a total of 29,000 sorties in support of the Salerno
landings; in the first 8 days of the assault 27 lives were saved by
the rescue organization.(28)

The rescue plan for the invasion of southern France (Operation
DRAGOON, 14-21 August 1944) allotted the area within 15 miles of the
fighter-control ship to RAF rescue units. A British air-sea rescue
flying-control team, charged with initiating rescue action, was
stationed aboard the fighter-control ship. Another ship, stationed
between Corsica and the assault area, was equipped with VHF control,
homing facilities, two pinnaces, and special refueling facilities for
rescue launches. Rescue craft included two high-speed launches
stationed at the fighter-control ship, and launches and rescue planes
based at Cagliari and Alghero in Sardinia, and Calvi, Borgo, and
Ajaccio in Corsica. Naval dispatch boats and destroyers were also
available for rescue of any aircrew forced down in their vicinity.(29)

Because AAF air-sea rescue facilities in the Mediterranean were
increased to a full squadron early in 1944, they were given a more
important part in DRAGOON than in earlier operations.

Outside the 15-mile limit rescue responsibility was primarily
assigned to the AAF, specifically to the planes of Flights A and C of
the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron. During the week of 14 to 21 August
the 2 Corsica-based flights flew 45 missions, achieved 13 open-sea
rescues, and saved a total of 27 lives. All those rescued were
Americans, except for one German and two British fliers. The
squadron was awarded a presidential unit citation for outstanding
performance of duty during this period.(30)

Air-Sea rescue cover for the Yalta conference provided a unique
and knotty problem. At no other time were such a large number of
VIP's concentrated in one over water area. Parts of the route were
totally unfamiliar to the Air Transport Command, charged with the
planning responsibility, and some areas were close to German-held
positions. Little information was available, and the need for close
security made it difficult to obtain more.(31)

It was planned to use 11 U.S. Navy surface craft along the route
and to station a B-17 with lifeboat at Bermuda, another at the
Azores, and two more in the Mediterranean. Two Navy PBY's were to be
at the Azores, and three OA-10's at Tunis, Malta, and Athens. C-47's
were to be at Casablanca, Oran, Algiers, and Tunis. Navy squadrons
at Bermuda and Port Lyautey and RAF flying boats in the Mediterranean
were to be alerted.(32)

Because of the lack of AAF rescue planes, great dependence had to
be placed on British facilities, and responsibility for air-sea
rescue was shifted to the theater command, which delegated authority
to the RAF officer commanding at Malta. Available facilities were
then supplemented by the use of 10 British destroyers and 10 Warwick
aircraft. Since there were no B-17's equipped with lifeboats in the
theater, an attempt was made to move two of them to Malta from an
Atlantic station, but the AAF Emergency Rescue Branch stated that
this was not possible. In their stead two OA-10's were sent to the
Mediterranean (the four B-17's of the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron,
alerted for movement to India, were still available, but had no
lifeboats, three 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron crews were on temporary
duty at Malta conference, but since they had no aircraft they took no
active part in the operation).(33) With these changes, the original
plan for rescue cover was put into operation on 1 February and
remained in effect until 24 February, when all air transport to and
from the conference was successfully completed.(34)

With the exception of these two incidents-the landings in
southern France and the Yalta conference-rescue activities of the 1st
Squadron were confined to search patrols and specific missions
resulting from a message from a distressed aircraft. Most of its
missions were flown in the Adriatic, since two flights based at
Grottaglie and Foggia aided the British rescue facilities in
providing cover in that area. One flight, based in Corsica, was
active in the Mediterranean waters surrounding that island, north to
France and east to the Italian mainland.

The squadron history explained its mission as follows:(35)

The purpose of this organization is to accompany Fighter and
Bomber Squadrons, effecting immediate rescue of their crews,
whose misfortune may lie in being set adrift on the open sea. In
so doing we may not only save human life, but trained and
experienced fliers, who can again be at their battle stations
with a minimum loss of time.

Exclusive of the humanitarian aspect, the monetary saving is
not inconsiderable. It is estimated that the aggregate expense,
to the government, for the training program of an Air Crew, with
ten men, approaches a figure in excess of $200,000.

In the event of high swells, making water landings
impractical, close radio liaison is maintained with surface
craft, namely Crash Boats. Pursuant to the geographic bearings
received, these craft locate and pick up survivors that are
stranded on dinghies, or that are floating in pneumatic life
craft.

Generally speaking, the greatest good that can be
accomplished by a smoothly functioning rescue unit is that of
maintaining and sustaining the morale of flying Bomber and
Fighter Personnel. It is no small comfort, to be assured that
hovering on the edge of battle is a friendly formation, waiting
expectantly to pull one out of the "drink," should he be ill-
fated in combat. Such peace of mind definitely contributes to
the prevention of "war jitters" and "flying fatigue." It is no
less reassuring to know that as soon as a ship is abandoned the
location has been accurately plotted and a PBY is launched on its
mission. Much of the fear of "ditching" is thereby circumvented
and the hope of survival made almost a certainty.

Like the loaded automatic at the MP's side, the very presence
of an Emergency Rescue Squadron promotes the realization that
help and protection are there, should the exigency arise. This
will give to the airmen an additional measure of confidence, so
vital to mental composure, for no man is unafraid.

During the first month of operations, a rescue which demonstrated
the squadron's zeal in carrying out its mission was effected. On 17
April 1944 an OA-10 sighted a lone survivor in a dinghy while
searching for a ditched Wellington. A strong wind and 15-foot waves
made a landing almost impossible, but there was only a 300-foot
ceiling, and it was feared that if sufficient altitude were gained to
send a radio message to bring a rescue launch to the scene, the
survivor would not be found again. The crew "unanimously decided" to
land, and they picked up the survivor. Since take-off was
impossible, the pilot taxied toward Bastia, Corsica, until all gas
was expended. Fortunately a high-speed launch was encountered, and
the plane was towed to shore.(36)

Twelve days later another Corsica-based rescue crew accomplished
a mission which merits description because of the dispatch with which
it was executed, and because it reveals something of the procedure
employed.(37)

Six hundred and forty planes, with crews keyed for action,
participated in a surprise daylight raid on Toulon. All crews of
the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron were instructed to stand by for
immediate search. At 1230, a mission was ordered by the Ajaccio
Control Sector and one by one the PBY's took off from the Bay.
The "fix" for the "ditching," as given by the disabled B-24G,
with both portside engines gone, was 42°22' North and 07°03' East.
At 1400 two dinghies, containing ten men, surrounded by sea-
maker, and anchored by an open partially submerged parachute were
sighted by Lieutenant Mork and crew of Flight "B." Because one
of the occupants was known to be injured, permission to land was
asked and granted by "Seagull 01," the cooperating surface craft.
A smooth landing in a sea corrugated with moderate swells was
accomplished and the survivors, most of them drenched to the
skin, were helped aboard, through the port blister hatch, after
dismounting the fifty caliber machine gun. Never have we seen
such a demonstration of elation. "Thank God for the Catalina,"
one managed through purple lips, and chattering teeth. Sodden
clothing was removed and the crew intact to the man, was bundled
into blankets and given a "nip of spirits." The men sighed
happily. Presently the heat in their stomachs matched the warmth
of gratitude in their hearts. Lieutenant Mork started the
engines with speculation, not unmixed with apprehension, for the
PBY, packed with eighteen persons, and burdened with retrieved
equipment, was ponderously loaded. The engines roared mightily,
throbbing, pulsating, accelerating and strained for flying speed.
The wave crests, with watery fists, pounded the hull
unmercifully. After breathtaking suspense, which seemed to
stretch interminably, the Catalina, vibrating from bow to stern,
cleared the water. An expectant crowd greeted "957" as it
tottered up the ramp. The rescued, like so many Indian Braves,
only less scantily clad, were helped into a waiting Ambulance and
were rushed to the hospital, operated by the 2688th Group.

The B-24G is said to have "ditched" at 1300; the dinghies
were sighted at 1400, water landing was successfully made
at 1500. The take-off was undertaken at approximately 1530,
and the PBY taxied out of the basin and up the ramp at 1615.

In summarizing the exploits of the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron,
the recommendation for citation prepared 6 September 1944 emphasized
the almost continual hazard of attack from enemy fighters and
antiaircraft and coastal guns.(38) On 16 November 1944, for example,
an OA-10 on a search in the Adriatic was hit by antiaircraft fire and
forced to ditch. The rescue crew took to their lifeboats as their
plane sank, but rescue operations could not be undertaken until the
following day, since the forced landing occurred near dusk. At 0800
on the 17th the survivors were sighted in two dinghies, an OA-10
landed, and the rescue was effected without incident.(39)

As late as March 1945 enemy artillery constituted a hazard for
rescue planes and their crews. Take a mission of 21 March, for
example:(40)

Lt. Dunn off at 0835 for a P-40 pilot. Arriving at the fix,
the man in a Mea West was located at once. Making sure no mines
were in the vicinity, the PBY was landed on the water. Just as
the aircraft approached the victim, the shore batteries opened
fire with 88mm guns. The survivor was so weak he could not hold
the rope to get him up, it was decided to hook him by the Mea
West and this proved successful. All the time the coastal guns
were throwing all they had. The ship was hit in the wing and the
right blister glass was broken. One shell exploded under the
tail.

The plane finally managed to take off and return to its base, but
two crew members were wounded in the action.(41)

In the performance of their duties, the personnel of the rescue
squadron sometimes found themselves giving aid to the enemy. Two
rescues of enemy personnel have been described in detail:(42)

Lieutenant Walker and crew, on stand-by [at Grottaglie], were
awakened at 0500 [8 June 1944] and informed of a "ditching" which
had occurred fourteen miles South of the "heel" of Italy. During
the night a "Beaufighter" had shot down a JU-88 reconnaissance
plane which for weeks had been frequenting the sunset skies of
Southern Italy; particularly the harbors and convoy lanes. The
"Beaufighter" noted the "ditching" position and reained in the
immediate locality radioing the "fix" which was established at
39°27' North and 18°25' East, to the control sector. The
Catalina, under cover of two "Spitfires" from the 249th Fighter
Squadron (RAF), was straightway directed to the scene. Two men,
both Germans, bobbing about in life vests about one hundred yards
from a burning red flare, were sighted at 0605, tossed a rope and
assisted aboard. . . . The rescued Germans . . . made it
understood that there was a third comrade in their crew . . .
missing. After a short period of search the body of the third
man was found, floating face down about five hundred feet from
the sight [sic] where the raft was discovered. There was room in
the PBY for the dead German and he was lifted aboard thru the
port blister hatch. Take-off on moderate swells was
comparatively simple. Landing at Grottaglie Field was effected
at 0745.

A second rescue of German aircrewmen was accomplished by a
Corsica-based OA-10 on 14 June 1944:(43)

At 0515 hours, Lieutenant Robert B. Bell's crew . . . were
alerted for a Rescue Mission . . . at a position thirty-six miles
northwest of the Cape at Calvi.

During the night a plane had spotted a distress Signal flare
at this position. A "Halifax" had been missing all night and the
"Filter Room" reported that a hostile plot had faded in this
vicinity. The crew took off at 0615 hours and proceeded by
Pilotage and dead reckoning to the position of the proposed
search. Here a square search was executed and on the sixth leg
at 0718 hours, Sergeant Welling reported over the interphone that
flares, sea marker, and a dinghy were visible to the Starboard at
a distance of about three miles. The square search was
immediately abandoned and the crew flew toward the dinghy soon
determining that there were four men aboard. A landing was made
and when they had taxied to within about one hundred yards of the
dinghy, it was possible to identify the occupants as German
fliers. Security measures were taken by placing three of the
crew who were carrying .45 Pistols in various positions in the
ship. The Germans showed no hostility and appeared to be very
grateful for their lives being saved.

Besides the rescue operations which were the particular mission
of the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron, its personnel sometimes engaged
in other activities. In December 1944, for instance, they were
called on to evacuate the 10-man crew of a B-24 which had been downed
in Yugoslavia; an OA-10 removed them from an offshore island. Rescue
cover patrols for VIP flights were flown on several occasions.
Fighter pilots were ferried from one field to another, mail was
delivered, and transportation for nurses was provided.(44)

Rescue statistics. Determination of the effectiveness of rescue
efforts in the Mediterranean Theater is difficult, even if the study
be restricted to the AAF 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron. During the
first four months of the squadron's operations (April-July 1944) 226
sorties were flown, 59 of them successful; 80 Allied airmen and 6
Axis crew members were saved. In the last 4 months of 1944, 102
missions were flown, and 38 of these were successful. By 31 December
1944 the squadron had rescued a total of 244 airmen.(45)

Comparison of the total number of sorties flown with those which
were successful might seem to indicate that approximately 25 per cent
of all crews that went into the sea in the first four-months period
were saved, and 38 per cent in the four months ending 31
December 1944. Actually no such sweeping conclusion is justified.
No consolidation record of the number of Allied aircraft down
at sea was maintained, nor of the total number of crew members.
Interpretation of even the squadron's own figures is made difficult
by the frequent lack of indication as to how many persons were
involved either in crashes which were not found or in incidents which
were accounted successful. A sortie might be considered successful
if 1 member of a 10-man bomber crew were rescued. Finally, some
other agency may have saved personnel for whom 1st Squadron crews were
searching, but if the 1st Squadron did not find them, the sortie was
accounted a failure.

Conclusion. Several recommendations for changes in air-sea
rescue equipment, procedure, and planning resulted from the
experience in the Mediterranean Theater. Early in 1944 it was
suggested that much more extensive facilities were needed for
adequate coverage. Recommendations included 2 air-sea rescue
officers for staff and command duty, an airborne rescue detachment
with 3 OA-10's for each 400 miles of coast line, and a boat
detachment for each 200 miles. All detachments would be self-
sufficient for quarters, rations, transportation, supply, and lower-
echelon maintenance.(46)

Dissatisfaction with the alert procedure led the personnel of the
1st Emergency Rescue Squadron to suggest changes reminiscent of those
recommended by their English counterparts. Rather than wait for a
distress call, they urged that rescue planes follow each bombing
mission and await the return of the heavy planes. Additional
equipment was also suggested. More smoke bombs rocket lines,
sleeping bags, safety belts for survivors, and seasick pills for all
personnel in case of extensive taxing were needed as part of rescue-
plane equipment. Because a number of searches had been successful
when a flare was spotted, it was recommended that additional flares
be placed in each life raft.(47)

American air-sea rescue experience in the Mediterranean Theater
was rather brief. Little over a year elapsed between the beginning
operations of the first informal organization and the invasion of
southern France, which marked the beginning of the end of need for
overwater rescue cover in the Mediterranean. The only formal flying
rescue unit in the area saw service for less than nine months before
its personnel began to be transferred to India, and its activities
were curtailed because of lack of planes and personnel. Although the
achievements of rescue personnel should not be underestimated, they
were accomplished with a minimum of equipment, inadequate for the
task. The lack of equipment and personnel was underlined by the
inability of the Air Transport Command and the American theater
headquarters to furnish complete air-sea rescue cover for the flights
to Yalta. The effectiveness of air-sea rescue cover in the
Mediterranean was largely due to the British rescue organization in
that area, which provided a continuing service on a large scale from
the Sicilian invasion until Germany's surrender.

Chapter V

THE PACIFIC THEATERS AND THE CBI

Introduction
The war with Japan presented air-sea rescue problems not encountered
in the European conflict. The far reaches o£ the Pacific made
overwater flying inevitable in almost all air operations, and called
for an air-sea rescue effort on a larger scale than was necessary in
other regions. At the same time, the comparatively small land areas
made establishing rescue bases difficult. The war in the Pacific
necessitated continual movement of bases as the Allied attack, after
initial setbacks, began to achieve success. Organization for air-sea
rescue in this respect bore a closer similarity to rescue planning in
the Mediterranean than in England, for in Great Britain the bases
remained constant, and a well-coordinated, constantly functioning
communications system for controlling rescue efforts was possible. In
the Pacific phase of the war, as in the Mediterranean, standardized
control of rescue operations could not so easily be established.

Moreover, the assistance given by the British rescue organization
to the AAF in the European and Mediterranean Theaters was absent in
the Pacific.[In 1942 the British secured American agreement "to assume
rescue responsibility for the United States zone of operations in the
Far East" (Air Ministry (A.H.B.), Air/Sea Rescue, p.136)] In England
an efficient and effective organization trained the AAF rescue control
personnel on their arrival. AAF spotter squadrons were established in
a pattern already tested by their Allies, and the American emergency
rescue squadron, the 5th, followed the British lead in equipment and
practice. In the Mediterranean, also, a British air-sea rescue
organization was on hand to aid in the recovery of AAF personnel
forced to ditch of bail out overwater. The 1st Emergency Rescue
Squadron, and the AAF rescue detachments which preceded it, operated
as adjuncts of the British rescue service. In the war against Japan,
on the other hand, British aid was important only in the China-Burma-
India Theater (CBI). In the Southwest Pacific (SWPA) and Central
Pacific (CENPAC) theater the rescue burden was borne almost entirely
by the American forces.

Despite these handicaps, the final rewards for the establishment
of effective large-scale rescue organization in the Pacific were
greater than in any other theater. Not only would a higher percentage
of flyers be in need of rescue, since virtually all flights were over
large area of water, but also the Japanese had threatened to execute
Allied flyers who fell into their hands.(1) The development of air-sea
rescue organizations was imperative in the interest of preserving the
lives of Allied aircrews, and efforts had to be extended well into
enemy-held waters. The rescue services could also serve as a powerful
morale builder, for not only was the saving of life important in
itself and because it represented a saving in money and in the time
spent in flying training, but it might alleviate the flyer's fear of
going down at sea with no chance of survival. In the European
Theater, Eighth Air Force flyers knew that they had over one chance in
three of being rescued if they reached the surface of the water alive.
A similar assurance in the Pacific would be tremendously valuable.

During the first year of the rescue operations in the Southwest
Pacific, the decision was made to assign the rescue organizations to
air force headquarters. Fifth Air Force was responsible for this
action, and the Thirteenth followed suit. But the major credit for
this decision should be given to Major Small.(4)

The basic AAF air-sea rescue organizations-squadrons and boat
crews-stationed in the Pacific were the same as those used in the war
against Germany and Italy. As the war progressed, however, the boat
crews were combined into squadrons, and these units joined with the
air squadrons to form composite groups. This type of organization had
evolved in both the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces by the autumn
of 1944. Thus the Fifth Air Force Rescue Service became the 5276th
Rescue Composite Group (CP) on 24 September 1944, combining the 3rd
Emergency Rescue Squadron and the 14th Emergency Rescue Boat
Squadron.*[The 14th Emergency Rescue Boat Squadron had been formed in June 1944 From rescue
boat crews assigned to various duties in the Australia-New Guinea area.] In April 1945
the 6th Emergency Rescue Squadron was also assigned to the 5th Emergency
Rescue Group, successor to the 5276th. The 5230th Rescue Composite
Group (P) was activated in October 1944 by Headquarters, Thirteenth
Air Force. It included the 2nd Emergency Rescue Squadron and the 15th
Emergency Rescue Boat Squadron.(5)

Although a rescue group was assigned to air force level of
command, the individual flights often found themselves widely
separated. The flights assignments of the 3rd Emergency Rescue
Squadron of the Fifth Air Force in the Philippines were typical.

Units of the Fifth Air Force rescue organization began moving into
the Philippine Islands late in 1944, the 3rd Emergency Rescue Squadron
leaving for Dulag, Leyte, on 30 October. From that point, flights of
the squadron following closely on the heels of invasion troops-in
December Flight D

The Southwest Pacific Theater

Organization. During the first year of the war there were no AAF
rescue organizations in the Pacific, although U.S. Navy amphibious
planes carried out rescue duties in both Central and Southwest Pacific
Theaters. But early in 1943 an AAF rescue organization, Fifth Air
Force Rescue Service, was established in the Southwest Pacific. It
was pioneered by Maj. John H. Small Jr., who arrived in New Guinea on
11 December 1942. He found "universal interest in rescue," but no
rescue structure in existence. With only one assistant, an enlisted
man, and without an organization to help him or any precedent to guide
his actions, be began to direct search and rescue missions, using any
means that came to hand. For over six months he continued these
efforts, using the planes of operational units for search, and calling
on the RAAF 1 Rescue Squadron and the RAAF Small Boat Unit for rescue,
before two OA-10's were finally assigned to the Fifth Air Force Rescue
Service in August 1943. It was nearly a year later (in July 1944)
before the first organized AAF rescue unit to reach the Southwest
Pacific, the 2nd Emergency Rescue Squadron, was assigned to Fifth Air
Force. Before its arrival, Major Small had directed operations
accounting for 54 rescues during the intensive air attacks on Rabaul,
and by April 1944 the tenuous rescue organization and accomplished the
surprising total of 455 rescues.(2)

Meanwhile, Thirteenth Air Force interest was aroused by the
efforts of the Fifth, and a rescue organization was formed in that
Headquarters also. When the 3rd Emergency Rescue Squadron reached the
Southwest Pacific from the Zone of Interior, it replaced the 2nd, which
was then assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force.(3)

During the first year of rescue operations in the Southwest
Pacific, the decision was made to assign the rescue organizations to
air force headquarters. Fifth Air Force was responsible for this
action, and the Thirteenth followed suit. But the major credit for
this decision should be given to Major Small.(4)

The basic AAF air-sea rescue organizations--squadrons and boat
crews--stationed in the Pacific were the same as those used in the war
against Germany and Italy. As the war progressed, however, the boat
crews were combined into squadrons, and these units joined with the
air squadrons to form composite groups. This type of organization
had evolved in both the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces by the autumn
of 1944. Thus the Fifth A%r Force Rescue Service became the 5276th
Rescue Composite Group (CP) on 24 September 1944, combining the 3d
Emergency Rescue Squadron and the 14th Emergency Rescue Boat
squadron. In April 1945 the 6th Emergency Rescue Squadron was also
assigned to the 5th Emergency Rescue Group, successor to the 5276th.
The 5230th Rescue Composite Group (P) was activated in October 1944 by
Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force. It included the 2d Emergency
Rescue Squadron and the 15th Emergency Rescue Boat Squudron.(5)

Although a rescue group was assigned to air force level of
command, the individual flights often found themselves widely
separated. The flight assignments of the 3d Emergency Rescue Squadron
of the Fifth Air Force in the Philippines were typical.

Units of the Fifth Air Force rescue organization began moving into
the Philippine Islands late in 1944, the 3d Emergency Rescue Squadron
leaving for Dulag, Leyte, on 30 October. From that point, flights of
the squadron followed closely on the heels of invasion troops---in
December. Flight D was stationed in Mindoro, and in January Flight C
was transferred to Luzon. By 1 May 1945, squadron headquarters and
Flight A were at Tacloban, Leyte; Flights B and C were on Luzon, at
Clark Field and San Marcelino, while Flight D was on Mindoro. On 21
May, Flights A and C were moved to Floridablanca, Luzon. Flights A
and B were later transferred to northern Luzon to cover air operations
from Okinawa. No other moves were made by this until it was
transferred to Japan in the autumn of 1945.(6)

Besides this geographical separation, the flights were sometimes
under different operational control. In May 1945 the 3rd's
headquarters and Flight A at Tacloban were directly under the 5th
Rescue Group, but Flight B was under the 308th Bombardment Wing, Flight
C under the 309th, and Flight D under the 310th.(8)

Similarly, units of the 5230th Rescue Composite Group of the
Thirteenth Air Force were located at widely separated points late in
1944. Detachments of the 15th ER Boat Squadron were at Noemfoor,
Sanaapor Biak, New Guinea, and Morotai, in the Moluccas, in October
1944. At the same time, Flights B and C of the 2nd ER Squadron were on
Middleburg Island, off the tip of Dutch New Guinea, and A and D
Flights were on Morotai. In April 1945 there were units of the 13th
Emergency Rescue Group, successor to the 5230th, on Morotai, and in
Palawan, Zamboanga, Leyte, and Samar, in the Philippines.(8)

Personnel and equipment. When the 2nd Emergency Rescue Squadron
was activated in December 1943, it was authorized a headquarters and 4
operational flights, with a total strength of 59 officers and 205
enlisted men. Twelve OA-10 aircraft, four AT-11's, and four L-5's
were allowed by the table of equipment.(9) By January 1945, the 2d
Squadron's assigned personnel strength was 67 officers and 270 enlisted men, and
the squadron had in its possession 9 OA-10's, 2 C-47's, and 1 C-45.(10)

On 21 December 1944 the War Department prescribed a revised T/O
&E (1-987). Personnel authorization under the new regulation
increased the size of emergency rescue squadrons to 93 officers and
328 enlisted men. Aircraft equipment was changed to include eight B-
17's, four helicopters, and four L-5's with floats. Each squadron was
to retain 12 OA-10's.(11)

The most commonly used AFF rescue aircraft in the Southwest
Pacific were OA-10's, although L-5's were authorized and sometimes
available, and other types such as C-45's, C-47's, and B-24's were
often pressed into service. The OA-10's caused many problems, as they
were frequently damaged in water landings. As late as 1945 the 6th
Emergency Rescue Squadron lost four ships as the result of damage
incurred in landing.(12) Some of the OA-10's manufactured by Vickers
in Canada were delivered with equipment which had to be replaced
before they could be flown.(13)

B-17's equipped with lifeboats began arriving in the Pacific in
the spring of 1945. The first ones brought their own problems, since
the rescue squadrons had no mechanics who were familiar with them, and
parts were scarce.(14) Helicopters made their appearance in the
Pacific in the last months of the war, but they were confined chiefly
to land rescue and evacuation duties. Three helicopters, for
instance, were used by the 8th Emergency Rescue Squadron, assigned to
the China Air Service Command, by May 1945, and succeeded in effecting
7 land rescues within the next 30 days.(15) An late as June 1945,
however, the 13th Emergency Rescue Group was unable to obtain a
helicopter despite urgent pleas that one was needed to rescue
personnel stranded in Borneo.(16) The 5th Emergency Rescue Group had a
helicopter by April 1945, but it was used for evacuating sick and
injured personnel, picking up prisoners who had escaped from the
Japanese, and the transportation of supplies and personnel.(17)

A combination of facilities wan often employed in rescue missions.
In one such instance an OA-10 and a B-17 of the 5th Emergency Rescue
Group cooperated with a submarine in rescuing a pilot on 6 May 1945.
The OA-10 arrived five minutes after the fighter pilot was forced to
parachute into the sea. Minutes later a B-17 was on the scene and
dropped its lifeboat, and the final pickup was made by a submarine.(18)

Personnel and equipment strength of the boat squadrons assigned to
the 5276th and 5230th Groups varied greatly. In January 1945 the 14th
Emergency Rescue Boat Squadron, of the 5276th Group, had fifteen 85-
foot boats, six of 63 feet, five 45-feet long, one with a length of 36
feet, and eight of 28-foot length. Assigned personnel numbered 88
officers and 320 enlisted men.(19) In contrast with the 35 boats
operated by the 14th Squadron, the 15th Emergency Rescue Boat Squadron,
assigned to the 5230th Group, had only 24--three 104-foot boats, nine
85-feet and twelve 63-feet long. Assigned personnel totaled only 134-
-30 officers and 104 enlisted men.(20)

Operation. Immediate rescue service accompanied many of the air
strikes in the Southwest pacific. Protection could be advanced to the
immediate vicinity of the target if air superiority, adequate
communications, and water landing areas were all present. The rescue
service prepared and issued a plan based on the daily operations
order; the rescue aircraft and boats then proceeded to the close
vicinity of the strike and stood by to come to the aid of personnel
compelled to ditch or bail out. In addition to rescue cover on
specific missions, daily protection of air traffic raid air routes was
provided by patrol and alert aircraft and boats. Notice of distressed
aircraft was received through assigned communication channels, and the
available facilities were sent to the rescue.

An example of rescue cover for a combat mission is afforded by the
strike on Balikpapan on 10 October 1944. The Fifth and Thirteenth Air
Forces, the 91st Reconnaissance Wing, and elements of the U.S. Navy
participated in this action. In order to insure successful rescue
cover for an operation of such magnitude, central rescue control and
advance planning were necessary. Knowledge of enemy fighter strength,
ocean currents, prevailing winds, and weather conditions were
essential to determining the number of rescue planes that would be
needed, the fighter escort required, the selection of a site for a
rescue submarine station, and the location of rescue aircraft
stations.

It was decided to use a device known as the "rescue line." The
line consisted of rescue craft stationed at definite positions along
the path of the tactical operation. Boats as well as planes were
sometimes included in such a line, but in this particular case the
only rescue facility used, other than AAF OA-10's and Navy PBY's, was
one submarine from the Seventh Fleet (submarines used for rescue
purposes were appropriately dubbed lifeguard submarines). Seven
rescue aircraft of the 2d Emergency Rescue Squadron were assigned to
the rescue line. Two of these were in the forward area nearest the
target, and two others covered the middle and rear areas. Three
planes remained on the ground on the alert, ready to give aid whenever
needed. Since no AAF fighter planes could be spared to afford
protective cover for the rescue aircraft, and enemy fighter
concentration was expected to be heavy, no planes were assigned to
rescue cover directly over the target. The lifeguard submarine was
stationed 15 miles off shore, as close as was considered safe in view
of the expected enemy fighter opposition and the depth of the sea in
that area.

A comprehensive rescue communication order was written, and
specific rescue frequency assigned with orders that it be guarded with
scrupulous care. Instructions regarding distress calls to the rescue
submarine were given, with emphasis placed on the use of a code which
would transmit all necessary details on the distressed aircraft (i.e.,
its position, cause of distress, type of plane, etc.), but would not
betray the submarine's presence and location to the enemy.(21)

The rescue cover for the Balikpapan strike operated with the
highest degree of efficiency. All personnel who reached water or land
away from the target alive were rescued, and it was believed that all
those who reached the water alive near the target were also saved. A
total of 40 were rescued--24 by plane and 16 by submarine.(22)

The Balikpapan action was not the first instance of air-sea rescue
in which naval authorities cooperated with the AAF. In raids on Truk,
in April 1944, a lifeguard submarine was a part of the rescue
equipment and was credited with saving 22 persons.(23) The use of
submarines for rescue continued to the end of the war. In order to
facilitate assignment of submarines for rescue duties, the Navy
eventually appointed submarine liaison officers to headquarters of the
air forces in the Pacific.(24)

Elaborate sa_fe6uards continued to be enforced in order to keep
the submarine's presence secret. The necessity for caution often made
it impossible for the submarine to rescue personnel in the sea if they
were close to enemy installations. It was feared that if the
submarine surfaced long enough to allow the survivors to clamber
aboard, it would be attacked by enemy fighters or subjected to fire
from shore batteries before it could dive. In balancing the possible
loss of a submarine and its crew against the gain of an aircrew, the
decision was against the rescue attempt. Late in the war, however, a
technique which lessened the danger to the submarine in a rescue close
to shore was devised. In the event that an airman fell into the sea
close to an enemy installation with a friendly submarine nearby, the
submarine would pass close to the dinghy at periscope level,
and the survivor would pass a rope around the periscope. The
submarine would then tow the rescued airman out to sea before rising
to the surface and completing the rescue. Several instances were
recorded in which this maneuver was completed successfully.(25)

Although the value of submarines in rescue activities was
demonstrated on many occasions, each time its employment was the
result of a specific request in relation to a particular operation.
Naval authorities reserved the right to deny the request if they felt
it was not justified, or if the submarine would be greatly endangered.
Among other reasons that counted most heavily in such a decision were
the importance of the strike, the strength of the enemy, and the
adequacy of other rescue facilities.(26)

Despite the measures normally taken to insure the safety of the
rescue submarine, there were occasions on which this caution was dis
regarded. One of these involved a submarine rescue of the crews of an
OA-10 and a B-29.

On 29 May 1945 an OA-10 of the 4th Emergency Rescue Squadron was
on station directly over a lifeguard submarine as part of the rescue
Cover for a bombing mission to Japan. A message was received from a
B-29 that its wing plane was about to ditch. A few minutes later, the
ditching was confirmed and the position given in code. The OA-10
immediately flew to the site, but found nothing. The B-29 called
again, asking permission to give the position "in the clear" (without
use of code). After permission was the rescue plane flew to the new
position and succeeded in spotting two large rafts and one small one.
The pilot immediately landed find transferred the survivors to the
plane, but on take-off three large swells broke into the cockpit and
smashed the propellers. The left propeller and housing were pushed
into the pilot's compartment, knocking the pilot unconscious. The
co-pilot immediately cut the engines, attempted to staunch the flow of
blood from the pilot's lacerated head, and ordered the radio operator
to send an SOS in the clear to the submarine. An anxious hour and a
half passed before the submarine arrived, took the two crews aboard,
and sank the plane with surface fire. The pilot died during the night
and was buried at sea, but the other survivors were put ashore at
Iwo Jima the next morning.

The individual rescue planes and their crows were the primary agents
in the saving of life in AAF operations. The aircraft flaw assigned
patrol sectors during bombing missions and carried on routine patrols
of air lanes. In addition, one or more crews of each unit were
customarily on a stand-by alert in case of an unexpected request for
help. When an SOS was received, either by a rescue plane in the air
or by a ground receiver, the rescue plane reached the scene as quickly
as possible and began its search. When and if the crew in distress
was located, the OA-10 landed and picked up the survivors. If sea and
weather conditions did not permit a landing, the rescue plane dropped
supplies--including a dinghy--circled over the spot, and attempted by
means of radio to bring a surface craft to the rescue. The assignment
of B-17's with lifeboats early in 1945 removed some of the necessity
for hazardous amphibious landings. The lifeboats carried by the
converted bombers provided the crew in the sea with a means of
survival without further assistance. Usually, however, surface craft
intercepted the lifeboat and removed its occupants before it had
proceeded very far.

An example of an efficient B-17 rescue operation occurred on 13
June 1945. A B-17 dispatched to search for a B-24 crew down in the
sea somewhere between Formosa and Luzon searched fruitlessly for 71/2
hours and was returning to its base when it received a strong distress
signal. It turned back and some 25 minutes later spotted 2 life
rafts. Dye markers and flares were dropped to mark the spot, and
smoke bombs to indicate the wind drift. The lifeboat was then
successfully dropped within 40 feet of the rafts. After the survivors
boarded the boat, a note was dropped giving them their position and
course, and a few hours later motor torpedo (PT) boats were on hand
to make the final rescue.(28)

Earlier that same year, an OA-10 crew of the 13th Emergency Rescue
Group completed a spectacular rescue of the 17 survivors of 3 B-25's
shot down near their target, Zamboanga, in Mindanao. One crew was so
near the Japanese-held beach that enemy barges were already on their
way to capture it when the rescue plane landed. Other B-25's in the
vicinity held off the barges while the rescue crew, working under
machine-gun and mortar fire, picked the men up. The second B-25 was
near-by, but only 500 yards offshore. Nevertheless, the OA-l0 taxied
in and picked up the crew. At this time 1 engine became overheated
and went out of commission for 15 minutes. The third B-25 was 15
miles away, but the sea was too rough for a take-off, and the pilot
taxied the entire distance. By the time the last group of survivors
was reached, the OA-10 was leaking badly from the buffeting of the
high waves, but the jettisoning of 400 gallons of gasoline lightened
the plane sufficiently to make possible a take-off even with 25 men
aboard.(29)

These two incidents illustrate the varying abilities of the two
types of rescue aircraft. The B-17 was able to insure survival of
distressed airmen without any danger to its own crew other than that
normally present in a long over water flight. The OA-10 could perhaps
have done the job as efficiently, but the rough sea would have
endangered the rescuers. On the other hand, the rescue performed by
the OA-10 could not have been accomplished by a B-17. In the time it
would have taken for the B-17 to drop a lifeboat, the B-25 crews
nearest the enemy beach might very well have become Japanese
prisoners. For such a rescue operation as that off Zamboanga, the
B-17 was no substitute for an amphibious plane.

In the spring of 1945 the need for long-range rescue aircraft to
accompany raids on Japan led to experiments wit B-29's fitted with a
lifeboat. Although finally successful, the experiments were not
completed in time for B-29's with lifeboats to see action in the war.
B-29's were eventually used for rescue purposes in the bombing
missions against the Japanese home islands, but their duties were
confined to search, orbit, and dropping emergency equipment.(30)

Besides saving lives on the sea, the emergency rescue air
squadrons and boat at crews were often called upon for land search and
rescue. Even in the wide reaches off the Pacific some airmen did
manage to hit the islands, dwarfed though they were by the water
expanses surrounding them. Friendly natives often hid Allied pilots
and managed to convey word of their presence to the nearest AAF
forces. Evacuation by air or boat was then arranged.

Rescue facilities were also used for many purposes other than
rescue. Prisoners were sped by rescue planes to intelligence officers
for interrogation, critically wounded or ill persons were evacuated
for treatment, and intelligence personnel were dropped behind the
enemy lines. Carrying messages and supplies to guerrilla forces,
particularly those in the Philippine Islands, was often a duty
assigned to rescue personnel, and air rescue planes were also used for
maintaining liaison between services, for photographic missions, and
for reconnaissance. Boat units were commonly used for transportation
and evacuation missions, and there were several instances of crews
whose duties seemed to consist largely of providing recreational trips
for other military personnel.(31)

Statistics: Despite the attention given to these other duties,
available statistics indicate a creditable performance of the primary
mission. The 2nd Emergency Rescue Squadron achieved a record total of
588 rescues.(32) The accelerated pace of bombing missions after the
AAF came within range of Japan indicated by the record of the 6th
Emergency Rescue Squadron, which to arrived in SWPA in April 1945.
Operating from the Philippines, le Shima, and Okinawa, the 6th
amassed a total of 232 rescues in less than 5 months.(33) Among the
air forces, the rescue organization of the Fifth Air Force accounted
for approximately 1,650 rescues by April 1945.(34)

Surface craft played a major part in rescue operations in the
Pacific. For instance, during, its first year of operation (July
1943-June 1944) Fifth Air Force Rescue Service boats and planes each
accounted for approximately an equal number of rescues.(35) After June
1944, however, the superiority of seaplanes for rescue operations
became apparent as the air war ranged farther north and combat
aircraft flew longer missions. By January 1945 seaplane rescues
totaled 650, while only 380 survivors had been picked up by surface
craft.(37)

Any accurate total of rescues is rendered difficult by the absence
of consolidated statistics. Lack of statistical evidence also makes
it difficult to state the percentage of successful rescues. The
statement was made at an air-sea rescue conference at Guam on 3 July
1945 that rescues were being accomplished in 90 percent of all cases
where the ditching or bail-out was successful, but there was no
indication that this referred solely to AFF efforts.(37)

Rescue statistics compiled from the Far East Air Forces Air
Surgeon's monthly reports for July 1944 through February 1945 (see
tables on the following page) show that rescue effectiveness during
the eight-month period averaged 46.4 per cent in cases where the
location of the survivors was known. If the total number of missing
aircrew members were considered the average percentage of personnel
rescued dropped to 29.9 per cent.(38) These figures were far below the
90 per cent mentioned in July 1945, but they represented a more
impressive record than that achieved by the Eighth Air Force where the
problems were not nearly so complex. The Far East Air Forces' well-
trained crews had one chance in two of being rescued upon completion
of a successful ditching, as compared with one in three in the Eighth
Air Force.

The Central Pacific Theater

Organization: The initial rescue plan for the Central Pacific was
based on the assumption that the U.S. Navy would be completely
responsible for air-sea rescue. The theater did not establish
requirements for any AAF rescue units until the existing rescue cover
was found to be inadequate for XXI Bomber Command operations. The
inadequacies of the rescue organization were pointed out by a study of
6 November 1944 which stated: (39)

. . . The Navy was found to have a well-organized and effective
air-sea rescue organization. The Air Forces in that area did not
have a good organization and did not appear to be at [sic] in the
least concerned therewith. The Navy organization is built around and
for carrier strikes. It is not an organization for, nor does it
effectively operate with shore based aviation.

The AFF had determined from experiences in the Southwest Pacific
that rescue units should be a part of a combat air force, and should
not be under theater commando affording rescue cover on an area basis.
In the Central Pacific, however, the AAF concept could not be
realized, since it conflicted with directives issued by the theater
command enjoining area or island responsibility for land-based
aircraft.(40)

Rescue coverage improved as a result of AAF augmentation of naval
Facilities in the spring of 1945. On 6 February the 4th Emergency
Rescue Squadron arrived at Peleliu, in the Palau group, to assist in
covering missions against Japan, and in July the 6th ER Squadron-
assigned to Fifth Air Force--was divided between Ie Shima and Okinawa
to assist in rescue operations for missions to Japan. The 7th ER
Squadron was redeployed from India to Okinawa in August for the same
purpose, though the war ended before it could render any assistance.(41)

That the situation was still unsatisfactory to the AAF, however,
was indicated by a series of letters between Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles,
Commander, AAF in Pacific Ocean areas, and Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker,
Deputy Commander, AAF, in May, June, and July 1945.(42) General Giles
characterized the rescue cover as "inadequate," and the AAF
contributions as "late and small."(43) General. Eaker replied that
"the meagerness of the AAF contribution to rescue facilities in the
Central Pacific has been due, I believe, to the fact that in the past
we have let somebody else run the show.(44)

No action was taken, however, to increase the AFF share of
responsibility, and since according to the theater commander's
directive the naval commander in the Marianas was responsible for the
area, AAF planes and personnel were made available to the Navy's
rescue task group. The assignment of AAF personnel made possible the
establishment of a rescue control center on Iwo Jima. This center,
ostensibly a Navy responsibility, was manned and almost completely
equipped by the AAF.(45)

AAF facilities became even more important in July, when Navy
seaplane Squadrons were moved to the Ryukyus. Henceforth the only
aircraft suitable for rescue work available to the naval rescue task
group were those of the AAF 4th Emergency Rescue Squadron.
Operational B-29's of the Twentieth Air Force were therefore called on
to augment the rescue coverage, thus weakening; combat strength.(46)

Personnel and equipment. The 4th Emergency Rescue Squadron had an
effective assigned personnel strength of 98 officers and 298 enlisted
men on 1 July 1945. There were 36 officers and 130 enlisted men on
Saipan, and 62 officers and 168 enlisted men at Peleliu and Iwo Jima.
Assigned aircraft included 11 B-17's and 14 OA-10's.(47)

Operations. The rescue plan for the raids on Japan envisaged an
air-sea rescue task group made up of three units based in the
Marianas, on Iwo Jima, and in the Western Carolines. The accompanying
chart shows the extent and location of air-sea rescue facilities.(48)

This variety of available rescue craft made it possible for the
naval task group to divide rescue responsibility into three areas:
near air bases, up to 600-miles from base, and over 600 miles from
base. The allocation of rescue facilities for these areas was as
follows:(49)

1. Near air bases

a. Patrol boats on duty off runways
b. Crash boats on stand-by alert
c. PBY's (with 600-mile radius) on stand-by alert
d. Fighter planes for observation duty on stand-by alert

2. Intermediate range (0-600 miles from base)

a. PBY's and/or PBN's were stationed on the bombers' course to
radio position of and orbit over distressed aircraft, guide a
destroyer or other surface craft to the rescue scene, and drop
life rafts and supplies if needed. They did not usually land.

b. B-17's operated from Iwo Jima after the arrival of the 4th
and 6th Emergency Rescue Squadrons.

3. Far range (600 miles to near target)

a. Destroyers were stationed on bombers' course out of range of
enemy land-based planes, unless fighter cover was provided.

b. Submarines were stationed on bombers' course closer to enemy
shore than destroyers.

c. B-29 search aircraft were stationed over or near the
submarines and/or destroyers. (In 1945 the XXI Bomber Command
sent two B-29's along on missions to Japan as search and rescue
aircraft. They carried a large gas load, had no bombs, and
were stocked with a large quantity of life-saving gear. They
accompanied the bombers, rendezvoused at an advance point with
the submarine and/or destroyer, and followed the bombers home.
If a ditching occurred, the rescue B-29 went to the position,
gave the sea craft a fix on the distressed crew, orbited their
position to assist the rescue craft to pick up the survivors,
and dropped supplies if necessary.(50)

Communication facilities available for rescue operations in the
Central Pacific included the following:(51)

l. Liaison radio (AN/ART-13 transmitter and BC-348 receiver)-
used to contact ground stations for requesting; and receiving D/F
bearings, and to send distress messages.

2. VHF Command Sets (SCR-522)--used to contact other B-29's to
alert rescue facilities, and to obtain a VHF D/F bearing if within 100
miles of the base.

3. Radio compass, (AN/ARN-7)--used as a homing device when a long
distance from rescue facilities, for obtaining a bearing on a
powerful broadcasting station, and as an emergency receiver for
frequencies from 100 to 1,750 kilocycles.

4. IFF (SCR-695)--used to give base stations a bearing if within
100-mile radius, to enable submarines to take a bearing, and to report
an emergency involving radar equipment.

5. Radar set (AN/AP-13)--used to pick up rescue aircraft beyond
range of vision, to obtain position in relation to the coastline, to
home on rescue facilities and islands, to obtain an accurate position
by intercepting a radar beacon, and to obtain altitude reading.

6. Loran set (AN/APN-4)--used to obtain an accurate line of
position within a 1,200-mile radius of a suitable ground station.

7. Emergency communication equipment (carried in plane):
a. Gibson Girl transmitter (SCR-578)--a portable transmitter
that could be used in the plane, life raft, or lifeboat. This
device transmitted a signal on an international rescue
frequency of 500 kilocycles, but could rot receive messages.

b. Radio transmitter buoy--a device which, dropped by a rescue
plane, would automatically send a signal over a period of
hours. Rescue craft could hom on the signal with their
radio compass.

c. Corner reflector (MX-137 or MX-138)--a device that could be
used by survivors to reflect radio energy back to a receiver
or to a radio set.

d. Visual aids to rescue--flares, sea marker, and smoke
grenades. Aircraft in distress in the Central Pacific were
directed to take the following actions:(52)

1. If able to communicate with the usual aeronautical station or
another known Army or navy station, the aircraft was immediately to
establish such communication on the assigned frequency, using
prescribed procedure. Sufficient information was to be transmitted to
permit identification and location. The circuit was to be kept open
so that changes in the situation could be transmitted. For security
against enemy interruption of the message, code symbols were to be
used when available, and the messages kept free from unnecessary
information.

2. If the usual, aeronautical station could not be contacted, a
communication with some other class of stations was to be attempted by
transmitting distress signals.

a. The following frequencies were prescribed for this purpose:
1) 140.58 kilocycles (Fighter air-sea rescue frequency)
2) 4,475 kilocycles (high frequency air-sea rescue
frequency-voice)
3) 500 kilocycles (International distress frequency)
When transmitting on 500 kilocycles, the operator was to
remember that international regulations required all
maritime stations to maintain watch on that frequency
twice an hour for three-minute periods at 15 and 45
minutes after the hour.
4. 4,495 and 6,610 kilocycles (Array sir common calling
frequency, used if near AAF activities)
5) 3,105 and 6,210 kilocycles (Civil air common calling
frequency, used if near civil air activity)
6) 4,495 kilocycles (Voice--used if near-civil air activity)

b. Two kinds of distress signals were used:
1) Radiotelegraph--SOS or three dots, three dashes, and
three dots. The automatic alarm signal, consisting of a
series of 12 dashes in one minute, activated automatic
alarm-receiving instruments and initiated an alert which
called the operator to his station. A two-minute interval
was to elapse between the signal and, the distress
message.
2) Radiotelephone: Distress call was the signal "Mayday."

3. The aircraft was to follow the distress call with a distress
message as soon as possible.

a. The distress message was to identify the aircraft, and give
its position and a description of the difficulty
encountered. Transmission was to be continued for as long as
possible so that D/F stations might locate the distressed
aircraft.

b. The distress message, whenever possible, was to be in code.
To facilitate its use, reference points were established in
the areas where it was anticipated that a large number of
water landings would occur. A series of six code names was
assigned to each reference point, and these names were
rotated daily. These points and their code names were used
in the appropriate field orders. In reporting a position,
the distance in nautical miles from the nearest reference
point, the code name for the point, and the true bearing
from that point were all to be indicated. For example, the
message might begin "15 Hairbreath Harry 180." Decoded, this
would indicate that a plane was in distress 15 nautical
miles from a certain reference point (Hairbreath Harry), on a
bearing; of 180 degrees from the point. If the positions of
both the reference point and the rescue plane or vessel were
known, the distressed air-craft or a companion might "steer"
the rescue craft to the survivors by using the reference
point. Such messages might read "Hairbreadth Harry steer
course 120 degrees for three miles," or "Hairbreath Harry
change course 30 degrees left and go three miles."

c. Use of the reference point wee restricted to a voice call,
and such Points were to be considered neither as rendezvous
for rescue nor as sites for emergency landings. Other
distress information was also to be transmitted in code. The
message might include identification of the survivors' base,
the aircraft type, the condition and number of survivors, and
whether sea dye marker had been released.

d. Each bane won assigned a code name, and aircraft types
were assigned the following, code names: Chicken--fighter; Hawk-
dive bomber; Fish-torpedo bomber; Boxcar-heavy bomber; and
Monster-very heavy bomber.

e. The number of survivors was indicated in the clear, but the
following code words were used to indicate their condition:
Goodyear--in a raft; Yellow Jacket--in life jacket(s); and
Davy Jones--without life jacket(s).

f. The presence of dye marker was indicated by the word
"Evergreen." A typical message might read, "15 Hairbreadth
Harry 180 Prattle Monster Goodyear 12 Evergreen." Decoded,
this would mean that 12 survivors of a B-29 from (Prattle)
base were down 15 mi1es from the reference point on a true
bearing of 180 degrees, that the survivors were in life rafts,
and that dye marker was showing.

When the rescue aircraft sighted the survivors, a message was sent
to guide surface craft to the rescue, and one or two planes orbited
the survivors (i.e., circled over the scene se as to aid the rescue
craft in locating them). If two planes were present, one climbed to an
altitude from which IFF signals could reach the nearest base (an
altitude of 1,000 feet for each 10 miles distance was required for
this purpose), so that a fix could be obtained on the position. The
orbiting aircraft whenever possible remained until relieved or until
the rescue craft saw the survivors. When the rescue surface craft
appeared, the orbiting airplane identified it by means of prearranged
signals and directed it to the survivors. The rescue could be hastened
if the orbiting aircraft indicated the direction of the survivors from
the rescue craft by zooming from just above the imaginary line between
the two. If it was desired that the rescue vessel follow the orbiting
plane, the latter circled the vessel twice, opening and closing the
throttle, and then flew toward the survivors. If the orbiting aircraft
had to leave before the rescue vessel appeared, the location of, the
survivors was marked by a smoke signal.53

Statistics. Although AAF personnel were dissatisfied with the
rescue cover provided under Navy direction in the Central Pacific, the
results compared favorably with those in other theaters. In its
attacks on Japan from November 1944 to 14 August 1945, the XXI Bomber
Command lost a total of 361 B-29's and 3,105 crew members. Of the
Latter, 1,424 were known to have gone down at sea. The total number
rescued was 687, only 22.1 per cent of the total number lost, but
48.2 per cent of those known down at sea.54 The figures for
individual months are given in the two accompanying charts. It will be
noted that air-sea rescue efforts become more effective during the
six months immediately preceding the Japanese surrender. Unfortunately
no statistics on the rescues performed by AAF units alone are
available.

Naval Air-Sea Rescue in the Pacific

Until 1944 rescue was regarded as an additional duty of naval
amphibious aircraft (PBY and PBN) units, but early in that year the
Navy began to station seaplane tenders and aircraft close to the scene
of operations, with definite assignment to rescue duty. When needed,
submarines and surface vessels were also employed.55

Naval rescue procedure specified advance requests from combat units
for rescue cover, general and particular information for crews which had
to ditch, and emphasis on crew training in ditching, bail-out,
and rescue procedures. Request for rescue facilities had to
contain the estimated time of departure and arrival and the time
over target of the tactical mission, detailed communications
information (including specification of a distress channel), the
desired number of rescue planes and their positions, and an
estimate of how long they would be required. General ditching
information included instructions for each crew member as to his
position and his duties in case of a ditching. Particular
information for ditching aircrews often dealt with the region over
which they flew. Crews flying from Saipan, for instance, were
informed that their chances of rescue would be improved if they
managed to reach the sea near one of the Mariana Inlands and they
were told in detail of the reception they might receive on the
various islands. On one of them the natives were friendly, and
there were no Japanese; on another a Japanese encampment had been
reported, but time native village at the other end of the island
might afford a refuge; and so forth.56

In the Southwest Pacific, Navy amphibious squadrons worked side
by side with AAF emergency rescue units. Besides offering direct
assistance to AAF combat crews in distress, Navy personnel were
often in a position to aid AAF rescue units. Because the OA-l0 was
a plane with which the AAF was relatively unfamiliar, the AAF
squadrons who flow them found maintenance facilities and spare
parts lacking within their own organization. Needed parts were
sometimes supplied by naval stores, and maintenance problems solved
with the aid of naval personnel. AAF rescue boat crews also took
advantage of the Navy's generosity to obtain parts, fuel, and oil
when they could not be found elsewhere.57

An analysis of naval rescue figures be compared with the somewhat
similar one compiled by FEAF.58 Unfortunately for the present purpose,
the naval survey was concerned with an earlier period and included
only one month, so no general conclusions can be drawn. The figures
do seem to indicate, however, a higher degree of rescue efficiency. The
fact that they refer to an earlier period than to the FEAF statistics
emphasized the validity of this statement, since rescue operations became
more efficient in the autumn of 1944 and in 1945.

The China-Burma-India Theater
Introduction. Rescue operations in China and India during World
War II were of no great importance to the history air-sea rescue,
since most of the flying in both regions was over land. The history of
the 8th Emergency Rescue Squadron, stationed in China, does not included a
single instance of air-sea search or rescue, and 50 per cent of the 7th
Squadron operations in India were concerned with land rescue. The period
of operations was not long in either case. The 8th Squadron did not arrive
in China until May 1945, and the 7th was operational in India only from
March until July 1945.

British facilities in India. The first rescue cover for aircraft
based in India was provided by the British. Beginning in July 1943 with
an air-sea rescue Unit with 2 launches, by mid-1944 the RAF rescue
service included 45 high-speed-launches based at points along the coasts
of India and Ceylon from Karachi to Chittagong, an air-sea rescue
squadron (No. 292) equipped with long-range search aircraft and
amphibious plane, and a rescue organization modified to fit the local
scene, but modeled after that in use in the United Kingdom.59 Rescue
facilities available in 1944 were adequate for missions such as the
AAF XX Bomber Command's attack on the Palembang, Sumatra, oil center on
10 August. Submarines were employed close to the target, cruisers were
stationed along the line of flight in the Indian Ocean, and destroyers
patrolled the waters close to the bombers' base at China Bay, Ceylon. A
variety of aircraft types were used for patrol of the area within 300
miles of Ceylon. Forty-one aircraft took part in the raid, and only
one was forced down. The lone unfortunate B-29 ditched at 0400 on 11
August at a position 160 miles ENE of China Bay. Rescue aircraft located
the survivors the following day, and a destroyer rescued the entire
crew.60

AAF air-sea rescue in India. A small AAF rescue detachment was
attached to the RAF for operations in June 1944. With two PBY's and only
one crew, this unit afforded rescue cover for many XX Bomber Command
long-distance missions.

When the unit's pilot, 1st Lt. C. J. Graham, returned to the United
States, he made some pungent comments on his experiences. To preserve
the full flavor of his remarks, his report is quoted in full.61

1. Back in the early days of 1943, I, as one of fifty Army plots, was sent to Pensacola
for PBY training. After graduation, I was sent to pilot school, navigation school, bombardier's
school, and finally began instructing in PBY's. This continued until June 1944, when two of
us were sent to the 10th Air Force in Calcutta. Immediately upon our arrival, we were put on
detached Service of the 231st Group, a British primary command. It was planned that we would
have three PBY's and three pilots with which to operate. One fellow, already in India, was to
join us, but before we arrived, he had been placed on B-24's and had finished his missions so
that he was no longer available. After we arrived in India, we found that our Canadian built
PBY's had to be "beefed-up" before they could be used. This required about four months during
which the kid who flew over with me turned the one flyable plane over, killing, himself and ten
others. That left me with the responsibility of doing all the rescue work. As a result, I flew
250 hours in two and one half months. That is why I'm home. I couldn't take it. There were
six officers and forty enlisted men in our organization. There were myself and one other
American as pilot and co-pilot, two RAF navigators, and two RAF radio men. The rest of the
outfit was American. After my buddy was killed, I had two ships, so I flew one while the
other was being repaired. One Thursday night, I took off on an 18-hour mission, returned and
was on the ground only one hour, when it became necessary to fly a 9-hour mission. I returned
from this and was on the ground for five hours before I had to go out again on a 14-hour
flight. When I came back, it was Sunday. We were in no particular danger, so the least we
could do was to give all our support to the boys who were getting shot up, even though it
meant flying long hours. Finally, just before I left, the Army sent a full squadron in to do
the work we had been doing. It arrived just a year too late for the CBI has just about folded
up as far as air-sea rescue is concerned. Three PBY's and three crews would take care of all
the work there, but they sent the squadron there a year late.

2. We worked entirely with B-29's. The set-up was coordinated so that when the big friends
would go out on a strike we would follow. It was timed so that after they had left the target
and were about twenty minutes on the return, we would meet. We would turn with them and
follow them home. In other words, we would patrol their course out and back. The biggest
discrepancy to my knowledge, and one that the 20th Bomber Command refused to do anything
about, at least as for as I know, was the fact that the bomber radio frequencies weren't
coordinated with ours. When one of them was shot up or on fire, and he had to ditch, he had
to relay a message to his home base. They in turn would send a message to the 231st Group,
which was our headquarters, who would send it to us. All this time wasted, and we were only
twenty minutes away from any of the bombers. Instead of coordinating their frequencies
with us, they had to go through all these channels. I know of three crews I could have saved
if they could have communicated directly with us. They might have that worked out by now, but
they didn't have when I left. We were supported by stripped down RAF B-24's. When I left,
they had begun to use B-17's equipped with lifeboats. At this time they were experimenting
with this ASR equipment and finally perfected it. To date, I've never heard of anybody using
the boats dropped.

3. The greatest difficulty in air sea rescue lies in the survival equipment in the planes.
Life rafts have just about one third of the pyrotechnics they needed. Those provided are too
small. The pyrotechnics put in a life raft to be used in operational aircraft should include the
largest Very signals obtainable. The present equipment can't be seen, especially on a hazy day.
I rescued thirteen men one time because one man out of the thirteen know how to use the
signal mirror with the little cross in it. That's the only thing that saved them. Special
Instruction in the use of that mirror and a lot more pyro-technics will save many more crews.
We found the best altitude for search to be 500 feet or below. A dinghy from 500 feet looks
like a spool of thread, but still a follow in a dinghy with a Very pistol will shoot it
right square at you every time instead of shooting it at 90 degrees as he should. By doing
this, attention is attracted to the trail of smoke. If he shoots it right at you, it looks
just like a tiny red dot. There are so many reflections on the water that it is always
difficult to distinguish a raft. I've seen sharks and monster turtles surface which were
so similar in color to a raft (a bright yellow) that I've circled them for hours many times.
Even after you see a dinghy on the water, it's awfully hard to hold him. Once you spot one,
if you take your eye off it, I'll give you odds that you'll lose it unless it's a perfect
day. When we picked up a life raft, I would lose it unless I kept my eye on it while the
copilot flew the plane. You don't have any trouble with the crews once you pick them up.
The fellows I picked up were pretty good. They're pretty scared and they'll do anything you
tell them. To get a "Cat" (PBY) off the water you have to put the load up in front. You
won't break water unless they're up forward. I landed one night about one o'clock contrary
to orders and was almost court-martialed for doing it, to pick up the crew of a B-29 ,
radar snooper plane. It had come up from Singapore, run out of gas, ditched, and floated
for four days. A B-24 was circling him, as were two RAF "Cats." They had told me not to land
on the water at night, but I did, so, we pulled eleven men on board and one dead man. There
was another dead fellow in the tail of the B-29, so I sent three of the crew members out
for him. With a crew of ten, that made twenty-three. We had a tough time taking off. 0n
the first trial, the ship yawed to the right, the wing float hit the water, and I had to try it
again. After a run of about three miles, she picked up, but hit five times before we got off.

4. Maintenance on a "Cat" is anyone's nightmare. There wasn't a part in that theater. I
had to fly 900 miles to get' parts for the airplanes. A nose wheel tire on a PDY is a 30-inch
tire. It's the only plane in the world that uses them, and there weren't any of them over
there. The Dutch were using B-25 tires, which are the same size on the outsides but the PBY
wheels are like doughnuts. I had six of them ordered, and I did get two, but I never
used them. The hydraulic systems are bad. The pumps installed are no good. They take a 214
PA pestile pump which we changed to a bigger pump. The fuel transfer system up in the engineer's
tower is always a source of trouble. We substituted a B-25 system for the PBY system. The gas tanks
leak, too. We had to tear every bit of radio out of the plane, beef up the bottoms, and put in
new equipment. It took about two months on one plane and three months on another. We had to
install new radio compasses. How those airplanes were ever passed by Army inspectors is more
than I'11 ever understand. They had Canadian radio compasses and radar equipment. We arrived
overseas to find there wasn't one bolt that we could replace. It cost the Army the initial cost
of that airplane to modify it.

5. There are a few other recommendations which I would like to make.
(1) Fellows that are going overseas in PBY's are not getting enough water work.
There's just as much difference between water and land flying as there is between
an automobile and a boat. The Army doesn't have anyone who realizes what it's
like to fly an amphibian. (2) Every amphibian unit should have one or two
decontamination units to wash them off. In two weeks, if we didn't you could
knock every rivet out. I borrowed a decon unit and was lucky enough to keep it.
The outfit there now doesn't have one, and they need something with which to wash
their planes. (3) There is a mixture called perakaton used to keep salt water off
stainless steal parts, wheels, and fittings which can't be painted. It's a
solution with a bees-wax base which looks like axle grease. You've got to have it
to keep salt water from chewing up your landing gear. (4) The biggest trouble we
had was that we couldn't get our enlisted men promotions because we were a
detached outfit, and the 10th Air Force didn't hand them out. I was a 2nd
Lieutenant twenty-one months. Finally made the grade last October.

Rescue cover provided by the British began to prove inadequate late
in l944, when XX Bomber Command missions were stepped up. Requests
for more rescue facilities were met by stationing the British No. 212
Squadron at Karachi, with. the mission of providing rescue aid in the Bay
of Bengal and along the west coast of India. This proved insufficient,
however, and the AAF 7th Emergency Rescue Squadron was activated on 25
January 194+5.(62) Two flights of the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron were
deployed from Italy to serve as the nucleus of the new organization,
which was authorized personnel and equipment under the provisions of
T/O & E 1-987. OA-10's, B-17's, L-5's, and PT-19'a made up the
squadron's aircraft.(63)

Operational flying began in March, and the first month's activities
included 43 missions and 16 rescues. Over one-half of the missions were
flown over land areas, and land search and rescue became increasingly
important in the following months as the India-based bombers moved to
bases closer to Japan.(64)

In August 1945 the squadron was moved to Okinawa, but did not
arrive there until after the end of hostilities.(65)

China. On 18 May 1945 the Air Search and Rescue Section of the
China Air Service Command was established in Headquarters, XIV Air Force
Service Command. The section was to be the control center for distress
data in China, and in that capacity evaluated and passed on for action
all distress information. The 8th Emergency Rescue Squadron was charged
with carrying out the section's directives for search and rescue
activity.(66)

Two days after this organization was formed, the first incident--a
C-47 search operation--took place. The first rescue, on 27 May, was
accomplished by three helicopters of the 8th ER Squadron. By 15 June
six more helicopter rescues had been accomplished. From its formation
until 10 September 1945 the rescue section received 138 reports of
distress cases. Search operations were carried out in 110 instances,
and 43 rescues were accomplished.(67)

The 8th ER Squadron was the only unit among those engaged in rescue
activities in World War II to be equipped solely with helicopters and
C-47 search aircraft. The mountainous terrain in which the squadron
operated provided a through test of the helicopter's proficiency in
rescue operations, and the results were extremely satisfactory. On
the basis of helicopter performance in China, the Chief of Air Staff,
Headquarters, AAF was told, "Helicopters are proving an important
addition to AAF emergency rescue facilities . . . this is especially
gratifying in view of the fact that helicopters are now standard unit
equipment for emergency rescue squadrons."(68)

Conclusion

The almost complete absence in the Pacific of any rescue
facilities other than those provided by the United States was a
unique situation for the AAF in World War II. Though rescue
efficiency undoubtedly suffered thereby, this lack of outside
support did serve the purpose of forcing the AAF to work out its
own policies for air-sea rescue.

Navy control of rescue cover in the Central Pacific Theater,
unsatisfactory as it was to the AAF, provided an opportunity to
compare the merits of the AAF's desire for air force-level command
over air-sea rescue activities with the Navy's preference for
area responsibility. The results strengthened AAF determination to
retain responsibility for air-sea rescue affecting its own personnel,
and reaffirmed its belief that rescue responsibility in a combat
theater should be assigned to that theater's air forces. the
necessity of naval assistance in CENPAC also served to emphasize AAF
shortcomings in equipment and maintenance.

The variety of conditions found in the Pacific Theaters and the
CBI, from tropic islands and trackless seas to mountainous regions
and jungle areas, afforded grueling tests for AAF air-sea rescue
equipment. The OA-10'S AND B-17'S with airborne lifeboats were not
found satisfactory. The seaworthiness of the former and the range
of the latter were limited. The short range of the B-17 was overcome
to a certain extent by assigning B-29's to long range search duties,
and experiments with equipping a modified B-29 with an airborne
lifeboat were under way by the Japanese surrender. The
deficiencies of the OA-10's which had always been considered an
unsatisfactory though necessary makeshift, were not unforeseen,
but the lessons learned from their use in the Pacific were of value
in determining the desired characteristics of their eventual
replacement.

Naval contributions to AFF air sea rescue efforts could not be
overlooked. Navy surface vessels and submarines were indispensable
to rescue cover, and the importance of AAF--Navy cooperation in
future rescue operations was emphasized by this fact.

Rescue operations in the Pacific thus engendered AAF over-all
policies for rescue activities; served as a testing ground for
rescue equipment (including the helicopter), and made it clear
that air-sea rescue success would always be dependent on a close and
friendly relationship with the Navy.

Chapter VI
OTHER AREAS

Introduction. Over water flying by the AAF during World War II was
not confined to the waters surrounding the United States and
in the principal areas of combat. Air transport routes in the
North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and the Pacific were
constantly in use. Antisubmarine patrols along the coast of
the United States, in the Caribbean, and off the coast of
Alaska were flown by the AAF. In addition, the Aleutian
Islands campaign involved numerous over water flights. All of
these AAF activities required air-sea cover, but it received it
in somewhat haphazard manner.

Although the Air Transport Command's (ATC) Caribbean
Division inaugurated an air-sea rescue service in 1943, and the
Navy and AAF, acting jointly, took similar action in the
Hawaiian region, no such systematic provisions were made in
the Panama Canal area, Alaskan coastal waters, or the North
Atlantic. In these regions much of the responsibility for air-
sea rescue was placed on the operational units themselves.

Several explanations may be cited for this seeming lack of
concern. In the North Atlantic the air route closely followed
that of surface convoys. Constant air and sea protective
cover for the stream of ships bearing supplies and personnel
to the Allied forces in Europe made the establishment of a
formal air-sea rescue organization superfluous. Two specialized
rescue units were stationed along the great circle route, but
these were arctic search and rescue squadrons whose activities were
concerned with the wastes of the ice-bound Arctic rather than rescue
from the sea. The presence of large-scale naval concentrations in the
Alaskan waters and on the Pacific side of the Isthaus of Panama
precluded extensive AAF air-sea rescue organizations in those regions.
In the Caribbean and the South Atlantic naval facilities also figured
in rescue planning.

Even where there was an obvious need for improved air-sea rescue
service however, necessary equipment and personal were often slow in
coming. The global character of the war so strained the production
and manpower resources of the United States that areas where the need
was still urgent but less critical were sometimes neglected. The
equipment supplied to emergency rescue squadrons even in combat areas
was sometimes old and inadequate. Other regions took what was left
when there was any surplus.

The Caribbean

The chief AAF air-sea rescue establishment in the Caribbean was
organized by ATC's Caribbean Division. The division's first step
toward a rescue organization was the activation of an air-sea rescue
boat unit at Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, Florida, on 26 February
1943.1 The boat unit, a quartermaster boat company already based at
the field, had provided rescue services 1941, but its efficiency had
been lowered by morale difficulties stemming from the use of mixed
civilian and military crews, and by uncertainty over its assignment
and mission.2
With the assignment of the unit to ATC its services were extended
by stationing boats at key islands along the Bahamas, specifically at
Cat Cay Exuma, Mayaguana, and South Caicos. These became checkpoints
for aircraft traveling the route. Each plane was required to report
by radio as it passed a checkpoint, giving its number, position, and
altitude. Nassau was also a checkpoint, but since a British rescue
boat unit was already established there, no AAF unit was needed.
Expansion of the facilities at the four island bases began
immediately. Permanent radio facilities and buildings to house
personnel were put up on all four, and a landing strip was constructed
at South Caicos.3

As an effort to provide directional guidance for rescue attempts,
four carrier pigeons were assigned to each aircraft flying from
Morrison Field, Florida; Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico; Waller Field,
Trinidad; and Belem Field, Brazil. The experiment was in effect from
January through July 1944, with inconclusive results. Theoretically,
if a ditching became necessary, the pigeons were to be released with
messages giving the position of the plane. In practice, the aircraft
crews had little confidence in the birds' ability, often refused to
accept them, and failed to use them in distress.4

More efficient aid for distressed aircraft was afforded in August
1944 by D/F installations at Morrison Field; 36th Street Airport,
Hialeah, Florida; Borinquen Field; Vernam Field, Jamaica; Atkinson
Field, British Guiana; Barbados, British West Indies; Hato Field,
Curacao; Waller Field; and Batista Field, Cuba. Airfields in Antigua,
Dutch Guiana, French Guiana, South Caicos, and at Nassau were later
added to the circuit. When a call was received from a plane desiring
a fix, the ground station which received the message notified all
other stations in the network, giving them the necessary information
results to one of the three not evaluation stations at Mami,
Borinquen, and Atkinson. The fix was plotted and the result given to
the aircraft or relayed through the station which had received the
original request.5

If a distress call requiring direct action was received, all
planes and ground stations in the area were directed to guard the
distress frequency of 500 kilocycles, rescue boat were alerted, rescue
airplanes dispatched, and assistance requested from AAF operational
units, the RAF, and the U.S. Navy.6 An overdue AAF B-25 en route from
Puerto Rico to Trinidad evoked a rescue search by 49 aircraft and 2
blimps. The search was abandoned on the eleventh day, after debris
and a lifeboat from the plane were found on an island near Trinidad.7

By December 1944 the Caribbean Division rescue organization had
four aircraft-two OA-10's, an OA-9, and a B-18 (an obsolescent bomber
type). The amphibious craft were provided with radar equipment, and
all planes carried AN/CRN-1 radio transmitters, to be dropped when
survivors were found. These devices automatically ejected a fish-pole
antenna on striking the water and began transmitting a continual radio
signal that aided in guiding rescue boats to the scene. Surface craft
assigned to the unit included eight 63-foot, one 45-foot, and two 22-
foot boats. For operation in the shallow waters of the Bahamas, the
boat unit preferred 63-foot craft to the 104-foot boats originally
assigned. The larger craft had been exchanged over a period of time
for those better suited to the operating conditions.8

The greatest difficulty faced by the rescuers was the shortage of
rescue aircraft. This need was confirmed by the search and rescue
statistics for the first six months of 1944. During that period there
were 18 incidents in the Caribbean which required the use of rescue
facilities. In even instances no search was required, in two more the
search was of short duration because they occurred near an airfield,
but extensive search was needed in the other nine cases. Three of the
aircraft sought for in the longer searches were found, but 6-all
B-24's-were never located, and 61 persons were lost as a result. At
the time these statistics were compiled the rescue aircraft numbered
two, both OA-10's.9 The request in November 1944 for seven additional
planes-four OA-10's, one OA-9. one B-18 and one L-4-was therefore a
reasonable one, but only two planes had arrived 45 das later.10

The Isthmus of Panama

Further west, AAF responsibility for rescue rested with the Sixth
Air Force, charged with protection of the Panama Canal. But the major
burned of rescue activities was borne by a Navy patrol wing which
operated a search patrol on the Pacific side of the Isthmus of Panama.
The Navy wing had 20 PBY's stationed at Coco Solo, Canal Zone (14);
Salinas, Ecuador, the Gulf of Fonseca (1), and Santa Cruz Island, in
the Galapagos (2). These planes flew scheduled search missions
primarily for the purpose of finding and reported any enemy activity
that might be directed toward the canal, but they were also used for
search and rescue.11 Sixth Air Force itself was assigned two
amphibious planes in May 1943, but no aircraft specifically designated
for air-sea rescue until the spring of 1945.12

Surface rescue facilities on the Pacific side of the Isthmus were
provided by the AAF 12th Emergency Rescue Boat Squadron, activated in
June 1944. This organization of 200 officer and enlisted men was
equipped with antiquated 104-foot boats hardly suitable for their
mission. The subsequent assignment of 63-foot craft and new 85-foot
boats greatly increased the squadron's effectiveness.13

The South Atlantic

Rescue operations in ATC's South Atlantic Division were not
properly organized until 12 July 1944, when a full-time Wing rescue
officer was assigned to the headquarters operations section.14 As
early March 1943 three 104-foot boats had been allotted to the
division, but the order was canceled before boats left the United
States.15 Six months later a 63-foot rescue boat with its crew arrived
at Natal, Brazil, but the crew's status was so uncertain that some
months passed before it was finally assigned to the South Atlantic
Division, and operational efficiency suffered during the period of
indecision.16 Meanwhile, in December 1943, four 104-foot rescue boats
with crews arrived. Two were tentatively assigned to Ascension
Island, one to Natal, and one to Belem, Brazil, but their assignments
were not finally decided until the rescue unit was formed in July.17

When the question of operational control was finally settled, work
was begun on a plan of rescue organization. The resultant division
memorandum provided for a division rescue unit to control the
activities of the base units, a division rescue officer assisted by
two rescue control officers-one for aircraft and one for boats-and
base rescue officers who were to be in charge of both planes and
boats. The equipment, still largely o paper, was to be divided
between the three bases-at Natal, Ascension Island, and Belem-one OA-
10 aircraft to be assigned to each. This allotment of equipment was
based on the supposition that three additional boats and three OA-10's
would be assigned to the division in the near future.18

The young rescue organization faced its greatest problem after V-E
Day, as plans were announced for moving aircraft and personnel from
Europe to the Untied States in preparation for use in the war against
Japan. These plans were in three parts: Project GREEN, Project
WHITE, and one labeled simply, Redeployment of Aircraft.19

Project GREEN involved the movement of 50,000 troops from the
European and Mediterranean Theaters to the Unted States, using C-54's
and C-47's. Forty per cent of the troops were to use the South
Atlantic. The movement, to be completed between 1 June and 1 August,
would entail 26 daily round trips from Dakar, in French West Africa,
to Natal by c-54's and 31 round trips a day by C-47's from Natal to
Miami. Project WHITE referred to the movement of 4,065 four-engine
bombers from Europe to the United States. The similar east-to-west
movement of two-engine aircraft was designated as Redeployment of
aircraft.20

The rescue plan adopted on 16 May 1945 to cover these movements
counted on the Navy's cooperation in providing six destroyers: one to
be stationed between Roberts Island and Ascension Island, two between
Ascension Island and Natal, and three between Natal and Dakar.
Besides participating in rescue operations the destroyers were to take
weather observations, monitor all traffic, and relay messages. The
Navy not only agreed to furnish the destroyers, but also offered to
provide three blimps which were operating in the South Atlantic.21

AAF rescue facilities included two B-17's, one crash boat and one
OA-10 at Natal; one B-17, one boat, and one OA-10 at Ascension Island;
one B-17 at Recife, Brazil; one B-17, one boat, and one OA-10 at the
Brazilian island of Fernando de Noronha; and one boat and one OA-10 at
Belem-a total of five B-17's, four OA-10's, and four rescue boats.
Protected by these rescue facilities, a total of 52,449 troops passed
through the South Atlantic Division in June, July, and early August.
During the same period of time 4,076 aircraft passed through Natal.
On 11 August Project GREEN was suspended when it became evident the a
Pacific peace was close at hand.22

The Hawaiian Islands

Like the Ascension Island in the Atlantic, the Hawaiian Island
were stepping-stones for planes crossing the Pacific. These island
had received the first blow of the war and were aware that another
might be aimed in their direction. In view of these facts and the
extensive military establishment existent on the islands long before 7
December 1941, it is surprising that a centralized air-sea rescue
organization was not achieved until almost a year later.

On 5 October 1942 the Hawaiian Rescue Service Control was
activated to coordinate AAF and Navy rescue facilities and direct
rescue operations. Through the AAF and the Navy operated the service
jointly, all personal were provided by the Seventh Air Force.23 During
the early period of operation the control center was handicapped by
lack of communication equipment. Only eight field and dial telephones
were available, radio equipment for rescue boats was inadequate, and
delays occurred because of the necessity of relaying all message to
and from rescue craft through the airfield tower.24 A year and a half
passed before these faults were completely eradicated, but by April
1944 the control center was equipped with 25 telephone lines, a radio
transmitter and a receiver; and all rescue boats and two liaison
planes had efficient two-way radios. Although conditions were not
ideal during these first 18 months of operation the Hawaiian Rescue
Service Control directed 244 missions which saved the lives of 131
persons.25

Besides directing rescue operations, the Rescue Service Control
was charged with providing information to lost aircraft desiring to
know their position. An AAF three-section network was under its
jurisdiction, and the Navy and Federal Communications Commission's
networks (six stations each) were tied in by telephone. When a
position was received, the three networks were alerted, their findings
correlated by the control center, and the position transmitted direct
to the plane. In 1942 fixes of multiengine planes, from October 1942
to April 1944, it was found that an average 15-minute time lag
occurred. The fault lay with the lack of a predetermined rescue
communication frequency. If all the planes had been assigned the same
frequency, network operators could have maintained a constant guard
on that one frequency and much of the lost time would have been
eliminated.26

In the summer of 1944 the Army and Navy commands decided to
Separate the Rescue Service Control's two main functions. It was
Felt that both missions could be carried out more efficiently if
Each was the responsibility of a different organization. Accordingly,
The Army Airways Communications System (AACS) assumed responsibility
for aircraft-position reports on 31 August 1944, and Rescue Service
Control was left to concentrate on direction of rescue operations.27

Concurrently with the loss of one mission by Rescue Service
Control, the responsible authorities were formulating a plan for
Improved rescue operations which placed all authority under one
Command and extended rescue services into the Central Pacific Area.
A study made in June 1944 by an Air-Sea Rescue Agency liaison officer
concluded that the Navy was more adequately prepared than the AAF to
undertake such responsibility. This report, submitted to the
Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier on 28 June, pointed out that there
were two areas of rescue operations within the Commander's zone of
responsibility. The first of these, under the operational direction
of the Rescue Service Control at Hickam Field, had a radius of
approximately 25 miles. Available rescue facilities included two
liaison-type planes and a number of Army boats operated by the 927th
Quartermaster Boat Company. This area was further served by a
Number of naval air stations with rescue equipment consisting of
either on amphibious plane and a boat, or a plane only. The Joint
Operations Center (JOC) of Hawaiian Sea Frontier was also near at
hand. Action in this region could be initiated by the Rescue Service
Control, local bases, or JOC.28

The second area comprised all that lay within the jurisdiction
of Hawaiian Sea Frontier beyond the 25-mile limit surrounding Hickam
Field. Here JOC was the controlling agency, but there were local Navy
air stations at widely separated points whose facilities could be used
for rescue within 25 miles of their own bases.29

The report continued with the assertion that, even with the best
of intentions on the part of all concerned, the lack of a single air-
sea rescue controlling agency for the Hawaiian Sea Frontier command
inevitably caused delay. If an unknown aircraft were in distress in a
local base area, the base rescue organization would probably not
receive the alert immediately, since its radio facilities would be
occupied with keeping track of its own planes. Delaying factors
would also be present if the distressed plane were on the "border
line". A base rescue organization might hesitate to endanger its
rescue facilities if its responsibility was not clear. Even if JOC
was alerted and unhesitatingly accepted responsibility, it had only
one plane available for long-range rescue, and that plane was also
used for patrol duty. If the aircraft was out investigating a report
of an enemy submarine, it would be unavoidably delayed in beginning a
rescue mission.30

The report therefore recommended the establishment of a rescue
task unit under the operational control of the Commander, Hawaiian
Sea Frontier.
Its mission would be:31

1. To respond immediately to all offshore crashes with a team
consisting of at least one plane and one boat.

2. To relieve training and operational units of rescue
responsibility.

3. To study and evaluate crash incidents.

4. To distribute rescue facilities.

5. To collect and pass on rescue information to JOC.

6. To maintain liaison with all other agencies concerned with
air sea rescue.

When a distress message was received, the incident would be
reported instantly to the Control Center of JOC, which would alert
the aircraft and boat teams. This procedure would not prevent local
facilities from taking immediate action, nor the dispatch of a direct
alert to obtain rescue facilities, but it would be clearly understood
that all operations were under Joc control.32

To operate the rescue service efficiently, it was recommended that
the rescue task unit be provided with long-range patrol planes and
amphibious aircraft, helicopters, and 63-foot rescue boats capable of
a top speed of 33 knots, and a range of 550 miles at an average speed
of 25 knots.

The report did not consider the possibility of any rescue
authority other than the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier. Its
opinions were not immediately shared by all concerned, and a joint
Army-Navy committee was appointed to study the problem and make
recommendations.33

But there was little doubt that the Navy was much better prepared
than any other agency to undertake the responsibility. Naval rescue
equipment-boats in particular-was newer and better than that of the
AAF. In one instance a Navy boat was dispatched to the scene of a
rescue 20 minutes after an Army boat, traveled twice the distance, and
arrived 15 minutes ahead of the Army craft.34 In view of the need to
offer rescue service as far west as midway and Johnston atolls, the
Navy was also the logical choice.

The committee soon came to the same conclusion. Naval authorities
had perhaps anticipated the result, and a plan for an air-sea rescue
task group under Hawaiian Sea Frontier was submitted by 1 August 1944
to the Commander in Chief, Central Pacific Fleet.35

Despite acceptance of this plan, joint responsibility continued
for the rest of 1944. AAF facilities grew, in fact, with the
assignment to the Hawaiian Islands of the 13th Emergency Rescue Boat
Squadron in December. By February 1945, however, the Hawaiian Sea
Frontier Air-Sea Rescue Task Group was operating with eight PBY's,
two L-5's thirteen 63-foot boats, and other surface craft. Rescue
bases had been established at the harbors of Honolulu and Kaneohe,
Oahu Island, Hawaiian Islands; Puunene, Maui Island, H.I.; Palmyra and
Canton Islands, H.I.; and at Midway and Johnston atolls.36

Alaska and the North Atlantic

Introduction. Air-sea rescue training and equipment in World War
II did not very greatly from region to region. In the arctic and
near-arctic regions, however, conditions were such as to require a
specialized approach. In two arctic areas-Alaska and the North
Atlantic-the flying hazards were great enough to warrant the
establishment of rescue organizations, but in both regions the problem
of rescue from the sea was complicated by the terrain and climate.

As an attempt to adjust rescue activity to these conditions,
specialized personnel were trained at the Arctic Training School at
Buckley, Colorado. Three arctic rescue squadrons were activated,
serving Alaska, Greenland, and the North Atlantic. This specialized
training did not begin until the summer of 1943, however, and the
personnel were not available for rescue service until the autumn and
winter of that year.37

Alaska. Trained rescue personnel from Camp Buckley did not arrive
in Alaska until December 1943. By that time, AAF forces in the area
had already experienced the more immediate perils of combat, and the
period of urgent need for rescue cover for combat missions had passed.

The Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor had aroused the fear of a
similar attack on our ill-prepared military installations in Alaska.
The expected attack, directed against Dutch Harbor, was beaten off,
but American forces in Alaska were powerless to prevent the
establishment of enemy bases in the Aleutian Islands chain, notably at
Kiska and Attu. It was immediately apparent that these bases posed a
threat that could not be ignored, and from the attack on Dutch Harbor
until the Japanese were driven out of the Aleutians, U.S. Army and
Navy commands in Alaska worked together to repel the enemy. Their
success was achieved in large part with the aid of continual bombing,
patrol, reconnaissance, and other air missions over large water areas
and in unfavorable weather conditions.

Although the need for air-sea rescue during the campaign was
obvious, there was very little planning done, and no Army facilities
were ever earmarked for the purpose. This seeming indifference is
explained by the fact that naval airpower of a type suited for rescue
work was present in the region. Thirty Navy PBY's, whose principal
mission was patrol, provided rescue cover, and a number of naval
surface craft were available. During the period of concentrated
bombing missions on Attu, for instance, the PBY's were responsible for
antisubmarine patrol, cover for ship movements, photographic
reconnaissance, reporting of weather conditions, relaying of messages,
and air-sea rescue.38

With the end of large-scale combat operations, air-sea rescue
cover was still needed in Alaska for planes that were being ferried to
Russia. Before a formal organization was created, rescue missions
were organized on the spot. All available aircraft were called to the
point where the plane was last reported, a search pattern was decided
on, and the search began. There were of course definite disadvantages
to this procedure. It required a considerable time to organize each
search, there were no experienced personnel trained in search
techniques, and the use of operational aircraft was wasteful. These
missions were too often unsuccessful, and even when survivor were
found, the search was usually an unduly long one.39

To remedy this situation, the Alaskan Wing Search and Rescue
Squadron, ATC, was activated on 14 December 1943. The squadron was
authorized 48 officers,6 flight officers, and 165 enlisted men by T/O
& E 1-618. Their authorized equipment included six liaison-type
planes, four transport planes, two utility aircraft, six large and two
small gliders, and four helicopters. The gliders and helicopters were
never furnished, but by March 1944 the squadron had eight C-64's and
six small planes. In January 1945 two C-47's were assigned, and just
before their arrival the squadron acquired two OA-10's.40

The squadron obtained its first sled and pack dogs in February
1944 and was operating snow vehicles by March. That same spring a
small fleet began to take shape, and by 30 Augst over 30 boats ranging
from 6-foot skiffs to a 33-foot cabin cruiser were available for
rescue. A much larger craft, 85 feet long, had been assigned in July
for use on the Bering Sea, but by the time the necessary modifications
had been made at Seattle, the sea was frozen solid. The ship was
brought north to Dutch Harbor, loaned to the 10th AAF Emergency Rescue
Boat Squadron and later traded for a still larger, and faster,
vessel.41

The squadron's area of responsibility was divided into Canadian
and Alaskan sectors. At first the Wing Search and Rescue Officer was
responsible for both, but in June 1944 that office was abolished, and
two sector search and rescue officers were appointed. Flights were
based at Edmonton, Fort Nelson, and White Horse in the Canadian
sector. In Alaska they were situated at Fairbanks and Nome. In March
1944 three aircraft were assigned to each of the Alaskan bases and to
White Horse. Edmonton and Fort Nelson had two each.42

Subsequent to the activation of the Alaskan Wing Search and Rescue
Squadron, only two missing aircraft remained lost. The first was a B-
25 from the AAF Cold Weather Testing Detachment, lost in February
1944 while the rescue squadron was still getting organized. The
second was a civilian plane which disappeared in March 1945 on a
flight from Galena to Candle, both in Alaska. After an 8-day search
the effort was reluctantly abandoned, but 20 days later the pilot
walked into a camp 100 miles west of Candle, much disgruntled because
the rescuers had not found him. He overlooked the fact that he had
never filed a clearance, had not been given a weather briefing, and
had omitted to maintain radio contact during his flight.43

The squadron was expected to accomplish a number of other missions
unrelated to rescue. These included ferrying replacements to isolated
outposted and dropping supplies to them, evacuating sick and injured
persons, and carrying medical supplies and personnel. The records
show relatively few air-sea rescue missions and those usually over
island lakes or bays rather than the open sea.44

One instance of air-sea rescue was a six-day search in July 1944
for an L-4 that disappeared on a mercy flight from Churchill,
Manitoba, to an Eskimo village. The search region was outside the
squadron's area of responsibility, but the Canadian request for aid
was granted. On 12 July the missing plane was discovered on a reef in
Hudson Bay, one mile offshore from the mouth of the Bir River. A
rescue PBY landed and recovered the pilot's body, but the doctor who
had accompanied him was never found.45

A possible explanation for the lack of many sea rescue incidents
in the history of the Alaskan Wing Search and Rescue Squadron was the
presence of the AAF 10th Emergency Rescue Boat Squadron of 300 men,
with headquarters at Elmendorf Field. Although the squadron had no
aircraft, it maintained fourteen 104-foot boats which were capable of
open-sea operations, and 14 other boats of assorted smaller sizes.46

Despite the size of the larger craft, squadron personnel were
dissatisfied with their performance. When new 63-foot boats began
arriving in August 1944 there was temporary enthusiasm, but it was
soon quelled by the discovery that their high superstructure made them
hard to manage in a heavy sea, and that they were built from
unseasoned lumber which warped and let the sea in.47

As ferrying operation declined, the necessity for rescue lessened.
On 15 September 1945 the Alaskan Division (successor to the Alaskan
wing) turned its rescue organization (less personnel) over to the
Alaskan Department, which presided over its dissolution. During the
same autumn, personnel and boats of the 10th Emergency Rescue Boat
Squadron were being returned to the United States.48

North Atlantic. Ther were no large-scale combat operations in the
Noth Atlantic, but ferrying operations of even greater proportions
than in Alaska created a need for air-sea rescue. This need was
emphasized by several incidents in which valuable lives were lost.

The one which attracted most attention was the crash landing of a
B-17 from the 2d Ferrying Group on the Greenland icecap on 9 November
1942. After escaping from the plane, the crew built a shelter under
one wing, set up a radio set and began sending out SOS signals. On 24
November a C-54 sighted the party and dropped food, and four days
later a Coast Guard amphibian landed and picked up two of the men. On
30 November two men from the Ice Cap Station reached the B-17 on skis
and promised to return the following day with a motor sled. This
attempt proved disastrous when one of the two-man rescue party fell
into a crevasse and was never seen again. On 1 December the amphibian
returned and removed one moved man, but the rest of the marooned crew
decided to stay and hunt for the would-be rescuer who had disappeared.
The decision was a fortunate one, since the amphibian crashed on its
flight to base and all aboard were killed.49

The search for the missing man was continued for a week with no
results. At the end of that time the remaining rescuer and three of
the B-17 crew started out for the Ice Cap Station with the motor sled.
Tis effort also resulted in tragedy when another man was lost in a
crevasse, and the entire party was stranded when the motor sled failed
and had weather set in. They were forced to dig in for two months
until a PBY was able to land and rescue them. Life was sustained
during this long period with the aid of supplies dropped from planes.50

In the meantime, the remaining crewman at the site of the crash
were also dropped supplies. To complete their rescue, three men and a
dog team were landed five miles from the wrecked plane. They
succeeded in reaching the B-17 and bringing the men to a point where a
PBY could land, and all were finally removed from the icecap on 6
April 1943-148 days after the crash.51

In view of the length of the rescue operation a remarkable degree
of success was achieved, but at the cost not only of lives but of an
appalling number of wasted hours for the aircrews and equipment
involved. If a specific rescue unit had existed, efforts to reach the
survivors and take them to safety could have been coordinated,
undoubtedly cutting down on the time and cost of rescue.

The first efforts to establish rescue facilities on Greenland
centered around a plan for establishing combination weather, rescue,
and warning stations on the icecap. The attempt failed because of bad
weather, inadequate supplies, insufficient personnel, and lack of co-
operation from the Greenland Base Command. The report of the
operation stated that adequate rescue facilities could more easily be
provided from already established bases in Greenland.52

From the investigations of the Ice Cap Detachment, as well as from the
investigations and records of others, it is believed that it is not practical
to establish a series of rescue stations on the Ice Cap. It has been demonstrated
that a highly mobile rescue squadron operating out of the main Greenland bases can
effectively and satisfactorily carry out rescue missions. A plane that is forced
down on the inland ice is actually resting on a nearly limitless landing strip for
ski planes. Rescue in such a case is a relatively simple matter, if ski-equipped
planes are available for the operation. Planes and their crews forced down in the
marginal zone may also be reached by mobile squadron units operating out of
Narsarssuak, Sondrestrom Fjord, or Ikateq with almost as little expenditure of
effort and nearly as quickly as from an outlying rescue station. It is believed,
in fact has been demonstrated, that the First Arctic Search and Rescue Squadron is
the answer to the rescue question on the Greenland Ice Cap.

In the fall of 1943, while the abortive attempt to establish
rescue stations on the icecap was still in progress, personnel of the
1st and 3d Arctic Rescue Squadrons arrived in Greenland and
Newfoundland. Two arctic rescue squadrons were formed under the
jurisdiction of ATC's North Atlantic Division (NAD), and each was
authorized 24 officers and 72 enlisted men.* Equipment included dogs
and sleds, boats stationed
-------------------------

*The Newfoundland and Greenland Base Commands also maintained search and rescue
organizations. There were nine operating units which were located at Presque Isle and
Bangor, Maine; Manchester, New Hampshire; Goose Bay, Labrador; Gander Lake and
Stephenville, Newfoundland; Mingan, Quebec, Canada; Fort Chimo, Province of Quebec,
Canada; and upper Frobisher, Baffin Island, Canada (South, Oron P., The Development of
Rescue and Survival Techniques in the North American Arctic, p.41).

along the ferrying route, PBY's, B-17's with droppable lifeboats,
C-47's, and C-64's. On one occasion a helicopter was used for a
rescue operation, but it was obtained from Floyd Bennett Field, New
York.53

A comprehensive search and rescue plan was prepared. Search was
initiated as soon as an SOS or a report on missing aircraft was
received. If the position was known, search planes flew a grind
pattern at that point; if it were not, search was begun at a distance
from the last known position based on an evaluation of the amount of
gas remaining in the distressed plane. Ice and snow made
identification difficult, and if the first search was unsuccessful, it
was followed by another at a lower altitude. When the missing plane
was found, the search aircraft landed if possible, or supplies were
dropped and a fix requested from D/F stations. If the distressed crew
was in the water, a surface craft was directed to them, a PBY landed,
or a lifeboat dropped from a B-17. If a land rescue had to be
effected, a small aircraft, dog teams, or snow vehicles were used.
Greater emphasis was placed on air-sea rescue in Greenland than in
Newfoundland partly because there were many lakes on which a PBY could
land. Even if the distressed plane crashed on land, trail parties
could often be transported by PBY to a lake near the point of rescue
and the survivors in this manner removed more rapidly.54

The squadron performed a variety of functions besides rescue.
Supplying outposts, evacuating the injured and the sick, aiding
natives in distress, and convoying ships that were in trouble were a
few of their additional duties. In addition search procedures were
studied and evaluated, and the Greenland squadron manufactured kits to
be dropped distressed personnel.

After the end of the war the NAD rescue squadrons relinquished
their functions and were inactivated.55

Chapter VII

RESCUE EQUIPMENT AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURE

Introduction. In every area the efficiency of a rescue
organization depended to a great extent on two factor: The equipment
provided for survival and eventual rescue, and the ability of the
combat crew members to aid themselves through knowledge of correct
emergency procedure.

Much early equipment was makeshift in nature, but as World War II
progressed, improvements were made, particularly in items of
individual issue. Changes in larger items-such as aircraft and boats-
were slower in coming, but modification of B-17's and B-29's for
rescue use in 1944 and 1945 were steps in that directions. Greater
attention was directed to development of equipment after the war
ended, and by 1952 significant improvements had been achieved.

Training of combat crews in the correct procedure of caring for
themselves in distress was neglected in the first years of the war.
As the war progressed, however, the necessity for such indoctrination
was demonstrated by the number of live lost. In every theater steps
were taken to remedy this defect, and by 1944 training programs in the
United States placed increased emphasis on the techniques of rescue
procedure.

Rescue Equipment

Rescue equipment can be placed in three general categories: that
carried by individual aircrew member on his person, that carried in
each aircraft, and that used by rescue organizations in carrying out
their mission.

Personal equipment. Besides the parachute issued to all aircrew
members, those who participated in overwater flights were also
provided with emergency C-1 vest, life vests (Mae Wests), and one-man
life rafts. In preparing for a flight, the conscientious crewman
first donned his C-1 vest, a loose-fitting garment worn over his other
clothing but under his Mae West and parachute harness. In the many
commodious pockets of the emergency vest were such varied articles as:1
sunglasses; hat; woolen gloves; leather gloves; signal mirror; fishing
kit; sewing kit; water bag; knife; 10 yards of bandage; matches; and
signal flares. Since the C-1 vest was originally designed for jungle
use, it contained other items of less value to one lost at sea. These
additional articles, often removed when the vest was used for
overwater flight, included;2 sharpening stone; burning glass; fire-
starting tabs; folding machete; revolver holster; cartridges;
container for boiling water; mosquito head net; collapsible spear and
gaff; and toilet tissue.

The Mae West vest, so called because of its shape when inflated,
was worn over the C-1 vest, but under the parachute straps. Several
types of these vests were used. The A-1, filled with kapok, a water-
resistant material providing a limited buoyancy, was the first. It
was soon replaced by pneumatic preservers such as the B-3 and the B-4.
The B-3 had two separate but adjoining latex rubber cells with an
outer casing of cotton. In the B-4 the compartment were superimposed,
and a rubber-coated fabric was used for the external surface. Both
types were inflated by carbon dioxide (CO2)gas supplied by cylinders
that were a part of the vest. To inflate either preserver, the wearer
pulled down on a cord attached to two discharges levers. A plunger
was activated and pierced the caps, allowing the gas to inflate the
compartments. The vest were highly reliable if the wearer was
familiar with their construction, inspected the CO2 cylinders
regularly to see if the caps were unpunctured and checked frequently
for leaks in the vests themselves. Unfortunately these safety
measures were not always followed. All too often accounts of sea
rescues stated that the Mae West failed to function properly, or that
only one side became inflated.3

The one-man life raft was designed to be carried by each
individual in one-two-and three-place planes. Although it measured
roughly 60x40x12 inches when open and inflated, the raft and its
contents were packed compactly enough to be attached to the bottom of
the back-type parachutes. It was inflated in the same manner as the
Mae West. Equipment provided in the early rafts was limited to the
following:4 sea anchor; bailing cup; first-aid kit; repair kit; two
collapsible paddles; water; sea marker; rations; distress signals; and
sail. An improved raft, the C-2 was slightly smaller, but more
commodious. In addition to the articles mentioned above, the survivor
was also provided with the following:5 pump; bailing sponge; spray
shield; collapsible aluminum mast; sail with rigging; and desalting
kit.

Aircraft equipment. Large aircraft had extensive emergency
equipment stowed in the body of the plane or in special compartments
from which the emergency gear was automatically released on contact
with the water. B-29, for instance, carried three large life rafts I
which the entire crew could find refuge, each containing such items as
the following:6 pyrotechnics projector (Very pistol); distress signals;
sea marker; flashlight; signaling mirror; whistle; radio transmitter
with kite and balloon; repair kit; sail with rigging; blue and yellow
tarpaulins; hand pump; desalting kit; water; rations (nine boxes of
Army Ration Type K); first-aid kit; fishing kit; sunburn lotion; and
religious booklet.

An important addition to the list of emergency equipment was a
portable radio transmitter, the SCR-578. This compact "Gibson Girl"
radio, so called because of its shape which allowed the instrument to
be held firmly between the knees of the operator, was manually
operated by turning a crank, and broadcast its SOS on the
international distress frequency of 500 kilocycles. The first Gibson
Girl sets were provided with a box kite to raise the aerial aloft.
The possibility of a period of calm during which the kite would not
cooperate led first the RAF and later the AAF to include a gas-filled
balloon in the emergency kit. Criticism still continued because of
the length of time required to inflate the balloon with hydrogen and
by 1945 a collapsible metal mast was also being used.7

An improved version of the Gibson Girl, the AN/CRT-3, was the same
weight and appearance, but allowed the operator to broadcast on either
of two frequencies, 500 kilocycles or 8,280 kilocycles. It was
equipped with a signal lamp like the original model and was capable of
transmitting to shore-based or other high-frequency D/F stations on
the added frequency. Aircraft or boats could still home on the 500
kilocycle signals by means of their radio compasses, but on the higher
band appropriate installations could determine the approximate
location even if situated 2,000 0r more miles away. The 8,280
kilocycle frequency was determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as
that on which joint sea-rescue communications would be sent.8

Besides the portable radio transmitter which allowed survivors to
take direct action to establish their location, they were provided
with two other aids-corner reflectors, designated as MX-137A's, and a
device known as "Walter." Both these devices and a third called
resonant dipoles were tested at Eglin Field, Florida, in the spring of
1944. The corner reflector consisted of a collapsible aluminum frame
set on a collapsible rod of the same material and covered with loosely
woven metal cloth. When assembled and hoisted, it afforded a target
for radar equipment. Tests revealed that it could be seen on radar
equipment for as far as 18 to 20 miles under certain conditions, and
the reliable maximum distance of detection was placed at 15 miles. In
testing its efficiency for use by one person adrift in a life vest,
the reflector was mounted on a simulated man (a nail keg upended in
the water), and found to be readily detectable at a maximum range of 7
miles if the search plane flew at an altitude between 500 and 1,000
feet.9 Although the latter test seemed to indicate the desirability of
including the device in issues of individual emergency equipment, the
U. S. Navy later declared that corner reflectors were of negligible
value when used by individuals adrift in life jackets.10 Nevertheless,
the AAF often included the reflector as one of the items placed in the
C-1 emergency vest. This was possible because it weighed only 20
ounces and measured only 14x3 inches when collapsed.11

"Walter," a lightweight VHF transmitter developed by the British,
broadcast on a frequency of 45 kilocycles. Although tests
demonstrated that Walter was superior as far as maximum range of
detection was concerned (25 to 30 miles from an altitude of 5,000),
the corner reflector was preferred. Walters's weight of 2½ pounds was
greater than that of the reflector; detection of Walter gave only
position while the reflector afforded both position and range;
Walter's operational life was 20 hours, while that of the reflector
was indefinite; and Walter lacked security on its frequency.12

The third detection device, resonant dipoles, consisted of metal
tubes suspended from a balloon attached to the life raft. They were
found to be unsatisfactory because detection was uncertain and the
range short.13

Of all the devices for attracting rescuers to the scene of
distress (including those discussed above and the whistles, signaling
mirrors, pyrotechnics, sea dye, and smoke bombs also used), the
portable radio was the most effective. The signal emitted by the
radio was at times received from as great a distance as 870 miles, and
other instances of unusual range included 780 miles, 220 miles, 150
miles, and 100 miles. The importance of its use was strikingly
illustrated by the report of a ditching incident of 9 May 1944 in the
South Atlantic between Natal, Brazil, and Ascension Island. Because
the plane was on fire when the ditching occurred, it was impossible to
transfer the Gibson Girl to the life raft. For three days and nights
in heavy for the distressed crew floated in their life raft, often
hearing search planes but unable to attract their attention. When the
fog lifted on the fourth day, a search plane spotted the raft and
dropped a radio transmitter. On the fifth day a surface craft was
able to locate and pick up the survivors after homing in on the Gibson
Girl signal.14

Although signals from the Gibson Girl transmitter could be
received on a variety of airborne and land-based receivers, a radio-
receiving set (AN/ARR-6) was specifically designed for the reception
of distress message. This device (first tested in April 1945)
automatically received any message on the Gibson Girl frequency (500
kilocycles). Installation of the sets precluded the danger of a
plane's being unaware of the presence of a destressed aircraft near
by. Not only did this new receiver provide an unfailing monitor for
distress signals, but it also drew attention to reception of a message
by means of a flashing red light mounted on the pilot's instrument
board. The set was small, only 225 cubic inches, and light, weighting
5½ pounds. It had operating range of from 200 to 400 miles.15

The radar detection device used in the corner-reflector test at
Eglin Field, and commonly used in rescue aircraft, was known as air to
surface vessel (ASV) radar equipment. It operated on a frequency of
176 megacycles and worked best when an auxiliary beacon was installed
on the object to be detected. Walter and other corner reflector both
produced favorable results when used with ASV.16

Rescue organization equipment: Airborne. Aie-sea rescue craft
were equipped with a large variety of emergency items. In 1945 a
rescue B-29. largest aircraft used for rescue, carried large life
rafts, raft-accessory kits, first-aid kits, emergency-sustenance kits,
Gibson Girl transmitters, and emergency-signal kits. Smoke grenades,
which were dropped to mark the spot at which survivors were found,
were also included. The rafts, designated as E-1 and E-2, had a
capacity of 2,500 pounds and were dropped from the bomb bay of the
rescue plane. Other rescue aircraft, PBY's and B-17's and the cargo-
type planes occasionally used, were similarly equipped. The
sustenance kits and all other emergency items fitted with parachutes
and dropped through the bomb bay or from the cargo-loading door if the
aircraft was not a combat-type plane.17

A typical emergency-sustenance kit, the E-5, was enclosed in a
large wooden box covered with yellow canvas. The E-5 included the
following items:18 24 packages of Army Ration Type K; first-aid kit;
iodine swabs; boric ointment; flashlight; bucket; compass; two glass
match cases; hunting knife; hand axe; mirror; two large candles;
fishing kit; six red flare candles; tarpaulin; two cans sea marker;
and 30 cans of drinking water.

Another emergency kit, the E-11, designed to supply the needs of
survivors for a short time, contained:19compass; matches; 2 cups;
fishing kit; first-aid kit; gloves; 4 heat pads; 6 knitted helmets;
knife; floating identification-type lamps; survivor's manual; signal
mirror; tarpaulin; pyrotechnics projector; 12 life-raft rations; sea
marker; 2 signal flares; sponge; sunburn ointment; whistle; water; and
water bag.

The Sea Rescue Gear, Type A-1, like the emergency-drop equipment
perfected by the British early in the war, consisted of five inter-
connected units attached to a parachute. One of the nits contained a
life raft, and the other four held miscellaneous supplies for survival
and rescue purposes. Forty-five items in all were included.20

An ever-present problem in rescue operations was maintaining
contact with the survivors after the initial discovery of their
position. Smoke bombs were provided to assist in this task, but their
effectiveness lasted only a few moments. If the air or sea craft
which was to perform the actual rescue was not at hand and the search
aircraft left the scene, the search had to be repeated. One solution
was a single-tube, battery-powered, low frequency radio transmitter
(AN/CRN-1) that could be launched into the water from the rescue
plane. A six-foot "baseball-type" parachute lowered the set to the
water where it automatically began emitting a radio signal which
served as a homing device for any aircraft or boat having a radio
compass. A timing knob could be set before the apparatus was dropped
to determine the time that transmission would begin. By turning the
knob, the set could be adjusted so that transmission would begin from
10 minutes to 12 hours after the drop. Continuous operation over 12-
hour period was assured.21

A similar device, to be carried in the distressed plane itself,
began to be developed in 1952. This was the crash-locator beacon, an
automatic electronic device designed to transmit distress signals.
The beacon contained its own ejection device and parachute. The pilot
of the distressed aircraft could manually eject the beacon if he had
sufficient notice of impending disaster. If it were not manually
ejected before the crash or ditching, it was automatically thrown up
and away from the plane at the time of the landing. The parachute
then lowered the beacon to the land or water surface, an antenna was
extended, and transmission of a distress signal began immediately.22

Development of a crash-location ground recorder and of D/F
equipment to be used with the crash-locator beacon was also in
progress in 1952. An airborne HF/OF receiver and homer would also be
used with the beacon, as would a portable set designed for the use of
ground rescue parties.23

Other rescue aids in the development stage in 1952 were an ultra
high frequency (UHF) homing adapter, an omni-range receiver with
distance-measuring equipment and course-line computer, electronic air-
craft-identification equipment, and an airborne public address system
to be used for giving directions to survivors.24

A significant development in rescue equipment during World War II
was the airborne lifeboat. First used by the British, the idea was
adopted by the AAF for use with the B-17 and the B-29. The A-1
lifeboat, carried by the B-17, was of laminated mahogany plywood,
five-eighths of an inch thick. This was strong enough to withstand
winds of 40 miles an hour and 20-foot waves. It was 27 feet long with
a 7.5-foot beam, and contained 20 watertight compartments. The boat
had two air-cooled engines that operated independently. Each was
capable of moving the boat at five knots, and with both running, a
speed of eight knots could be attained. The cursing range was 500
miles. The boat was attached to the B-17's bomb shackles at four
points, and released by the mechanical bomb-salvo lever.25

When the boat was dropped, three 48-foot parachutes opened, and
200-yard rocket lines were ejected as life lines and sea anchors when
it struck the water. Self-righting chambers, automatically inflated
with carbon dioxide, enabled the boat to remain right side up. Packed
in each boat was enough food, water, and clothing for 12 persons for
20 days.26

To supplement the fresh-water provision of 30 cans of water, there
were 30 desalting kits, and the salt-water stills attached to each
engine automatically changed salt water into fresh whenever the
engines were in operation. Food items consisted of 120 lifeboat
rations and 20 life raft rations. Each lifeboat ration provided two
meals for two men for one day. Life raft rations contained candy,
chewing gum, vitamin tablets, and cans could be heated by placing them
in the salt-water stills. Clothing items included 10 raincoats, 2
pair of boots, 12 pairs of socks, 24 shirts, 12 pairs of pants, and 12
hats. Other items for personal comfort were five cartons of
cigarettes, three cartons of gum, salt-water soap, eight blankets, and
four air mattresses. other equipment included:27 8 cups; 2
flashlights; 4 containers of sunburns cream; 1 sponges; 1 fishing kit;
10 water bags; 2 containers of blood plasma; 1 first-aid kit; 1
inflation pump; 3 containers of sea markers; 10 smoke signals; 1 tool
kit; 1 tarpaulin (yellow on one side, blue on the other; if used to
attract attention, the yellow side was placed up; if used for
camouflage, the tarpaulin was reversed); medical instructions;
navigation instructions; and survival booklet.

Placed in special compartments in the boat itself were many other
items. A mainsail, a jib, and mast and rigging were provided. To
simplify their assembly, the various parts of the sails and rigging
were marked with identifying colors, which were referred to by
appropriate instructions. Thus the survival booklet contained such
simple directions as: "Snap the black snap hook to the eyelet in the
black corner of the jib." Oars and oarlocks, a sea anchor, a taffrail
log with log line, a fixed compass and two wrist compasses, a clock, a
fire extinguisher, a bilge pump, and a radio with antenna were also
part of the lifeboat equipment.28

After the survivors succeeded in reaching the lifeboat, they were
instructed to pick out their leader, set watches, and appoint one of
their members to keep the logbook. Before further action, the
centerboard was put in place, the rear fins (which acted as
stabilizers during the parachute drop) were jettisoned, and the rudder
placed in position. If there was a favorable wind the sails could be
assembled and hoisted; if not, the engines were started with the aid
of an instruction booklet. Meanwhile, some of the personnel sent
radio distress messages, others determined their position and set a
course (usually given by the rescue aircraft), and an inventory of the
available supplies was taken.29

The A-3 airborne lifeboat was designed for use with the B-29. It
was longer and wider than the A-1 (30 feet 9/16 inches x 6 feet 81/2
inches), of all-metal construction, dropped by one rather than three
parachutes, powered by one rather than two inboard engines, and
carried provisions for 12 men for 30 days, but was otherwise similar
to the A-1. Other emergency gear was similar to that carried in the
original airborne lifeboat.30

In 1952 development of a third type of lifeboat, the A-4, was
begun. The A-4 would be an airborne, free-falling, personnel lifeboat
that could be dropped from an altitude of 25 to 100 feet into the sea
at a maximum speed of 180 knots. The A-4 would be carried externally
on bomb racks attached to the wing, or internally in the bomb racks of
aircraft capable of carrying 2,000-pound bomb loads. The boat would
be collapsible and self-inflating, so that it could be dropped in a
collapsed state and would inflate on reaching the water. Electronic
control from the air would be possible with the new boat. It would
carry supplies and equipment sufficient to sustain eight men for five
days.31

Rescue organization equipment: aircraft and boats. During World
War II the plane most used for air-sea rescue was the OA-10. Although
considered obsolescent even then, it was the best plane available be
cause of its amphibiousness, its slow cruising speed, its range, and
its ability to take off with as many as 25 men aboard. The OA-10 had
a cruising speed of 20 knots, slow enough so that careful scrutiny of
search areas was possible. Its range made possible a rescue radius of
from 600 to 800 miles, adequate coverage for all flights except the
longest bombing missions in the Pacific.32 The Navy rated its PBY
(equivalent to the OA-10) as being capable of open-sea landings and
take-offs in swells running as high as five feet.33 Although this may
have represented maximum performance without fear of damage to the
aircraft, many instances of successful landings and take-offs in much
heavier seas were recorded.

The principal defect of the OA-10 as a rescue plane was is in
ability to rescue survivors under adverse weather conditions. To
provide rescue facilities in such a situation, the airborne lifeboat
was developed for use with the B-17.

This converted heavy bomber, designated as SB-17 when used for
rescue, had twice the range of the OA-10, and a cruising speed of 160
miles per hour that enabled it to accompany other bombers on their
mission.34 That speed, however, was too fast for the most effective
search. Also, with the introduction of the very heavy B-29 bombers in
the war against Japan, and the inauguration of extremely long-range
bombing missions, the B-17's could no longer provide rescue cover
along the entire route of attack. The answer was to modify the B-29's
and use two of them for each long-range mission as rescue escort. The
SB-29 proved so well fitted for this role that a new version of the
airborne lifeboat (see above) was perfected after World War Two to
enable the SB-29's to carry out all the rescue activities of the SB-
17.

Cargo aircraft and medium bombers were sometimes assigned to
rescue squadrons in World War II. In air-sea rescue their use was
limited to search, dropping emergency equipment, and notifying the
position of survivors. Fighter aircraft were occasionally used,
especially in the ETO, but mainly to perform search missions, although
they carried a limited amount of drop emergency equipment. Liaison-
type aircraft were assigned to most World War II rescue squadrons, but
they were of little used in air-sea rescue except for locating ditched
aircraft within short range of the rescue base. Their primary
usefulness, because of their ability to alight in small and unprepared
areas, was in land rescue.

The seagoing equipment used by boat squadrons in World War II
varied from old 104-foot Army launches to converted pleasure craft.
In general, however, there were four classes of rescue surface craft
ranging downward from 104 feet to 85 feet, 63 feet, and 42 feet. The
last were usually considered too small for the open sea, while the
largest boats were often too old and lacked seaworthiness. The
ambitions of rescue boat squadron personnel were directed toward
obtaining the two medium-sized boats. These were capable of a range
up to 500 miles at slow speed, and up to 300 miles at a top speed of
33 knots. The greater speed of aircraft, the ability of the B-17's
and B-29's to drop rigid, self-propelling lifeboats to survivors, and
the adoption of helicopters as rescue craft, led to the abandonment of
surface craft by AAF air-sea rescue units. A contributing factor to
this decision was the inability of the emergency rescue boats
squadrons to function in long-range overwater flights such as the B-29
missions to Japan in 1944-45.

In the period between World War II and the beginning of the Korean
was there was developed a specific plane for air-sea search and
rescue, the SA-16. Originally amphibious, it became "triphibious"
with the addition of skies for ice and snow landing. The SA-16 is a
two-engine plane carrying a crew of four-pilot, co-pilot, navigator,
and radio and radar operator. Two medical attendants are often added.
It has a capacity of 12 stretcher patients or 10 passengers. Its
cruising speed is 225 miles per hour and its maximum speed 247 miles
per hour at sea level. The SA-16's low stalling speed of 79 miles per
hour increases its efficiency in a sea search, where the ability to
fly at a slow speed is essential. Its cruising range of 2,700 miles
gives it an effective search range of over 1,000 miles. The open-sea
take-off abilities of the SA-16 are enhanced by the possibility of
attaching jet-assisted take-off (JATO) units on each side of the
cabin. The units can be fastened to the doors from inside.35

Perhaps the most important advance in air-sea rescue equipment has
been the successful development and adaptation of the helicopter. Its
characteristics not only enabled it to perform routine air-sea rescues
with greater dispatch than either amphibious or lifeboat-dropping
aircraft, but also opened two new vistas for rescue efforts: the
rescue of personnel from behind enemy lines and the speedy evacuation
of wounded from front-line positions. Because of this effort on the
concept of a rescue squadron's functions, the story of the development
of this unique aircraft may be of interest.

Army interest in the helicopter dated as far back as 1918, but
research lagged until 1938 when Congress appropriated $2,000,000 for
development of rotary-wing aircraft and other similar types.36
Inspired by this promise of financial reward, two groups secured
aircraft contracts in 1940. The first ship offered, the XR-1, built
by the Platt-LaPage Aircraft Company, was not satisfactory, nor were
later models produced by the same company. Vought-Sikorsky Aircraft
was more successful. The XR-4, built in 1941-42 (modeled on
Sikorsky's VS-300, made five years earlier), attained the prescribed
Army standards and, with modifications, was the craft used during
World War II. It was a two-place single-rotor plane with an auxiliary
tail rotor to counter-act the torque reaction of the main rotor. It
weighed 2,400 pounds, had a 165-horsepower motor, and cost $60,000.
On the delivery flight to Wright Field, the first model was found to
have a speed of 80 miles per hour, a maximum ceiling of 11,200 feet,
and a cruising range of 112 miles.37

Modification was begun almost immediately after acceptance. The
new model, the YR-4A, featured increased rotor diameter and greater
power. In April 194, 13 of them were ordered, and the first delivery
under contract was made in July 1943. Sixteen YR-4A's were eventually
acquired by the AAF, four of which were sent to China for land-rescue
purposes.38

The XR-5 was a larger model of the original Sikorsky helicopter.
Its engine developed 45 horsepower, and its gross weight was 4,900
pounds. Five passengers could be carried at a speed of 125 miles per
hour to a height of 15,000 feet, and it was capable of sustained
flight for over four hours. Between 1942 and 1944, 210 of these
planes were ordered by the AAF, and a number of the U.S. Navy and the
RAF. All were delivered by 1946. A third modification, termed the
XR-6, has a top speed of 85 miles per hour, a range of 400 miles, and
ceiling of 13,000 feet. Although 156 helicopters of this model had
been delivered to the AAF by December 1945, they did not immediately
prove satisfactory, and the bugs were still being worked out in the
spring of 1946.39

During the years from 1942 to 1946, at least 382 helicopters were
delivered to the AAF. Some of these were used for experimentation,
and there were some losses, but a large number remained available for
operational use. Surprisingly few found their was overseas, and those
that did were not used for rescue from the sea. By 1945, however, the
table of equipment for a rescue squadron included eight helicopters.
Experimentation with helicopters in the postwar period confirmed their
effectiveness for air-sea rescue, and by 1950 they were considered an
integral part of a rescue squadron's equipment.

A demand foe helicopters with greater range and capacity led to
the development of the Sikorsky H-19 and the Piasecki H-21. The
former, capable of carrying 8 litter patients, an attendant and pilot,
or a crew of 2 with 10 passengers, was in use before 1952. The H-21
was slightly larger and could carry 12 stretcher patients and 2
crewmen including the pilot, or 14 passengers and a crew of 2.
Delivery of the H-21 was scheduled to being in 1952.40

Many suggestions for new rescue equipment and improvement of
existing items came from personnel who spoke from firsthand experience
because they either served in an overseas rescue organization or had
themselves been rescued from sea. Many pointed out the need for more
and better signaling equipment-more flares and larger ones, radar
reflectors for life rafts, and whistles for individual use. It was
suggested early in the war that one-man dinghies should be provided
for all flying personnel. It was also urged that shoulder harnesses
be provided for pilots and co-pilots, whose duties prevented them from
bracing themselves against the shock of a crash landing or ditching.41

A good deal of the criticism from rescue personnel centered on the
OA-10. Its hull was frequently characterized as "too weak" for open-
sea landings.42 However, one pilot, a veteran of 65 rescue missions in
the Mediterranean Theater, expressed the opinion that the plane was
underrated. Despite the Navy's contention that 5 open-sea landings
was the maximum allowable before an overhaul, he stated that his own
plane had made 27 before this was necessary and he though at least 20
sea landings could be safely made between overhauls.43 This point of
view was shared by few others. The OA-10 was further criticized
because of the difficulty in getting an injured survivor from a life
raft into the plane, and its radar locator equipment was referred to
as of "not much use" in finding ditched personnel.44

That these criticisms were well-founded is confirmed by the
subsequent changes and additions made in rescue equipment. The use of
one-man life rafts became standard, and additional signal devices-
including individual whistles and radar reflectors-were constantly
being produced. In replacing the OA-10, the SA-16 profited by the
criticism directed at its predecessor. Among other improvements, its
hull was sturdier, its radar equipment more dependable, and a ladder
was placed on the fuselage to aid in rescue from the sea.

Emergency Procedure

Form the time of the earliest air-sea rescue experiences in World
War II, it was apparent that one of the greatest difficulties sprang
from the inability of members of a distressed crew to aid in their own
rescue, due to insufficient training in emergency procedure. The
training and equipment of rescue organizations was worth little if
combat crews did not advance notice on the proper frequency of their
distress, or failed to prepare themselves adequately for the ditching,
or were without the equipment designed for their use. Rescues were
made under such circumstances, but luck rather than knowledge and
skill was largely responsible, and in almost every instance there were
casualties which could have been avoided if the proper procedures had
been followed. Some accounts of such incidents have already been
given in Chapter II. Many more could be cited, but one further
instance may be sufficient to point the moral. In the emergency
landing of a B-17 in the English Cannel in March 1943, the pilot
ditched across a heavy swell at 100 miles per hour. His position was
wrong and his speed too high. As a result, the plane broke into four
parts which sank immediately. The lift rafts were stowed inside the
plane instead of in the compartment provided, in pursuance to an order
by the group commander given because of a previous accident in which a
properly carried raft had broken loose in the air and fouled the tail
surfaces of the plane. Consequently, only one raft was recovered and
no other equipment. It took the crew 30 minutes to inflate the raft
and inn that interval 3 men drowned. Questioning of the remaining
crew members revealed that they had had no training or briefing in
emergency procedure.45

Such unnecessary personnel losses led to intensive study of the
problem. The institution of training program and the issue of
instruction manuals brought fruitful results. Percentages of
successful rescues in every theater rose not only through improved
equipment and increased rescue personnel, but also because aircrews
became aware of the importance to them of their own actions before,
during, and after a ditching.

Because of the similarity of these instructions, those prepared in
1944 for aircrewmen in the European Theater may be cited as typical.46

Separate ditching procedures were drawn up for the different
planes used in the theater-B-17's, B-24's, B-26's, A-20's and single-
seater aircraft. They included specific instructions for each
crewmember on his actions before, during, and after the ditching.
Manuals and posters were prepared to insure wide dissemination of the
information in graphic form. In addition, the ditching
characteristics of the planes were publicized.

The B-17 was pronounced to have such "excellent ditching
characteristics" that if undamaged and ditched properly, it might
float for as long as 30 minutes, allowing ample time for escape.47
Instructions for the B-17 crew follow: the pilot, after giving his
crew ample warning while at as high an altitude as possible, of his
intention to ditch, was to send an SOS on the established air-sea
rescue VHF channel, fasten his safety harness, and either jettison or
close his side window. He was then to decide on the direction of
approach, chiefly by the speed of the wind. In the wind velocity was
over 35 miles per hour, the approach was made into the wind. If the
wind was blowing at less than 35 miles pre hour, the ditching approach
was made parallel to the crest of the swell. Determining wind speed at
sea level was one of the most difficult decisions that faces the
pilot. He had only general instructions to aid him, primarily based
on the appearance of the sea. If there were a few white crests, the
wind was probably blowing at a rate of 10 to 20 miles per hour; if
white crest were numerous, the wind velocity was probably 20 to 30
miles per hour. Streaks of foam along the water indicated a dangerous
wind of 30 to 40 miles per hour, and if spray was blown from the top
of each crest, the wind was blowing over 40 miles per hour. Having
made his decision on the approach, the pilot was to touch down as in a
normal three-point landing at the lowest airspeed possible, using
power and flaps to regulate his approach and check his speed. If the
approach and touch-down were completed as perfectly as possible, there
were two impacts: when the tail hit, and when the forepart of the
plane settled into the water. About five seconds before the touch-
down, the pilot was to warn the crew to "Brace for ditching".48

After the initial warning, and while the approach was being made,
the other crewmembers were to jettison equipment such as unused bombs,
machine guns, cartridge boxes, and other items that might injure them
at the time of impact, close the waist windows, remove the upper
hatch, and destroy classified material. The radio operator was to
begin transmitting an SOS as soon as he received the message from the
pilot and continue until it was necessary to place himself in the
attitude for ditching. The IFF set was turned to the emergency
position and left on.

Before the touch-down, all crewmembers except the pilot and co-
pilot were to pace themselves in the radio compartment, with parachute
and blankets for padding. The co-pilot, having closed or jettisoned
his side window, was strapped in his seat. The top-turret gunner was
to point his turret's guns forward before leaving his position. The
eight crewmembers in the radio room assumed one of the two positions-
they either lay on their backs with knees slightly bent, hands over
their heads, and feet toward the pilot's compartment, or they sat
facing the tail with knees drawn up, head bent forward, and hands
clasped around their heads.

On landing, the first steps were to pull the life raft release
handles and to secure the dinghy and emergency-ration packs. Leaving
the airplane "without delay but in an orderly manner" by way of the
side windows in the pilot's compartment or by the open top hatch, the
crew was to enter the rafts, cut the lines that held them to the
plane, paddle a short distance away, and tie the lines together.49

The B-24 had poor ditching characteristics. Its high-wing design
placed the brunt of the impact on the fuselage. "Invariably" the
bomb-bay doors broke open and the aircraft disintegrated. The
ditching positions assumed in a B-17 were therefore not satisfactory
for a B-24 crew. Because of the danger of the to turret falling into
the radio room, only three crewmembers were to stay in that
compartment, with their backs against the forward bulkhead. The
remaining five crewmembers were to await the ditching in crouched
positions over the aft bomb bay. Two escape hatches were used,
certain crewmembers assigned to leave by each hatch, and a prescribed
order given for entering the two lifeboats. The need for greater
haste in a B-24 ditching accounted for these differences in methods of
departure from a downed plane.51

Ditching procedure for the B-26 and A-20 aid not differ
appreciably from the B-17, although with the A-20 it was believed that
the navigator would always have to bail out.52 For single-engine
aircraft the standard procedure was not to ditch but to bail out,
because their high speed and smaller surfaces caused them to break up
and sink rapidly. This at least simplified procedure, for a fighter
pilot had only to attain sufficient altitude, transmit an SOS on the
VHF emergency channel, and leave the plane. His Mae West would keep
him afloat until he was able to climb on the one-man life raft
attached to his parachute pack.53

Preparation of manuals containing ditching instructions was only a
first step toward saving lives. The instructions that sounded so easy
to follow were difficult to remember after the strain of a long flight
in which damage to the plane might have occurred, and injured or dead
crewmembers might be present to make impossible rigid adherence to the
SOP. In the stress of preparing for a crash landing under such
conditions, the decision as to which equipment to jettison was often
difficult and sometimes capricious (on one occasion it was discovered
that an over enthusiastic crewmember had jettisoned the Gibson Girl
radio). The force of the ditching often made it difficult to leave
the plane in "an orderly manner." Actual practice was therefore
needed so as to make these emergency activities familiar to the crew.
Earnest attempts were made, both in combat areas and in the Zone of
Interior, to carry on such training, and, the combat crews of 1944 and
1945 undoubtedly profited thereby. However, under the pressure of
training for combat operations it is certain that most crews were not
given sufficient instruction in emergency procedures to make their
responses automatic in case of distress.

Chapter VIII
POSTWAR PLANS, OPERATIONS, AND TRAINING

Planning. During World War II jurisdiction over air-sea rescue
activities had never been clarified. The AAF had assumed rescue
responsibility for its own personnel in spite of objections by the
Navy and the Coast Guard. In combat areas rescue organizations had
been improvised, and aid obtained from other sources when it was
available.

In the last year of the war air-sea rescue planning based on
General Kuter's memorandum of 5 August 1944* had resulted in the
publication of AAF Regulation 20-54, effective 1 March 1945. It
designated three areas of rescue activity: the United States, covered
by the four continental air forces; oversea areas; entrusted to the
overseas air forces; and transport routes, which were the
responsibilities of the Air Transport Command. ATC was to operate
rescue agencies along its routes; the air forces-both continental and
overseas-were to establish emergency-rescue control centers within
their assigned areas.
*See pp.5-7

Cooperation with the Navy continued to be a basic policy. A
letter from Headquarters, AAF directed AAF commanders to cooperate
with naval commanders in preparing a common emergency-rescue plan for
each area, and to collaborate closely with the Navy in all rescue
operations. It was not considered advisable, however, to establish
joint operations centers. The Navy issued similar instructions to its
commanders.1

Even as AAF Regulation 20-54 was being prepared, the question of
rescue responsibility was again raised. The Coast Guard was the
agency most often advocated as best suited for the task. AAF opinion,
however, continued to favor retention of responsibility within its own
organization. Admitting that the Coast Guard had borne the primary
responsibility for sea rescue off the coast of the United States since
1915, the AAF contended that no purely continental organization could
operate a service that had to extend from the "Ice Cap of Greenland to
the Jungle of Burma."2

Perhaps with an eye to a future when U.S. overseas air forces
would be withdrawn, the ATC did not join in the otherwise AAF-wide
desire to have all air-sea rescue responsibility under AAF control.
On 28 March 1945 Maj. Gen. Harold L. George wrote Lt. Gen. Barney M.
Giles expressing concern over the provisions of AAF Regulation 20-54
charging ATC with rescue responsibility on transport routes. General
George felt that ATC was "in no way equipped to carry out this
responsibility," and stated "that the only way to provide the maximum
efficient sea rescue service is by turning over that responsibility to
the Navy." The Georger letter concluded:3

. . . the Army Air Forces is not, in my opinion cannot logically be,
prepared to fulfill the heavy responsibility that rests upon it in
safeguarding the over ocean airlines of the world in a manner that
will insure that all individuals making trans-ocean flights are
provided with the maximum security and safety in the event that water
landings become necessary.

The end of war in Japan only accentuated the question of rescue
responsibility. Naval authorities continued to press the primacy of
the Coast Guard's claim and at the same time was deactivating its own
rescue squadrons. AAF spokesmen remained reluctant to change their
position through fear that AAF rescue needs would not be adequately
met if an agency outside its own jurisdiction controlled all rescue
activities. As late as November 1945, however, the ATC was unwilling
to accept responsibility for operating the rescue organization.4 No
decision was reached until after memorandum that same month by Lt.
Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations,
who discussed the problem and proposed a solution.5

General Vandenberg stated that the lack of a rescue organization
in 1941 had led to the introduction of varying systems influenced by
local conditions in the different theaters. Conflicting policies were
the result. Attempts to establish joint policies or a joint
organization had been unsuccessful, largely because of Navy
opposition. These rescue organizations faced the problem of providing
four types of cover: for operational strikes, transport routes, rear
areas, and individual bases. The AAF had provided superior cover for
strikes, but the cover for the second and third types had been neither
efficient nor economical, and rescue in the fourth category had been
largely improvised by each base.

General Vandenberg believed that six elements were needed for air-
sea rescue: control and supervision; communications facilities;
mobile, self-contained airborne rescue units; base rescue equipment;
oceangoing station vessels; and destroyers and submarines. He
asserted that the first four of these could be provided by the AAF,
but the last two could not.* The Navy however, was deactivating its
rescue squadrons and would depend on regular patrol squadrons and the
Coast Guard for postwar needs. Other factors to be considered were
the Civil Air Patrol's intention of formulating a rescue plan for the
Zone of Interior, and the results of tests and operational experience
with the helicopter. I n view of CAP's project, it was doubtful that
the AAF should maintain an elaborate rescue organization in the United
States. The helicopter experiments indicated the possibility of
developing that aircraft as an all-purpose rescue instrument which
would replace crash boats, miscellaneous ground equipment, and other
aircraft.6
*General Vandenberg dismissed the use of rescue boats by the RAF
and AAF as being "only successful" in the English Channel and even
there only in the early stages of the war. This perhaps overlooked
the number of rescues accomplished by boat crews in the Southwest
Pacific. However, for long-range patrols the rescue boats were
inadequate, and his evaluation of their use was undoubtedly based on
this fact, plus the obvious superiority of the rescue cover afforded
by Navy ships.

In summarizing, Vandenberg stated that:7
1. A joint Army-Navy rescue organization was not possible.

2. AAF coverage in combat areas was excellent, but duplication
and inefficiency existed in rear areas.

3. AAF operation of rescue control, distress-communication
facilities, and airborne rescue units had been superior, but the
rescue program as a whole had not been a success.

4. The Coast Guard was planning a comprehensive sea-rescue
program for transoceans air routes and waters near the United States
and its possessions.

Finally, he recommended approval of a directive, which would
delegate The responsibility for providing an aircraft search and
rescue service for all components of the U.S. Army to the ATC. The
ATC would be directed to establish and maintain a land-air search and
rescue organization within the United States and sea-search and rescue
agencies along ATC foreign routes, organize mobile rescue squadrons
for assignment to each theater air command, and establish liaison with
Coast Guard commanders for continental search and rescue.8

Acceptance of General Vanderberg's conclusions set the framework
within which the AAF formed its postwar rescue organization. In
accordance with his assessment of the value of sea craft, it was
decided that AAF rescue units would use only aircraft in their
operations. All AAF rescue craft longer than 45 feet were declared
excess. The smaller craft however, were retained for rescue
operations in waters near air-fields; it was expected that the Coast
Guard would assume future responsibility for rescue-boat operations in
the open sea.9

Organization. The ATC did not attempt to establish a world-wide
rescue service immediately. Its first activities were confined to the
United States, and control was extended only gradually to overseas regions.

The first move toward establishing a rescue service under ATC was
the organization of the 62d AAF Base Unit, with headquarters at
Andrews Field, Maryland, effective 23 January 1946. Personnel were
drawn from the continental air forces search and rescue base units,
which the new organization was to replace in maintaining rescue
coverage for the Zone of Interior.10 Two months later, on 13 March
1946, its designation became Headquarters, Air Rescue Service (62d AAF
Base Unit).11

To afford nation-wide rescue service, three sector control centers
were designated. These were located at Andrews Field, Maryland;
Peterson Field, Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Hamilton Field,
California. Twelve detachments aided in extending rescue service:
five were assigned to the Maryland control center (A), four to
Colorado Springs (B), and three to the California center (C).
Personnel for the detachments and control centers were drawn chiefly
from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Air Force search and rescue
base units.12

This arrangement lasted for less than a month, and in April sector
control centers B and C were consolidated, with headquarters at
Hamilton Field. Unit assignments were also charged. The only change
in the east was the shifting of the detachment at Westover Field,
Massachusetts, to Mitchell Field, New York. Units at Andrews,
MacDill, Selfridge, and Memphis retained their original assignments.
In the west, under sector control center B, the use of Peterson Field
and Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas, as bases for rescue units was
discontinued. Kirtland Field, Albuquerque, New Mexico, replaced Biggs
as a center for rescue operations in the southwest, and units at Hill
Field, Ogden, Utah; Great Falls, Montana; Portland, Oregon; March and
Hamilton Fields, California, remained in their original positions.13

Shortly after these changes were made, Headquarters, Air Rescue
Service (ARS) itself moved from Andrews Field, Maryland to Washington
National Airport on 29 May 1946, and from there to Morrison Field,
West Palm Beach, Florida, on 1 July. This last shift was made to
bring the headquarters closer to the 5th Emergency Rescue Squadron,
which had been transferred in May from Keesler Field, Mississippi, to
Morrison Field was followed by another rearrangement of units
assignments. Control centers A and B were redesignated as
headquarters squadrons A and B, with no charge of station. Westover
Field, Massachusetts, and Fort Worth, Texas, became ARS bases, while
Mitchell, Peterson, and Biggs Fields were dropped from the list. On
26 July 1946 headquarters squadrons A and B were redesignated as air
rescue squadrons. At the same time all subordinate units were
designated as numbered air rescue detachments. The 5th Emergency
Rescue Squadron was redesignated as the 5th Rescue Squadron on 11
April 1947.15

In late spring of 1947 the designations and stations of all
Air Rescue Service organizations were as follows:16

Headquarters, Air Rescue Service (62d AAF Base Unit)
Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, Florida

Air Rescue Squadron A (62D AAF BU)
Pope Field, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Air Rescue Detachment #2 (62d AAF BU)
Westover Field, Massachusetts

Air Rescue Detachment #4 (62d AAF BU)
Selfridge Field, Michigan

Air Rescue Detachment #5 (62d AAF BU)
Scott Field, Illinois

Air Rescue Detachment #6 (62d AAF BU)
Biggs Field, Texas

Air Rescue Squadron B (62d AAF BU)
Hamilton Field, California

Air Rescue Detachment #8 (62d AAF BU)
McChord Field, Washington

Air Rescue Detachment #9 (62d AAF BU)
March Field, California

Air Rescue Detachment #10 (62d AAF BU)
Hill Field, Utah

Air Rescue Detachment #11 (62d AAF BU)
Great Falls AAB, Montana

Air Rescue Detachment #12 (62d AAF BU)
Lowry Field, Colorado

These myriad changes were typical of the air rescue establishment
in the postwar period. Relocation and redesignation of units occurred
at periodic intervals. Some of the changes were in the interest of
greater efficiency of operation, while others were due to inactivation
of bases in a period of postwar austerity.

Throughout this period ARS personnel did not lose sight of their
future global mission. In January 1947 Col. Richard T. Kight, ARS
commander, directed that a plan be prepared for a world-wide
organization.17 Headquarters, Air Rescue Service was returned to
Washington in December 1947 so that coordination with other AAF
services could be achieved and planning facilitated. Training
functions, however, continued to be carried on in Florida by the 5th
Rescue Squadron, which was also responsible for rescue coverage of
that area.18

Early in 1948 the awaited projection of ARS control into overseas
areas began. Rescue organizations in Saudi Arabia, Tripoli, the
Azores, Bermuda, Newfoundland, and Labrador were established.19 In
most instances these were small units with a minimum of rescue
equipment. The Saudi Arabian detachment at Dhahran, for instance, had
only three officers, two enlisted men, and one B-17 when activated as
the 512th Base Unit.20 At Wheelus Field, Tripoli, the 2154th Rescue
Unit had some 30 officers and enlisted men and two B-17's at the end
of it's fifth month of existence.21 The 2152d Rescue Unit was equipped
with 1 B-17's, 10 OA-10's and 1 L-4, but these were scattered between
flights located at Newfoundland, Labrador, Bermuda, and the Azores.22

Meanwhile, the rescue organizations in the United States were
again renamed in February 1948. The old squadron and detachment
designations were dropped (except for the 5th Rescue Squadron), and all
personnel were assigned to the 8th and 9th Rescue Units, which, with
their flights, were made responsible for all rescue mission in their
country. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Air Rescue Service
was moved to Gravelly Point, Virginia, and its flight section to Pope
Air Force Base, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 8th Rescue Unit had
flights based at Hamilton and March Fields California, and McCord Air
Force Base in Washington. Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado, was
the center for 9th Rescue Unit activities, with flights based at Biggs
Field, Texas, and Selfridge Field, Michigan.23

Assignment of Air Rescue Service to the Military Air Transport
Service (MATS), established on 1 June 1948, brought more changes and
additions. The 1050th Rescue Unit was established with headquarters in
Newfoundland and flights in Labrador, the Azo0res, and Bermuda. The
1061st was activated in Tripoli, and the rescue detachment at Dhahran
became the 1060th Rescue unit.24

These numerical designations were altered in August. The 1050th,
at Newfoundland, became the 2152d; the 1060th, at Dhahran, became the
2153d; and the 1061st, in Tripoli, became the 2154th. In the United
States the 2150th and 2151st Rescue Units replaces the 8th and 9th Rescue
Units.25

In the meantime the 5th Rescue Squadron continued its training
duties and rescue operations from MacDill Air Force Base in Florida,
although one flight was located at Westover AFB, and one at Pope AFB
to afford rescue coverage in those areas.

In 1949, the Air Rescue Service extended its authority into
Europe and the Pacific with the assignment of the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 7th
Rescue Squadrons to its jurisdiction. These assignments, however, did
not alter the operational control of overseas units. That authority
continued to be vested in the air commander of the theater, area, or
base concerned. On 1 September an extensive reorganization of all
rescue units was ordered; the results was the creation of numbered
squadrons at the bases below:26

1st Rescue Squadron

Headquarters and Flight A MacDill AFB, Florida

Flight B Albrook AFB, Canal Zone

Flight C Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico

Flight D Kindley AFB, Bermuda

2d Rescue Squadron

Headquarters and Flight A Kadena Field, Okinawa

Flight B Kadena Field, Okinawa

Flight C Clark AFB, Philippine Islands

Flight D North AFB, Guam, Mariana Islands

3d Rescue Squadron

Headquarters and Flight A Yokota AB, Japan

Flight B Yokota AB, Japan

Flight C Misawa AB, Japan

Flight D Ashiya AB, Japan

4th Rescue Squadron

Headquarters and Flight A Hamilton AFB, California

Flight B March AFB, California

Flight C McChord AFB, Washington

Flight D Hickam AFB, Hawaiian Islands

5th Rescue Squadron

Headquarters and Flight A Lowry AFB, Colorado

Flight B Biggs AFB, Texas

Flight C Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Flight D Selfridge AFB, Michigan

6th Rescue Squadron

Headquarters and Flight A Westover AFB, Massachusetts

Flight B Ernest Harmon AFB, Newfoundland

Flight C Goose AB, Labrador

Flight D Bluie West I, Greenland

7th Rescue Squadron

Headquarters and Flight A Wiesbaden AB, Colorado

Flight B Lajes Field, Azores

Flight C Wheelis Field, Tripoli, Libya

Flight D Dhahran Field, Saudi Arabis

From 1949 to 1952 additions to the above roster of air rescue
squadrons included the 9th an d10th Rescue Squadrons and the 2156th Air
Rescue Unit (TTU). Headquarters of the 9th and three of its flights
were based in England, and one flight was at Wiesbaden, Germany. The
latter flight replaced the 7th Rescue Squadron, which moved its
headquarters to Tripoli. The 10th Rescue Squadron was stationed in
Alaska, and the 2156th carried out rescue-training functions at MacDill
Air Force Bae.27

Training. The 2156th Air Rescue Unit, activated on 21 January
1950, carried on the training of rescue personnel which had previously
been assigned to the 5th Rescue Squadron. Training conducted by this
unit included instructions of aircrews for operation of the SB-29 and
SA-16 planes and the H-19 and H-21 helicopters. Separate programs
were established for each aircraft, and included ground school,
transition flight training, and operational rescue aircrew training,
In addition, there were courses of instruction for all in such
subjects as land rescue, precision spot-parachuting techniques, land
navigation, native psychology, mountain climbing, advanced swimming
techniques, communications, aerial delivery of equipment and supplies,
and medical procedures. In other words, the school provided
specialized training for every phase of rescue work.28

Operations. Rescue missions naturally diminished in number after
World War II, but increased again as the Air Rescue Service area of
operations widened. In the last 6 months of 1946 only 107 searches
were conducted,29 but in the corresponding months of 1947 the number
had increased to 435.30 Search missions in the last half of 1948
totaled only 247, although there were 1,215 occasions on which rescue
personnel were altered.31 With the assignment of additional overseas
rescue squadrons in 1949, the number of alerts increased to a year's
total of 3,155, of which 2,089 were false and 1,066 necessitated
search and rescue activity.32

Problems. False alerts, caused by the failure of pilots to make
prompt and proper notification of late arrivals, completion of
flights, changes in flight plans, and the like, were a constant strain
on the operational efficiency of the Air Rescue Service. Reports from
individual units continually stressed the number of false alerts, and
the totals are appalling to contemplate. In the last half of 1947,
out of 787 total alerts, 352-nearly half-were false.33 Since the total
alert figure included civilian as well as military planes, it might be
expected that the former were largely responsible. On the contrary,
however, the figures for that period indicate that military personnel
were culpable to a far greater extent. Of 258 alerts occasioned by
civilian aircraft, only 52 were false.34 As late as 1949 almost two-
thirds of all alerts received were unjustified.35

Personnel shortages, lack of funds, and makeshift and antiquated
aircraft and equipment were other major problems of the Air Rescue
Service in the postwar years. There was no critical shortage of
officers, but the lack of trained enlisted men was a constant source
of difficulty. As early as December 1946 the number of available
enlisted men was only a little more than half the authorized figure.36
By 1949 the situation had eased, but shortages of airmen in certain
categories were still apparent, and sufficient helicopter and
amphibian pilots and navigators were not available.37

Shortage of funds was particularly apparent early in the postwar
period. Communications were for a time seriously affected thereby.
During the war, when money was plentiful, an excellent communications
network had been established by the numbered air forces in the Zone of
Interior. Complete coordination with all interested agencies had been
achieved, and intercommunicative systems involving boats, aircraft,
search parties, and air bases had been well developed. In the short
time between the end of the war and the formation of the Air Rescue
Service these facilities had deteriorated because of budget-cutting
and shortage of trained personnel to the point of inefficiency. By
1947, however, the Air Rescue Service had succeeded in reestablishing
an efficient communications net within the Zone of Interior.38

Parts shortages and maintenance problem affected some rescue
units, particularly those located overseas. The story from these
outfits is consistently similar. Flights B and C of the of the 2152d
Rescue Unit, based in Labrador and the Azores respectively, reported
in 1948 that their greatest problem was obtaining aircraft parts.
Flight C, with only one operational aircraft, feared its loss at any
time because of maintenance difficulties.39 The unit in Tripoli
reported that throughout July 1948 it had only one B-17, and that was
out of commission most of the month.40

The 2153d Rescue Unit at Dhahran had a unique complain. On 23
September 1949 they were alerted to have a full crew standing by at
all times, prepared to go to the assistance of Lowell Thomas, the
author and news commentator, who had been thrown from a horse in
faraway Tibet and injured. The order was complied with, but the unit
felt that the alert was unreasonably prolonged when further orders had
not arrived after the expiration of seven days.41

Despite lack of satisfactory equipment, maintenance difficulties,
and other problems, the ARS mission continued to be carried out in an
outstanding manner. When on 16 November 1949 a B-29 en route from
March Field, California, to Bermuda was forced to ditch, two SB-17
rescue aircraft from Kindley Air Force Base in Bermuda were already
in the air attempting to intercept the plane and lead it to its
destination. Although prompt action had been taken, a large-scale
four-day search, involving approximately 150 planes, was necessary
before the survivors were located and the rescue performed by an
SB-17, which first dropped its lifeboat and then guided a Canadian
cutter to the spot.42

Much credit for the successful peacetime record of the rescue
crews must be given to their ability to cooperate with other military
units-those of both the United States and other countries. The AAF
rescue detachment in the Azores, for example, combined forces with the
Portuguese rescue squadron in training missions which paid handsome
dividends when an actual emergency arose.

Chapter IX

AIR-SEA RESCUE IN KOREA

When hostilities began in Korea, the Air Rescue Service was
represented in Japan by the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron, whose flights had
been based on Japanese airfields since the end of World War II.
Aircraft from that squadron were almost immediately drawn into the
conflict.

Rescue Organization and Equipment

Within the Far East Command, Headquarters, Far East Air Forces
(FEAF) was charged with the responsibility of coordinating Army, Navy,
and Air Force search and rescue activities. Responsibility for search
and rescue in the Japanese area, including Korea, was delegated by
FEAF to Fifth Air Force. The 3rd Air Rescue Squadron was designated as
the operating agency within this area.1

The original personnel authorization of the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron
was 108 officers and 353 airmen.2 They were assigned to four flights-
A, B, C, and D-which at the outbreak of the war were stationed
respectively at Johnson, Yokota, Misawa, and Ashiya bases in Japan.
In addition, a detachment of Flight D was at Seoul, Korea.3 Rescue
equipment included H-5 helicopters, SB-17's (with airborne lifeboats),
C-47's, and L-5's. The 3rd Squadron had no SB-29's or SA-16's until
after the beginning of hostilities in Korea.4

The first crucial problem facing the Air Rescue Service was the
shortage of personnel. A new T/O & E (7-1613) raising the personnel
level to 122 officers and 624 airmen was authorized on 10 August 1950.
Before that time, however, emergency aid was extended by assigning
personnel on TDY from the 2d Air Rescue Squadron, based at Okinawa.
As additional personnel were assigned fro the Zone of Interior, those
on TDY returned to their original squadron.6 In this manner the actual
strength of the 3rd Squadron was built up from 88 Officers and 381
airmen on 25 June 1950 to 133 Officers and 623 airmen on 15 November
1950.7

Further aid resulted from the activation of Detachment E of the
5th Air Rescue Squadron, Lowery Field, Colorado. This unit, compose
of 4 SA-16 planes, 12 officers and 22 airmen, arrived in Japan on 28
July 1950. The original TDY of 120 days was extended to 150 before
permanently assigned SA-16's and crews replaced them.8

A second problem was the lack of suitable aircraft. The first
four SA-16's to arrive in Japan were those of 5th Squadron's Detachment
E, and the first planes of this type assigned to 3d Squadron did not
arrive until 20 November. The first SB-29 was assigned four months
earlier, on 29 July 1950. By the end of 1950 the 3d Squadron was
equipped with 14 H-5 helicopters, 8 SA-16's, 6 SB-17's, 5 SB-29's, 3
C-47's and 3 L-5's.9

Aircraft maintenance and rescue communications provided additional
worries for rescue personnel. The increased allotment of aircraft
equipment and the task of working on unfamiliar plane types placed a
burden on mechanics and supply lines which they were at first unable
to cope with efficiently. However, as priority was given to Korea-
bond supplies, and mechanics began to become familiar with the SA-16
and the SB-29 aircraft, out-of-commission hours declined. By December
1950 aircraft maintenance was as efficient as in peacetime. The SA-16
was the greatest source of difficulty. A maintenance kit was included
with the planes of 5th Squadron's Detachment E, but it was not adequate
to keep them in flying condition at all times. On one occasion all
four SA-16's were grounded at once while awaiting parts.10

Rescue communications controlled by the 3d Squadron eventually
became highly efficient, but at first the shortage of equipment and
trained personnel caused delays in transmission. Again the chief need
was for rapid expansion of facilities. Rescue units resorted to
telephones as other means of communication became well-nigh useless
under the strain placed upon them. In some cases electrical messages
were delayed from two to three days and arrived long after the mission
to which they referred was to have been accomplished. The assignment
of supply priorities, however, succeeded in reducing the delay to no
more than 8 to 10 minutes.11

Operations

Organization. Coordination of rescue efforts and liaison with
other combat units was effected by an air rescue officer appointed
to the Directorate of Operational Services, FEAF. It was this
officer's duty to advise the Director of Operations on the operational
status and capability of air rescue units, to form policies and
programs for search and rescue, to prepare and supervise plans and
procedure for rescue missions, to make recommendations on the
assignment and location of aircraft, and to monitor rescue missions.12
Rescue coordination centers were established at air defense centers at
Johnson, Fukuoka, and Misawa airfields, and a naval liaison officer
was assigned to each control center to insure coordination with naval
rescue operations. For direction of search and rescue operations in
Korea, a rescue coordination officer was appointed to work in close
conjunction with the Joint Operations Center (JOC).13

The 3d Air Rescue Squadron operated a 24-hour-a-day radio network,
centered at Johnson Air Force Base, which covered all of Japan and
Korea for direction and coordination of rescue activities. The rescue
network could contact practically every American or Japanese agency
which could be utilized in rescue activities. In emergency cases air
rescue stations at Iwo Jima, Guam, Manila, Okinawa, and Hawaii could
be called on for assistance.14

A distressed aircraft was to notify its home base, which checked
with the nearest control center. The rescue network then began
operation, providing a clear channel for rescue directions. Air
rescue units nearest the scene were assigned the mission unless they
lacked the specialized equipment needed for a particular situation.15

Rescue procedures were similar to those used in World War II.
Cover was regularly provided for in mission planning, and facilities
made available for special search and rescue flights when needed.

Medical evacuation. A new field of rescue activity-evacuation of
wounded by aircraft-was inaugurated in Korea because of the difficulty
in moving front-line casualties over the rough Korean roads to rear-
area hospitals. The helicopter was seized upon as the ideal
instrument for speedy evacuation of the wounded, and the few which 3d
Squadron had on hand in June 1950 were in almost constant demand from
the early days of the war.16 When Colonel Kight, Air Force Service
commander, visited Japan in the summer of 1950, he found ARS
helicopters being used exclusively for evacuation. Although medical
air evacuation had not previously been a part of the ARS mission, and
the use of all available helicopters for that task made difficult the
successful performance of rescue duties, it was a function that
logically belong to the Air Force, and Colonel Kight recommended the
formation of helicopter units for this purpose.17 His recommendation
was still being studied by the Air Staff on 22 November 1950, but in
the meantime a helicopter evacuation unit, Detachment F of the 3d Air
Rescue Squadron, had been activated on 24 September 1950 at Taegu,
Korea.18

Detachment F, later designated Detachment One, was composed of 11
officer and 56 airmen, and originally equipped exclusively with H-5
helicopters.19 By October 1950 the detachment was also flying L-5
aircraft, which were found adequate for some evacuation mission.20 In
1951 two H-19 helicopters, larger versions of the H-5's, were assigned
to the 3d Air Rescue Squadron.21 Four more H-19's were sent to Korea
in February 1952.22

Carrying two patients and a medical technician on each flight, a
helicopter could compress an hour of land travel to a five-minute air
hop.23 A medical officer of a Korean field hospital, examining one
group of six wounded soldiers who had been evacuated by helicopter,
stated that five would have died had they been moved by normal land
means.24 In June 1951 Dr. Elmer L. Henderson, chairman of the American
Medical Association, stated that the mortality rate among wounded
soldiers in Korea was only 2 per 100 in Korea as compared with 4 per
100 in World War II. One of the major reasons was "speedy air
evacuation."25 Third Squadron helicopters had evacuated 32 front-line
patients by 6 August 1950, and at the end of the first half-year of
the war the number of helicopter medical evacuees had reached 618.
During the same period L-5 aircraft evacuated 56 wounded soldiers.26

Most helicopter and L-5 missions were between front-line medical
clearing stations and rear-area hospitals. If the wounded soldier
required immediate medical attention of a type available only at
hospitals in Japan, the aircraft landed at an airstrip from which a
transport plane flew him to Japan.27 Medical attendants aboard the
evacuation aircraft were often called on to give immediate first aid
to wounded men. An outstanding example was the administration of an
emergency plasma transfusion during a helicopter flight on 12 October
1950. The patient was an English pilot who had crash-landed behind
the enemy lines.28

In December 1951 two helicopter of Detachment One were selected
for a special mission to determine the practicability of direct
helicopter evacuation to a hospital ship equipped with a helicopter
landing platform. On the first two days of test, the two pilots
landed six times with simulated operational loads to acquaint
themselves with the technique of shipboard landings. Wind was found
to be the most important factor to consider; the ship's roll, caused
by swells, was second; and pitch was third. It was decided that
ideally the ship should face directly into the swell, eliminating the
roll, with the wind from either forward quarter. The pilots radioed
the hospital ship 5 minutes before landing to alert the ship crew, and
made a normal approach with a traffic circle at 1 200-foot altitude.
Deck handling crew were charged wit fire protection, crash boat stand-
by securing the helicopter, and removing the patient. To safeguard
the wounded passengers, four kapok life jackets were placed around
each one, arranged so that if a ditching was necessary the patient
would float with head out of the water and feet slightly submerged.

The experiment lasted from 23 December 1951 through 11 January
1952. In that time 134 sorties occurred in which 218 patients were
evacuated. Almost all possible conditions were encountered from calm
sea and wind and warm temperature t rough seas, winds up to 25 knots,
and below-zero temperatures. Landings were made on both wet and dry
decks, and emergency night landings were accomplished.29

Other helicopter missions. While medical evacuations was the
primary helicopter mission in Korea, the aircraft were also used for
rescues from behind enemy lines and from the sea. Operating under
fighter cover, they succeeded in rescuing personnel from over 100
miles behind enemy lines. An early example was the rescue of a Navy
pilot who on 1 August 1950 crash-landed 10 miles southwest of
Pyongyang. A Kimpo-based helicopter flew 125 miles in 3½ hours to
accomplish the rescue under enemy fire.30

Large-scale evacuation from behind enemy lines was effected by
helicopters and L-5's in October 1950 after a paratrooper drop north
of Pyongyang. Four helicopters and two L-5's shuttled wounded from
the drop area to an evacuation hospital. In the 2-day period of
operations, 21-22 October, 47 cases were evacuated. Although enemy
ground fire was constantly encountered, no aircraft or personnel
causalities were listed.31

Rapid air-sea rescues were frequently recorded. on 23 August
1950 a fighter pilot was rescued from the sea eight minutes after he
crashed while in flight from a Japanese air base.32 Four days later
a fighter pilot who bailed out of his plane near southern Honshu was
rescued within 40 minutes.33 In March 1952 a singular triple rescue
was effected by one helicopter. The series of rescues was initiated
by a Navy pilot who bailed out a mile offshore after his ship was hit
over the target. The helicopter arrived within 20 minutes, but the
pilot was entangled in his parachute shroud-lines and could not get
into his life raft. As a result, the water so chilled him that he
could not get into the sling without assistance. The rescue crewman
jumped into the icy water and succeeded in placing the now unconscious
pilot in the sling. Although the victim's temperature was down to 92
degrees when reached the nearest ship, he was revived within a few
hours. The crew member had been forced to take the Navy's man's place
in the water, but before the helicopter could get back to the scene,
one of the planes circling overhead tried to drop him a life raft.
The raft became fouled in the stabilizer and the pilot was forced to
ditch on the beach, unhurt, but under enemy fire. He ran into the
water, and he and the crewman were both picked up by the helicopter.
After taking the second rescued pilot to a Navy ship, the helicopter
was on its way again to assist a Navy pilot who had ditched his plane
in Wonsan Harbor. This time, however, a destroyer effected the
pickup.34

The helicopter's versatility was demonstrated more than once. In
1950 approximately 600 South Korean troops were saved from a enemy
surrounded area on the east Korean coast of Pohang. A helicopter
notified landing ships further north, returned to the rescue scene,
and guided the troops to the seagoing craft.35 Helicopters were used
during August 1951 to evacuate United Nations soldiers form front-line
positions when they were isolated by floodwaters. Sixteen soldiers
were rescued by helicopter from flooded areas on 8 August, but the
largest operation, 3 days later, involved 94 soldiers of the Turkish
Brigade. In 34 sorties helicopters evacuated 83 from an area
completely surrounded by water. Before the last 11 men could be
saved, the water level made landings impossible, but the helicopter
hoist was used to complete the operation successfully.36

A final use for 3d Air Rescue Squadron helicopters was the
transport of United Nations officials to and from the truce
negotiations sites at Kaesong and Panmunj0m, North Korea.37

Problem of helicopter operations. Because of the novelty of
its operations, the helicopter rescue and evacuation detachment in
Korea faced unaccustomed problem in carrying out its mission. Officer
personnel of Detachment One prepared a report in October 1951 which
dwelt on the pitfalls encountered and the means of escaping them.38

1. Command obligations-Any rescue unit functions most effectively
when close to the scene of offensive operations. This necessity was
accentuated in the case of the helicopter detachment because of the
range and speed limitations of its rescue craft. The natural
corollary was that the detachment moved often with the ebb and flow of
battle, and had difficulty in maintaining relations with support
units. It was necessary for detachment personnel to check the unit
assignment to supporting organizations to insure that the unit did not
remain the responsibility of an organization too distant to furnish
effective assistance. Detachment One received a lesson in this
respect in December 1950 when the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing was called
back to Japan, leaving the rescue unit with no support in Korea until
it was moved and attached to the 6153d Air Base Squadron on 2 January
1951.

2. Maintenance-The helicopter detachment found the same
difficulty in obtaining replacement parts which confronts any unit
equipped with a distinctive type of aircraft. Other problems
distinctive type of aircraft. Other problems distinctive to the
region and the equipment included the cold weather, which was hard on
engine starters; the dust, which caused excessive wear in helicopter
jackscrews; and the deteriorating effect of rain on the main rotor
blades.

3. Operations-
a. Flights into enemy territory. Assignment of helicopter
pilots to rescue of personnel from enemy territory, the report
concluded, should be restricted to approximately once weekly
for each pilot. Otherwise the pilots experienced a dangerous
degree of mental tension due to the risk involved in flying
a slow, unarmed, and unarmored craft into an area of probable
enemy fire, landing under fire, and flying out again.
b. Evacuation of wounded. The two most important factors in
this operation were speediness and accurate location. Pre-
established lines of communication between the helicopter
detachment and the medical facility in the front lines were
the first essentials for speedy evacuation. Errors in
indicating the location of an incident, both in reporting to
the helicopter detachment and in marking the landing spot,
were too often responsible for loss of valuable time. The
importance of giving the correct grid coordinates and properly
marking the landing site had to be impressed on medical
personnel in front-line position.

Detachment One found that piloting a helicopter in combat required
techniques not taught in an ordinary course of pilot instruction.
There were two particular factors which required the attainment of
special flying skills. First was the frequent necessity of operating
the helicopter with a maximum load, or even an overload. These
conditions were compensated for by carrying a minimum fuel load (60
gallons of gasoline or less) and by combining vertical lift with
forward movement so that helicopter took off in a nose-low attitude.
Correct use of ballast was important in such a take-off to prevent a
crash. Secondly, because of their rescue missions behind enemy lines
and evacuation missions close to the line of battle, pilots were
frequently exposed to small-arm fire or flak. The slow speed of the
aircraft seemed to be an asset when under enemy attack, since the flak
burst were consistently ahead of the helicopter. Nevertheless,
Detachment One pilots were instructed to alter course and altitude as
rapidly as possible whenever enemy was met.39

Helicopter losses. The first helicopter loss in the Korean war
came on 25 July 1950, exactly 30 days after the war began, when a
helicopter was forced to land behind enemy lines. The pilot stayed
too long over enemy territory trying to locate a downed fighter pilot.
When at last he turned toward friendly ground, he found that United
Nations troops had pulled back during the day and he did not have
enough fuel to reach the new position. A safe landing was made, but
the plane had to be abandoned when an attempt to drop gasoline failed
because of enemy fire. The pilot and medical attendant succeeded in
making their way back to the UN line. Their aircraft was destroyed by
UN planes to prevent its capture by the enemy.40

Since the helicopter was a unique item of aerial equipment, it was
perhaps fitting that the first helicopter loss due to enemy action was
an unusual incident. On 1 October 1950 an R-5 was returning to base
following an unsuccessful search for a downed fighter pilot. The
plane was at 300 feet, following a road which had been mined by the
North Koreans. Nearing a railroad tunnel, the helicopter was knocked
into a hill by the blast of a large antitank mine. The crew members
escaped unharmed, and were later returned to friendly territory in a
jeep.41

The first helicopter-crew loss as a result of enemy action was
recorded on 13 September 1951. A helicopter escorted by four fighter
was hit on a rescue mission behind the enemy lines. The pilot managed
to return to the Allied lines, but before he could land, a blade went
out of track, cutting off the tail cone. The plane fell end over end
from 300 feet, killing the pilot and medical attendant instantly.42

Another helicopter was lost because of enemy action on 25 October
1951, but this time there were no casualties. The rescue craft had
been dispatched to pick up a pilot who was down in enemy territory.
Heavy ground fire met the helicopter when it arrived on the scene, and
it was hit on its first pass. The second try was successful, but the
oil tank had been hit and the oil pressure was falling rapidly. The
pilot flew as far south as possible before a forced landing was
necessary. The helicopter rolled on its side during the landing and
could not be retrieved, but two other helicopters evacuated the crew
and the rescued pilot on the following day.43

Other rescue aircraft. While the helicopter detachment in Korea
was establishing enviable rescue and evacuation records the SA-16's,
SB-17's and SB-29's assigned to other elements of the 3d Air Rescue
Squadron were carrying their share of rescue responsibility. The
larger rescue aircraft carried out conventional missions, providing
rescue cover for bombing and strafing missions originating in Japan or
South Korea, and aiding flyers down at sea. Methods tried and proven
in World War II were used, some of which had been forgotten and
rediscovered. Such, for instance, seems to have been the case with
SB-17 rescue cover for B-29 missions. The rescue planes took off 30
minutes ahead of the faster bombers so that they would reach the
rendezvous point at the same time. This was described in FEAF
Intelligence Roundup as the development of an "ingenious method."44
Rescue craft in India, Southwest Pacific, and Central Pacific had used
the same technique in World War II.

The first SA-16 mission in the Korean war was the rescue of a
pilot from the aircraft carrier Philippine Sea on 5 August 1950.
Accompanied by fighter cover, the SA-16 located the ditched pilot deep
in enemy waters. A heavy sea did not prevent the SA-16 from landing
and, after two unsuccessful attempts, getting a line to the pilot, who
was pulled to safety aboard the rescue plane.45

On 15 August 1950 a speedy rescue was accomplished in the Sea of
Japan. The 3d Squadron received word from a fighter base that one of
its planes had suffered extensive damage and the pilot was about to
bail out. An SA-16 in the area was contacted, reached the area in
time to see the pilot jump, and picked him up in less than five
minutes.46

The first airborne-lifeboat drop in the Korean war was made on 8
December 1950 by an SB-17 crew assigned to Flight D, 3d Air Rescue
Squadron. The boat was dropped to the only survivor of a B-26 which
had gone down on the night of 6 December while returning from a
bombing mission in North Korea.47

Statistics

The variety of services offered by the 3d Air Rescue Squadron in
the Korean area is enumerated in the accompanying table covering its
first six months operations. It is interesting to note that search
and rescue operations accounted for only 22 of the total of 2,784
missions, while evacuation missions numbered 744. Only 12 air-sea
rescues were accomplished (10 by SA-16's, 1 by an SB-17, and 1 by an
H-5). This small number, however, indicates the relatively greater
importance of overland operations and the effective surface cover
afforded on the sea, rather than any deficiency in air-sea rescue
operations. The importance of medical evacuation, the newest ARS
mission, was the most noteworthy development in the early months of
rescue operations in Korean.

The trends observed above continued into 1951 and 1952. In 1951
SB-17's and H-5's accounted for only 1 air-sea rescue each, and 59 SA-
16 air-sea rescues were recorded.48 To 30 June 1952 only four
additional air-sea rescues, all by SA-16's were accomplished. During
the entire period from June 1950 to June 1952, the 3d Air Rescue
Squadron evacuated 4,170npresons, rescued 894 from behind lines, and
accomplished 77 air sea rescues.49

Chapter X

CONCLUSION

Summary. Air-sea rescue operations in World War II achieved
varying degrees of success in the different theaters of combat. Air-
crew in Eighth Air Force were assured a one-three chance of rescue
from the sea, while by 1945 distressed crews in FEAF were rescued in
more than 50 per cent of the cases. In the Pacific the chance of
rescue varied according to area and command. Rescue efforts on the
bombing routes to Japan were almost 80 per cent successful in some
months, but in the Southwest Pacific such results were never attained.
In other areas-such as Alaska, the Caribbean, North Atlantic, and
South Atlantic-the probability of rescue varied, but an upward trend
toward the end of the war was universal.

In general, three factors were responsible for the indifference to
rescue activity in the early years of the war, and the failure to
achieve satisfactory results in any region until late in the conflict:
1. The novelty of the task. Naval aviation had long faced the
problem of rescuing its flyers from the sea, but the AAF had never had
to consider the problem before the war began.

2. The demands of the war. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
AAF, along with the rest of the United States military establishment,
was ill-prepared to mount an all-out global war effort. The urgent
need for building up combat units in all parts of the world-supplying
them with personnel, aircraft, and other equipment-left little
opportunity for providing the same facilities for support missions
such as air-sea rescue.

3. Dependence on other agencies. In the European and
Mediterranean theaters, British rescue organizations were functioning
before AAF units arrived. Early responsibility for rescue rested with
British facilities. Even after American air-sea rescue units were
assigned, they operated as adjuncts of the British rescue service.
Great reliance was also placed on the U.S. Navy. In the Central
Pacific, for example, no AAF emergency rescue squadron was assigned
until 1945.

Factors directly responsible for the increasing efficiency of
rescue efforts were:

1. Advance planning. When rescue efforts were a catch-as-catch-
can affair, successful achievement of the mission was difficult.
Percentages of rescue were directly tied to the degree of careful
thought given rescue needs, positioning of equipment, rescue control,
and communication. Such consideration was often lacking in the
Mediterranean, for example, but when rescue cover was specifically
included in mission planning-as in the invasion of southern France-the
percentage of crews rescued was always above the general average.
Much of the success enjoyed by rescue organizations in the various
Pacific theaters was due to the early recognition of this obvious
fact.

2. Adequate equipment. Equipment designed specifically for
rescue was slow in developing. Even into the last years of the war
the equipment used was almost in the makeshift category. Rescue
personnel found themselves with antiquated equipment, poorly suited to
their purpose, which because of its are, and, sometimes, its
unfamiliarity to air force personnel, was difficult to maintain.
Frantic borrowing of parts must have been almost an identifying
characteristic of every air-sea rescue unit.

Not only adequate equipment, but variety of equipment was often
lacking. In the rescue operations on the bombers' route to Japan, at
least three types of aircraft-PBY's, B-17's, and B-29's, were used, as
well as submarines, destroyers, and assorted smaller vessels. But the
most AAF rescue units were poorly prepared to equal the record
attained by an organization with such diversified equipment.

When new equipment specifically designed for rescue did become
accessible, there were delays in its use because of its vary novelty.
For instance, when the first B-17's with lifeboats appeared in the
Philippine Islands, rescue ground personnel knew little of their
maintenance. Sometimes equipment arrived piecemeal. The B-17 with
lifeboat affords an example here also. Aircraft of this type
delivered to the 1st Emergency Rescue Squadron in Italy never achieved
maximum efficiency because the lifeboats never arrived.

3. Adequate personnel. Even when personnel were available in
sufficient numbers to carry out the rescue mission properly, other
problems presented themselves. Every rescue unit in the first years
of the war was handicapped by the absence of a T/O authorization,
which prevented promotions. Even after that disability was removed,
the demands for rescue services were so great that personnel were
often placed on detached service with rescue units, and morale
difficulties again cropped up. Perhaps even more important was the
frequent ignorance of the worth of rescue operations and the function
of rescue units, with the results that the efforts of rescue personnel
and their equipment were often channeled into paths far removed from
the original mission. The case of the hapless emergency rescue boat
crew that spent its time overseas in painting its craft and carrying
passengers on holiday trips to Capri is perhaps the outstanding
example, but by no means the only one.

The personnel situation was considerably improved in the last year
of the war. Air-sea rescue training in the Zone of Interior provided
adequate replacements, an assigned position within the AAF framework
was allotted to rescue organizations, and awareness of the importance
of rescue work had reached most levels of command.

4. Combat crew knowledge and practice of rescue techniques. A
direct obligation of the crew in distress was to give advance notice
of their condition, to escape from the plane with the rescue equipment
provided in each aircraft, and to use that equipment after they were
in the water. However, ignorance of the methods of escape, survival,
and rescue were the rules rather than the exception with early combat
crews. Failure to use the communication facilities properly, the
decision to ditch when a bail-out would have been the wiser course and
vice versa, lack of knowledge of escape exits, discarding or neglect
of rescue equipment and complete ignorance of how to use it--all these
and more were faults that cost lives, faults which could have been
corrected during training. Th improved record toward the end of the
war owed much to better training and wider dissemination of rescue
information. However, this probably remained the weakest link in the
rescue chain.

When World War II ended, the future of air-sea-rescue operations
was still in doubt. The AAF's concept of rescue responsibility for
its own personnel was challenged by Coast Guard spokesmen, who pressed
their claim to over-all rescue supervision and operation. Continued
global commitment for AAF personnel, however, made it essential that
world wide rescue service be directed by the AAF in the absence of any
similar plan on the part of the Coast Guard or the Navy.

The Air Rescue Service, initiated to meet postwar AAF rescue
needs, grew slowly, but by 1950 had attained sufficient size to
operate with efficiency and success from the earliest days of the war
in Korea. The Korean war afforded a test under difficult conditions
of the adequacy of the AAF's concept of rescue organization-a central
agency to supervise and coordinate personnel training and to develop
and allocate equipment, combined with assignment of operational
oversees rescue squadrons to theaters or air forces.

The benefits of centralized organization were illustrated in the
early weeks of the war when personnel and equipment shortages in Japan
were overcome by assignment of personnel and aircraft from other
areas. Similarly, the wisdom of localized operational control was
demonstrated by the unforeseen necessity for swift medical evacuation.
Rescue aircraft were immediately commandeered for this purpose. If
operational control had been vested in the central organization, a
needless delay would have resulted.

Recommendations. The Air Rescue Service acquitted itself with
distinction in Korea, but possibilities for improvement still exist.

1. The variety of rescue aircraft is a weak point in the rescue
structure. The development of one or two basic all-purpose aircraft
is a desired goal. Until that end is attained, rescue units will
continue to be hampered in their work by the necessity of providing
service and maintenance for a variety of aircraft types. Maximum
operational efficiency is difficult to attain when an organization is
required to operate airplanes as divergent as those of a rescue
squadron-SB-29's, SA-16's, and helicopters.

2. Carelessness in filing flight plans, arrival reports, and
inflight reports continues to cause unnecessary emergency alerts. The
high incidence of false alerts indicates the need for continued
indoctrination of flying personnel in the importance of correct
procedures.

3. No substitute has been found for the cooperation of naval
facilities in air-sea rescue. The assistance of surface vessels and
submarines was invaluable during World War II, and continued to be of
great importance in the Korean war. Unless the Air Force provides
equal facilities -an obviously impracticable solution-it is apparent
that a standing operating procedure should be adapted jointly by the
Air Force and the Navy, to be automatically placed into effect in any
area in which an emergency occurs.*

________________________________
* "In July 1950, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Far East, Pacific, and Alaskan Commands, the 'Joint Standing
Operation, Pacific' was put into effect by the Commander-in-
Chief, Far East." This was considered a "sound and adequate"
system for rescuing personnel in distress. Nevertheless a
conference was held on 27 August at which representatives of the
Commander, Navy Far East, and of Headquarters FEAF agreed on
naval participation in search and rescue operations (Maj. Gen.
Glenn O. Barcus, et al., An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of
the USAF in the Korean Campaign, III, 84-85). Since such action
was necessary to provide AAF-naval understanding, the
desirability of a previous joint agreement is obvious.

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