CL-50 U.S.S.
HELENA
War Diary and Action Reports November 1942,
U.S.S. HELENA
Cl50/A16-3 10-ghs.
December 1, 1942.
S-E-C-E-R-T
From: Commanding Officer.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations (Office of Naval Records
and Library.
Subject: War Diary, U.S.S. HELENA, forwarding copy of.
References: (a) PACIFIC FLEET LETTER 11L-42 of March 11, 1942.
Enclosures: (A) Copy of War Diary, U.S.S. HELENA, period November
1. 1942, to November 30, 1942.
1. In compliance with reference (a), Enclosure (A) is
forwarded herewith.
C.P. CECIL
Copy to:
COMSOPAC with Similar enclosure.
U.S.S. HELENA
SECERT
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. HELENA (TASKFORCE 67)
From November 1, 1942 to November 30 1942.
Original to FILE:
Copy to CNO (Office of Naval Records and Library).
Copy to COMSOPAC
SECRET November 1, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 2400 Steaming on various courses at various speeds in
accordance to signal from CTF 65.
0720 Sighted Banks Islands bearing 358°
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 14°, 36'.8 S
Long 167°, 15'.6 E
1200 Lat 13°, 12'.5 S
Long 166°, 28'.5 E
2000 Lat 14°, 02' S
Long 165°, 07' E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Oct 31 to 1200 Nov 1:
Course: 306° T.
Speed: 15 knots.
Distance: 285 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 2, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 1200 Steaming as before on various courses at various
speeds in accordance with signals from CTF 65.
1227 - 1236 Received U.S.S. MANLEY alongside to transfer guard
mail.
1525 Sighted ships, hull down bearing 185° T, distance
15 miles. Later identified as PENSACOLA group
1808 Reversed fleet course to 150° T.
2310 Cleared formation and took station astern SAN
FRANCISCO.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 11°, 09'.5 S
Long 163°, 24'.5 E
1200 Lat 10°, 27'.6 S
Long 163°, 09'.1 E
2000 Lat 10°, 36'.7 S
Long 162°, 35' E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Nov 1 to 1200 Nov 2:
Course: 319° T.
Speed: 14 knots.
Distance: 295 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 3, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0900 Steaming as before. Maneuvering on various
courses at various speeds in accordance with
orders CTF 65.
0348 Radar contact 036° T., distance 11,200 yards.
Destroyer investigated.
0439 Destroyer dropped depth charges on submarine
sighted while investigating radar contact.
0910 Sighted three ships bearing 297° T. Identified as
Atlanta Group.
1342 - 1345 Sighted ship belonging to transport group.
1538 Sighted ship bearing 320° T., Identified as U.S.S.
CONYNGHAM.
1821 Sighted ship hull down bearing 285° T. Identified
as U.S.S. SOUTHARD.
1830 - 2400 Steaming as before.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 11°, 01'5 S
Long 161°, 22' E
1200 Lat 11°, 04'3 S
Long 162°, 29'6 E
2000 Lat 10°, 00'6 S
Long 161°, 49' E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Nov 2 to 1200 Nov 3:
Course: 247 T.
Speed: 16 knots.
Distance: 95 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 4, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
ENCLOSURE (A): Report of bombardment Koil Point.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0500 Steaming as before. Maneuvering on various
courses at various speeds in accordance with
signals from CTF65.
0500 - 1800 Operating off northeast coast Guadalcanal Island
on various courses at various speeds.
0745 Hoisted out one aircraft for gunnery observations.
1007 - 1112 Conducted bombardment to east of Koli Point (see
enclosure A).
1114 Aircraft reported on way to attack. Took station
to protect transports.
1322 All clear. Resumed patrol.
1506 - 1522 Recovered three aircraft - DOG METHOD.
1800 - 2400 Operating as patrol in Indispensible Strait.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 09°, 20'5 S
Long 160°, 02'.2 E
1200 Lat 09°, 20'2 S
Long 160°, 09'6 E
2000 Lat 09°, 14'7 S
Long 160°, 48' E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Nov 3 to 1200 Nov 4:
Course: 320° T.
Speed: 14 knots.
Distance: 250 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 5, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0600 Steaming as before. Maneuvering on various
Courses at various speeds in accordance with
signals from CTF 65.
0600 - 0930 Patrolled off Aola Bay.
0931 Received warning of impending air raid.
1012 - 1035 Launched four aircraft to proceed to Tulagi.
1035 - 1214 Screened transport group.
1212 - 2200 Patrolled off Aola Bay.
1558 - 1612 Recovered four aircraft - DOG METHOD.
2145 Reported radar contact bearing 250° T.
2250 Enemy forces reported off Savo and Lunga Roads
area.
2302 Sighted two flares dropped over Guadalcanal.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 09°, 25'5 S
Long 160°, 35'.3 E
1200 Lat 09°, 29'2 S
Long 160°, 31' E
2000 Lat 09°, 21'2 S
Long 160°, 41.7' E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Nov 4 to 1200 Nov 5:
Course: 120° T.
Speed: 15 knots.
Distance: 30 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 6, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0020 Steaming as before.
0013 Sighted two flares over Guadalcanal.
0020 Set course to clear Guadalcanal - Tulagi area.
0020 - 2400 Steaming on various courses at various speeds in
accordance with signals from CTF 65.
1906 Radar target bearing 056° T., distance 13,100
yards.
Appeared to be submarine from actions.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 09°, 51' S
Long 161°, 33' E
1200 Lat 10°, 10'2 S
Long 161°, 26'5 E
2000 Lat 11°, 30' S
Long 162°, 57' E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Nov 5 to 1200 Nov 6:
Course: 130° T.
Speed: 15 knots.
Distance: 72 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 7, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 2400 Steaming as before on various courses at various
speeds in accordance with signals from CTF 65.
1315 Launched one aircraft for flight to Buttons.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 14°, 13' S
Long 163°, 11' E
1200 Lat 14°, 10'5 S
Long 164°, 13'7 E
2000 Lat 14°, 20'5 S
Long 166°, 22' E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Nov 6 to 1200 Nov 7:
Course: 130° T.
Speed: 15 knots.
Distance: 72 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 8, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 290924 of October.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
CHANGES: Shifted Task Organization of Task Force 65 in accordance with
ComSoPac dispatch 061237 of November.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0400 Steaming as before. Maneuvering on various
courses at various speeds in accordance with
orders from CTF 65.
0446 Launched one aircraft for inner anti-submarine
patrol.
0500 Commenced maneuvering on various courses to
approach and enter port.
0517 - 0519 Launched two aircraft for inner anti-submarine
patrol.
0623 Moored port side to U.S.S. GUADALUPE for fueling.
0645 - 0700 Recovered three aircraft - BAKER METHOD.
0705 Commenced fueling.
1025 Completed fueling.
1056 Underway to shift berths.
1129 Anchored berth B-3. Prepared to shift berth as the
present one was too small.
1158 Anchored berth Y-1. Espiritu Santo, N.H. in 28
fathoms of water with 75 fathoms of chain to the
starboard anchor.
1200 - 2400 Anchored as before.
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 Nov 7 to anchoring.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 9, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 061237 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 65
LWT (-11)
0000 - 1100 Anchored as before.
1109 - 1223 Underway to shift berths.
1223 Anchored berth B-4 Segond Channel, Espiritu Santo,
N.H.
1223 - 2400 Anchored as before.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 10, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 061237 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
CHANGES: Task organization shifted to Task Force 67 for temporary
assignment. Operating in Task Group 67.4 in accordance with
ComSoPac dispatch 080222 of November.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 67.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0550 Anchored as before.
0557 Underway. Steaming on various courses at various
speeds to clear harbor and channel.
0652 Cleared harbor. Steadied on base course 140° T.
0700 - 1120 Steaming on various courses at various speeds in
accordance with signals from C.T.G. 67.4.
1120 Left formation to take station for San Francisco
offset firing practice.
1413 - 1436 Conducted test firing automatic weapons and six
inch H.C. projectiles.
1445 - 1538 Conducted main battery tracking exercise while
rejoining formation.
1547 Rejoined formation.
1735 Pensacola and escorts left formation.
1800 - 2400 Steaming as before.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 15°, 49'5 S
Long 167°, 08'8 E
1200 Lat 15°, 17'5 S
Long 166°, 17'0 E
2000 Lat 14°, 21' S
Long 164°, 30'3 E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from getting underway to 1200 Nov 10
Course: 290° T.
Speed: 17 knots.
Distance: 55 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 11, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 080222 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 67.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0800 Steaming as before. Maneuvering on various courses
at various speeds in accordance with signals from
CTG 67.4
0841 Sighted transport group. Commenced maneuvering on
various courses at various speeds in accordance
with signals from CTG 67.4 to join forces.
0905 Steadied on base course 330° T.
1000 - 1005 Received DD alongside to transfer guard mail.
1127 Unidentified aircraft reported bearing 200° T
distant 22 miles.
1132 Aircraft identified as Jap sea-plane.
1257 Unidentified aircraft 275° T., distant 23 miles.
Plane identified as four engine Jap seaplane.
1500 - 1508 Launched three aircraft for flight to Tulagi.
2123 Sighted two white lights in vertical row dead
Ahead.
2217 Passed Nugu Island abeam to starboard bearing
000° T., distant 1.75 miles.
2251 Passed through Sealark Channel.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 11°, 34'7 S
Long 162°, 59' E
1200 Lat 11°, 26'3 S
Long 162°, 22'7 E
2000 Lat 09°, 30'5 S
Long 160°, 58'6 E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 10 November to 1200 11 November:
Course: 315° T.
Speed: 17 knots.
Distance: 315 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 12, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 080222 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
Enclosures: (A) Report of shore bombardment Mouth of Kokimbona
River.
(B) Report of torpedo plane attack on Task Force 67.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 67.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0530 Steaming on various courses at various speeds in
accordance with signals from CTG 67.4. Making
sweeps off Savo Island - Guadalcanal Area to find
any enemy forces present.
0548 Destroyer reported sound contact and started
dropping depth charges.
0554 Resumed base course.
0600 - 0700 Patrolled station off transports.
0728 - 0825 Conducted shore bombardment on enemy installations
at mouth of Kokumbona River. (See enclosure "A").
0830 - 1320 Patrolled station off transport landing group.
1007 Friendly planes approached. Fired on by several
ships. No hits observed
1320 Received warning of impending air attack.
1320 - 1340 Maneuvered to take station in port quarter of
transport group.
1405 Enemy planes reported approaching over Florida
Island.
1408 Changed course to 340° T.
1410 - 1452 Repelled enemy torpedo planer attack. (See
enclosure "B').
1500 Resumed patrol off transport group conducting
landing operations.
1500 1800 Steaming as before. Patrolling stations.
1800 1840 Maneuvered on various courses at various speeds to
take station in formation.
2009 Passed Nugu Island abeam to port distant one mile.
2214 Changed base course to 270° T.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 09°, 23'0 S
Long 159°, 58'9 E
1200 Lat 09°, 23'3 S
Long 159°, 59'5 E
2000 Lat 09°, 18' S
Long 160°, 18'9 E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 11 November to 1200 12 November:
Course: 311° T.
Speed: 17 knots.
Distance: - - - - miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 13, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 080222 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
CHANGES: 0242 - U.S.S. Helena took charge of vessels of Task Group
67.4.
U.S.S. HELENA U.S.S. FLETCHER
U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO U.S.S. O'BANNON
U.S.S. JUNEAU U.S.S. STERETT
Enclosures: (A) Report of battle off Guadalcanal.
(B) Report of torpedoing and sinking of U.S.S. JUNEAU.
GENERAL TASK: Operating in Task Group 67.4
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0100 Steaming as before. Maneuvering on various
courses in accordance with orders from CTG 67.4.
0108 Changed base course to 280° T.
0122 Changed speed to 18 knots.
0125 Reported radar contact bearing 310° T., distant
31,000 yards.
0125 - 0400 See enclosure (A).
0422 Changed speed to 15 knots.
0430 Changed course 135° T.
0432 Changed speed to 20 knots.
0458 Changed course to 100° T.
0459 Radar contact 206° T., distant 10,000 yards.
0520 Changed course to 145° T.
0523 Changed course to 130° T.
0528 Commenced zig-zagging on base course 130° T.
Note: Between period 0300 and 0600 was joined by U.S.S.
JUNEAU, U.S.S. FLETCHER, U.S.S. O'BANNON and
U.S.S. STERETT.
0548 Changed base course to 110° T.
0600 Changed speed to 10 knots.
0622 Changed speed to 15 knots.
0637 Changed speed to 10 knots.
0638 Changed base course to 175° T.
0725 - 0755 Slowed formation to transfer doctors from HELENA
and JUNEAU to O'BANNON. Detached O'BANNON to
proceed to point clear of formation and transmit
dispatch 122005 to ComSoPac.
0755 Steadied on base course 180° T, speed 10 knots,
zig-zagging according to plan #8.
0830 Changed speed to 18 knots.
0950 STERETT reported sound contact. Executed
emergency turn to right. STERETT dropped depth
charges. Results unknown.
0954 Resumed base course.
1020 U.S.S. BUCHANAN reported for duty.
1100 Torpedo reported on port side distant about 400
yards bearing 260° relative.
1101 U.S,S, JUNEAU torpedoed, exploded and disappeared
from sight. (See enclosure "B"). Ships maneuvered
radically.
1116 Unidentified aircraft sighted.
1118 Resumed base course.
1121 Aircraft identified as a B-17. Reported sinking
and position of JUNEAU accident and requested
plane inform ComSoPac.
1124 Changed speed to 20 knots.
1129 Changed base course to 135° T.
1145 Torpedo wake reported by SAN FRANCISCO. Emergency
turn to right, increased speed to flank.
1148 Steadied on base course, resumed zig-zagging.
1400 Sighted ship bearing 015° T., distant 28,000
yards. Identified as U.S.S. O'BANNON.
1506 U.S.S. O'BANNON rejoined formation.
1500 - Sunset Escorted by one to four PBY planes acting as anti-
submarine patrol.
1918 Yellow flare reported on starboard quarter.
2000 Changed base course to 110° T.
2000 - 2400 Steaming as before.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 09°, 51' S
Long 161°, 04'9 E
1200 Lat 10°, 52'9 S
Long 161°, 23'6 E
2000 Lat 12°, 27' S
Long 162°, 51'2 E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 12 November to 1200 13 November:
Course: 318° T.
Speed: 20 knots.
Distance: 115 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 14, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 080222 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: Task Group 67.4 Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
U.S.S. HELENA
U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO
U.S.S. O'BANNON
U.S.S. STERETT
U.S.S. FLETCHER
CHANGES: U.S.S. BUCHANAN joined group as additional
escort.
GENERAL TASK: Retiring to base.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0400 Steaming as before. On base course 110° T; speed
20 knots; zig-zagging according to plan #6.
0400 Changed base course to 125° T.
0716 PBY anti-submarine patrol took station ahead of
formation.
0745 Sighted transport group (CTF 67) bearing 200° T.,
distant 18 miles.
0823 Changed base course to 180° T.
0834 Changed base course to 125° T.
0845 Sighted Banks Island bearing 140° T., distant 39
miles.
0945 SAN FRANCISCO reported periscope astern of her.
Emergency turn right. Increased speed flank.
0951 Resumed base course and zig-zagged.
0954 Resumed speed to 20 knots
1002 Changed base course to 100° T.
1015 Destroyer reported submarine contact. Emergency
turn right. Contact not developed.
1027 Resumed base course and zig-zagging.
1105 Changed case course to 120° T.
1145 - 1300 Vessels of Task Group unloaded all guns through
muzzles.
1300 Changed base course to 170° T.
1337 SAN FRANCISCO reported torpedo wake. Emergency
turn to the right.
1349 Resumed base course and zig-zagging.
1350 Torpedo wake reported. Emergency turn to the
right.
1400 Resumed base course.
1503 San Francisco reported sighting submarine.
Emergency turn to port.
1510 Resumed base course.
1513 Changed base course to 180° T.
1532 Changed base course to 260° T.
Commenced maneuvering on various courses at
various speeds to enter port.
1639 Moored starboard side to U.S.S. GUADALUPE,
Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides.
1735 Commenced fueling.
2030 Completed fueling.
2030 - 2400 Anchored as before.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 13°, 59' S
Long 166°, 04'3 E
1200 Lat 14°, 40' S
Long 161°, 23'6 E
2000
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 13 November to 1200 12 November:
Course: 305° T.
Speed: 20 knots.
Distance: 380 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 15, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 080222 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: Task Group 67.4 Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
U.S.S. HELENA
U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO
U.S.S. O'BANNON
U.S.S. STERETT
U.S.S. FLETCHER
U.S.S. BUCHANAN
CHANGES: Task Force 67disbanded in accordance with CTF 67 despatch
142000 of November
GENERAL TASK: Awaiting orders.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0850 Moored as before.
0851 Underway to shift berths.
0914 Anchored berth A-12 Segond Channel, Espiritu
Santo, New Hebrides with 90 fathoms of chain to
starboard anchor in 22 fathoms of water.
0930 - 2400 Anchored as before.
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 14 November to
anchoring:
Course: 170° T.
Speed: 20 knots.
Distance: 55 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 16, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComSoPac dispatch 061232 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Awaiting orders.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 2400 Anchored as before.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 17, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with CTF 62 dispatch 061232 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
CHANGES: In accordance with CTF 62 despatch 160622 of November formed
Task Group 62.7
U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G.C. HOOVER.
U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO
U.S.S. STERETT
U.S.S. BUCHANAN
GENERAL TASK: Awaiting orders.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 2400 Anchored as before.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 18, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComTaskFor 62 dispatch 061232 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: Task Group 62.7 - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
U.S.S. HELENA
U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO
U.S.S. STERETT
U.S.S. BUCHANAN
CHANGES: U.S.S. GWIN ordered to join Task Group 62.7
GENERAL TASK: Proceed to WHITE POPPY.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 1600 Anchored as before.
1640 Submarine reported at west entrance to Segond
Channel.
1603 Underway, steaming on various courses at various
speeds to clear harbor and channel.
1634 Changed speeds to 20 knots.
1638 Steadied on course 157° T.
1640 Steadied on course 125z T.
1645 Commenced zig-zagging according to plan #8.
1700 - 1815 Steaming on various courses at various speeds,
zig-zagging according to plan to pass through
Bouganville Strait.
1818 Steadied on base course 270° T. Zig-zagging
according to plan #8.
1900 Changed base course to 180° T.
2000 Changed base course to 165° T.
2032 Sound contact reported. Emergency turn right.
Increased speed to flank.
2041 Steadied on base course.
2229 STERETT made close sound contact. Dropped depth
charges. Formation maneuvered clear. Result -
STERETT believes submarine sunk.
2245 Resumed base course.
2245 - 2400 Steaming as before.
POSITIONS:
2000 Lat 16°, 12' S
Long 166°, 51' E
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 19, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComTaskFor 62 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: Task Group 62.7 - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
U.S.S. HELENA
U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO
U.S.S. STERETT
U.S.S. BUCHANAN
U.S.S. GWIN
GENERAL TASK: Proceed to WHITE POPPY.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0900 Steaming as before.
0800 Changed base course to 158° T.
1144 GWIN reported submarine contact bearing 170° T.
Emergency turn right 90°, increased speed to
flank. GWIN left formation to develop contact.
1202 Resumed base course at standard speed.
1230 Changed base course to 165°
1700 Changed base course to 235°
1830 Changed base course to 180°
2045 Changed base course to 220°
2045 - 2400 Steaming as before.
POSITIONS:
0800 Lat 19°, 07'1 S
Long 167°, 47' E
1200 Lat 20°, 15'6 S
Long 168°, 23'8 E
2000 Lat 22°, 17'2 S
Long 168°, 16'8 E
Courses, Speed and Distance made good for getting underway 18 November to 1200 19 November:
Course: 166° T.
Speed: 18.5 knots.
Distance: 290 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 20, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating in accordance with ComTaskFor 62 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: Task Group 62.7 - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
U.S.S. HELENA
U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO
U.S.S. STERETT
U.S.S. BUCHANAN
U.S.S. GWIN
CHANGES: Task Group 62.7 dissolved.
GENERAL TASK: Proceed to WHITE POPPY.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 0100 Steaming as before.
0100 Changed base course to 270° T.
0300 Radar contact - land bearing 025° T.
0600 Changed base course to 030° T.
0627 Sighted Amedee Light bearing 025° T., distance 23
miles.
0700 Changed base course to 047° T.
0730 Commenced steaming on various courses at various
speeds to enter port and conform with channel.
0941 Anchored berth B-2, Port Noumea, in 7 fathoms of
water with 60 fathoms of chain to starboard
anchor.
1035 U.S.S. SAN FRANCISCO moored alongside to
starboard.
1035 - 2400 Anchored as before.
Courses, Speed and Distance made good from 1200 19 November to anchoring.
Course: 218° T.
Speed: 18 knots.
Distance: 101 miles.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 21, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Awaiting tender overhaul.
Operating under ComSeronSoPac dispatch 210407 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Tender overhaul.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 1600 Anchored as before.
1601 Underway to go alongside tender.
1609 Moored starboard side to U.S.S. PROMETHEUS.
1610 - 2400 Moored as before.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 22, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating under ComSeronSoPac dispatch 210407 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Tender overhaul.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 2400 Moored as before.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 23, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating under ComSeronSoPac dispatch 210407 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain G. C. Hoover, USN.
Captain C.P. Cecil, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Tender overhaul.
LWT (-11)
0000 - 2400 Moored as before.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
SECRET November 24 - 30, 1942.
REPORT FOR COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE:
Operating under ComSeronSoPac dispatch 210407 of November.
TASK ORGANIZTION: U.S.S. HELENA - Captain C.P. Cecil, USN.
GENERAL TASK: Tender overhaul.
LWT (-11)
- - - - - - Moored as before.
M.T. TYNG,
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
By direction.
U.S.S. HELENA
CL50/A16-3 10-s
November 15, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Action off North Coast Guadalcanal, Early Morning of
November 13, 1942, report of. (3rd Savo Island Night
Action.)
References: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Arts. 712 and 874(6).
(b) PacFlt Conf. ltr 24CL-42 of June 21, 1942.
(c) USS HELENA Secret Airmailgram 140001 to CTF 67.
(d) USS HELENA secret Airmailgram 152121 to CTF 67.
(e) CTF 67 Secret 151012 to ComSoPac.
(f) USS HELENA Secret Ltr. CL50/A16-3(005) of Nov. 14,
1942, on sinking of JUNEAU.
(g) CTF 67 Secret dispatch NPM 225 - 120133.
(h) NPM 387 - 130200.
(i) USS HELENA Secret dispatch 121610 to Radio Tulagi.
(j) USS HELENA Secret dispatch 122005 to ComAirSoPac.
(k) USS HELENA Secret ltr. CL50/A16-3(004) of Oct. 20,
1942 on Action Night 11-12 October.
Enclosures: (A) Track Chart of HELENA.
(B) Extracts from TBS Log.
(C) Copy of Report of Lieutenant Roger W. O'Neil,
MC-V(G), USNR, senior survivor JUNEAU.
(D) Copy HELENA BT to B-17 Plane on Nov. 13, 1942.
(E) Sail George Radar Officer's Report.
1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report
is submitted following the sequences given in enclosure (A) of reference (b).
(1) Comments on and summary of outstanding events.
As stated in the HELENA's report of the Night Action off Savo
Island on 11-12 October, reference (k) par. 1(1) and 1(5-c), the value of the
a Sail George Radar cannot be overemphasized. It was invaluable, and was the
sole means of keeping the OTC informed of the enemy prior to sight contact.
The OTC was informed of the approximate formation, general size of ships
(large or small), bearing, distance, course and speed. This information
started at about 31,900 yards on true bearing 310°, as is shown in Enclosure
(B). It was necessary to send this in voice code via TBS as the flagship was
not equipped with SG Radar and therefore must rely on outside information..
With this invaluable instrument available every possible effort should be
made to at least equip flagships with it.
An enemy cruiser illuminated this ship by searchlight,
simultaneously opening fire, prior to our force commencing fire, two hits
doing minor material damage were at once registered. Size of projectile
fragments and base plug, height and size of searchlight, and radar image
confirm this.
The enemy were very evidently equipped with bombardment
ammunition for that mission, or it is believed much greater material damage
would have resulted to us. Parts of projectiles recovered on board this and
others of our ships verify this statement.
As the main battery of the HELENA was tracking the target
that illuminated it, and was completely ready to open fire with fire control
problem solved by radar, our fire was effective at once and large fires with
quick sinking resulted. This burning ship illuminated others in this force
and greatly assisted the destroyers in directing torpedo fire on major ships.
This is the ideal method of Night Illumination.
Four important decisions were involved in this action, and its
aftermath, which the commanding officer of this ship had to make.
(l) The ship was illuminated and under fire of the enemy.
When should fire be returned as no orders to "commence firing" had been
Received? Just "stand-by to open fire".
This ship had furnished most of the information on the
enemy and had a very good picture of them showing our force surrounded on
three sides, or soon would be. The enemy was hitting us at once and a delay
might be fatal. See reference (k), paragraph 1 (7-b). This was discussed at
the preliminary conference with Rear Admiral Callaghan prior to sailing. I
opened fire at 0148.
(2) At about 0218 the PORTLAND appeared to be out of control
and on questioning reported a torpedo hit jamming her rudder. They asked for
a tow at 0231. Should the HELENA stop and do this under the circumstances?
Action was still taking place. The position of our forces
was not definitely known. Every effort was being made to close the SAN
FRANCISCO. The PORTLAND and JUNEAU had been torpedoed, and from previous
observation probably the ATLANTA. Enemy destroyers were in all directions
and a grave danger of torpedoing existed. See reference (k) paragraph 1
(7-d). I tried to contact the OTC by TBS and to find the SAN FRANCISCO
visually. After the action described in reference (k), Rear Admiral Scott
emphasized the desirability of all remaining forces keeping closed up and
assembling for possible further action. (At about 0228 the only ship that
would answer on TBS were the O'BANNON and FLETCHER). Returning to the area
of the PORTLAND was not considered justified. At 0240 the SAN FRANCISCO was
contacted by blinker tube on our port bow and instructed us to take charge.
Reference (i) was then sent to Radio Tulagi requesting tow and air coverage
for the PORTLAND.
(3) When should the night action be broken off and a
retirement started?
At about 0214 while attempting to get the course of
the rest of the ships in the force I received no answer. As I knew the
PORTLAND was damaged, the ATLANTA appeared to have been hit, the SAN
FRANCISCO was known to have been hit, and the JUNEAU was not seen. I called
all ships and at about 0226 attempted to assemble what forces remained.
Firing then was sporadic and numerous ships were burning. The O'BANNON and
FLETCHER only were contacted. Course 092, speed 20 knots and form 18 was
given in code by TBS to all ships, and destination Sealark. Soon after this
the SAN FRANCISCO was contacted ahead on our port bow headed for Sealark
Channel and some idea of her crippled condition was obtained. SAN FRANCISCO
asked HELENA to lead her out. This together with the few ships contacted
caused my decision to retire with the remaining forces via Sealark Channel,
which was done with the aid of the Sail George Radar. The FLETCHER preceded
us, and the O'BANNON joined to the eastward having transited Lengo Channel.
At 0420 the STERETT having transited Lengo and being damaged joined near Nura
Island at the rendezvous I had given for 0425. At 0455 sighted JUNEAU ahead
on the port bow. At 0526 the JUNEAU was directed to join us.
(4) At 1101 the JUNEAU was torpedoed as reported in reference
(f). Should an attempt have been made to search the area for
survivors?
The SAN FRANCISCO and HELANA were screened by the
STERETT (damaged) and the FLETCHER, as the O'BANNON was at about 0815 sent to
send reference (j), and it rejoined at 1530. Due to the small screen, the
crippled condition of the ships, and the devastating nature of the explosion,
it was not considered that the risk of further torpedoing was justified. No
sound or sight contact was made. The hope that a plane would soon appear was
held, as the message sent by the O'BANNON asking for air coverage had been
already received by us on the Fox Schedule. At 1121 a B-17 did appear and
Enclosure (D) was the message transmitted to him for forwarding. This
message was acknowledged for by the plane, but apparently not forwarded to
Commander South Pacific Force.
(2-a) Enemy forces:
#1 See NPM NR 205 D/T 120030.
#2 See NPM NR 232 D/T 120625.
#3 See NPM NR 200 D/T 112345.
#1 Concerning 2 BB or 2 CA.
#2 Concerning 2 CV.
#3 Concerning 5 DD.
See Enclosure (E) for general disposition of enemy.
(2-b) Own formation entered the area via Lengo Channel in battle
disposition "Baker One". Order of ships as follows: Column of station units
van unit Commander Stokes CUSHING, LAFFEY, STERETT, O'BANNON; Base unit
ATLANTA, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND, HELENA, JUNEAU; Rear units Captain Tobin
AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, FLETCHER. Distance in yards Destroyers 500,
Cruisers 700. Distance between rear and first ship adjacent units 800 yards.
(Refer CTG 67.4 despatch 120615 of November).
(2-c) Wind from 120, 9 knots; sea smooth swells from 125; Sky partly
cloudy but clear overhead. Jagged lightning over land areas especially in
mountains on Guadalcanal and Florida Island.
(3-a) While our forces was steaming on course 280° T, speed 18, in
special battle disposition (column with four destroyers leading in column,
five cruisers (HELENA fourth cruiser in column), followed by four
destroyers), off Guadalcanal between Lunga Point and Cape Esperance, Radar
Plot reported a contact at 0124, bearing 312° T, range 27,100 yards. One or
two minutes after this Radar Plot reported that three separate groups of
targets were distinguishable, two at 27,000 yards, and one at 32,000 yards.
At about 0130 Radar Plot reported that target course was approximately 134°
T, speed 20. Between 0125 aand 0130 our course was changed to 000 and speed
increased to 20 knots. At about 0135 range to left closest target group was
15,000 yards, bearing 324° T, and tracking gave enemy course 120°, speed 20.
According to plotting room at about 0137 we changed course to 315° T and
speed to 25 which was directly toward the farthest of the three enemy groups
and between the two closest enemy groups.
(3-b) The forward FC radar picked up one target group at about
18,000 yards and in conjunction with radar plot tracked this group. It was
the left hand group of the two closest groups of targets. It never appeared
to change course or speed. At a range of about 6000 or 7000 yards the
Gunnery Officer checked and found that we were not on the left hand ship of
this group and by use of "SG" radar shifted to a ship farther to the left in
this group. This enemy group passed ahead of and crossed to port of our
leading destroyers which had at about 0140 changed course to about 270° T.
(3-c) Director I was tracking the target using the Forward FC radar
for range and train. Director II was doing likewise. All turrets were
loaded and in automatic train and elevation. Director I controlling in
train, Director III in elevation. At about 0148 we were illuminated by a
searchlight bearing about 285° relative and exactly in line with the train of
Director I. Commence firing was ordered immediately and the main battery
opened fire in continuous fire at a range of about 4200 yards. Rapid
continuous fire was maintained for about two minutes using a 200 yard rocking
ladder. Almost at the same time that we opened fire we started our turn to
the left following in column the ships ahead which had changed course to
about 270° T. The searchlight on the target (which appeared too high and
large to be on a destroyer) was immediately turned off or shot away. Spot I
reports that the target was visible to him, that our tracers appeared to be
perfect in deflection and that practically all of our shots appeared to hit,
and that before cease firing the target was afire forward and amidships and
was sinking. Cease firing was given as ordered by Task Force Commander and
Commanding Officer after about two minutes of firing at which time the range
was about 3000 yards. At about the moment of opening fire on this target a
large and compact salvo was seen to hit directly in our wake and 50 to 100
yards astern. During this firing we received two hits in the vicinity of the
stacks and searchlight tower, one of which has been definitely determined to
have been eight inch. It is also probable that the hit we received on the
airplane crane was received at this time. It is believed that our target was
an eight inch cruiser and that it was sunk. Two destroyers, the O'BANNON and
the FLETCHER, both report that it was a cruiser and both report seeing it
sink. Its burning silhouetted a BB target for the O'BANNON.
(3-d) The forward Fox Dog picked up the target at about the same
time as the Fox Cast and tracked a target ship in the same group obtaining
the same enemy course and speed as did the main battery. The 5" battery was
in automatic using radar train. Upon opening fire the 5" was on a target
slightly to the left of the main battery target and at a range of 6200 yards.
The director control officer and spotter reports seeing hits on this target.
The 5" battery ceased firing at the same time as the main battery.
(3-e) During this first phase of the action the main battery
expended about 175 rounds, the 5" battery about 20 rounds.
(3-f) The succeeding few minutes were mostly absorbed in avoiding
damaged ships and identifying own vessels on most of which before challenging
the batteries were trained. During this period we almost rammed but managed
to avoid by about 100 yards a large capsized vessel bottoms up, the beam of
which I am certain was greater than that of this vessel. (It appeared to the
Gunnery Officer just like the OKLAHOMA did on December 7th at Pearl Harbor).
Within about 2000 yards of this a vessel with outlines aft generally similar
to that of the SAN FRANCISCO was burning fiercely and completely from bow to
stern. It was at first thought to be the SAN FRANCISCO but the SAN FRANCISCO
was then sighted nearby and definitely identified. With both in sight it was
obvious that the burning vessel was definitely larger than the SAN FRANCISCO.
It is not considered possible that the burning vessel could have survived as
it was already well down. During this period there was considerable firing
between vessels mostly to the southwestward. Also during this period we
narrowly avoided being rammed on the starboard side by the ATLANTA or JUNEAU.
(It is believed to have been the ATLANTA.
(3-g) At about 0203 radar plot reported at least six enemy ships on
our starboard hand heading in northerly direction. While putting the main
battery on one of these targets one was observed to be firing on the SAN
FRANCISCO then on our starboard bow. Both FC radars got on this target and
at 0204 opened fire with the main battery in full automatic using forward FC
radar in train. Opening range was 8800 yards. Fired for approximately 1 ½
to 2 minutes and ceased firing at range of 9400 yards when SAN FRANCISCO on
our starboard hand came in line of fire. Approximately 125 rounds were
expended in this phase and were believed to be very effective.
(3-h) At the same time the 5" battery was getting on the enemy ships
to starboard as coached by radar plot it picked up a destroyer on our
starboard quarter firing at us and opened fire on it at a range of 7200
yards. About 40 rounds were fired and cease firing ordered when SAN
FRANCISCO came into line of fire, this fire was also most effective.
(3-i) During the above firing of the main and 5" batteries the
automatic weapons control officer observed between the lines of fire of the
batteries and at about 3000 yards, a vessel with four stacks passing on
diverging course. Fire was opened with the forward starboard 40mm mount on
this vessel and 159 rounds expended. This firing was very effective being
directly in the bridge area, and at least 2/3 were seen to hit. Cease firing
was ordered at the same time as the other batteries. During this phase of
the action two hits were received, one on the face plate of turret four and
one on the forecastle deck by a large projectile.
(3-j) Results of the above firing in the second phase are not
definitely known but both spotters report that hits were being obtained and
it is believed both main battery and 5" targets were on fire. The automatic
weapons control officer reports observing about two thirds of all shots fired
hitting in the area of the forward stack and bridge structure.
(3-k) After clearing several of own vessels the main battery again
opened fire on a vessel of the same group as before. The opening range was
16,400 yards, target course 330, speed 17. It had been tracked out from
about 10,000 yards by radar plot and the main battery and FC radars. Rapid
continuous fire was maintained for about one minute at a very high rate of
fire when the range was again fouled and ceased firing given. About 60
rounds were fired. The target appeared to be on fire.
(3-l) At about the same time during this third phase the 5" battery
fired about 40 rounds at a target believed to be a destroyer just forward of
starboard beam at a range of about 5000 yards. Cease firing was ordered when
the range was fouled by own vessel. This target also appeared to be in
flames.
TIME SCHEDULE - NIGHT ACTION
Task Group 67.4 - Early morning November 13, 1942. (All time
Love). Times and data collected from Quartermaster's Log, Signal Log, and
TBS Log kept by Navigation.
TIME EVENT
November 12, 1942
2214 Changed course to right to 270° T.
2218 Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).
2236 Changed speed to 15 knots (155 rpm).
November 13, 1942
0010 Changed course to left to 180° T.
0013 Changed course to right.
0024 Changed course to right to 280° T.
0040 Changed course to left to 270° T.
0108 Changed course to right to 280° T.
0122 Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).
0124 Radar contact (SG Radar) bearing 312° T, distance 27,100 yards.
0125 Radar contact (SG Radar) bearing 310° T, distance 31,100 yards.
(Note - above two contacts appeared to be several large ships with
screen).
0135 Changed course to right to 310° T.
0137 Changed speed to 20 knots (208 rpm).
0138 HELENA steering 315° T, speed 10 knots.
0139 Four targets on port bow. HELENA course 315° T, speed 10 knots.
0140 Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).
0141 Leading destroyer reported seeing ships dead ahead and on port
bow.
0142 Changed course to right to 000° T.
0143 HELENA making 18 knots.
0143.5 Leading destroyer told to fire torpedoes.
0145 Prepared to open fire. HELENA course 015° T.
0146 HELENA course 010° T.
0147 HELENA course 000° T.
0148 Commenced firing. Opening range 4300 yards. Fired on furthest
target to left. Fired two or more minutes after target
illuminated ship and hit our searchlight platform. (Clock in D/F
shack stopped at 0148).
0149 Changed course to left. Hard left rudder.
0149 Changed speed to flank (Maximum speed).
0150 HELENA stopped all engines.
0151 HELENA increased speed to maximum.
0152 HELENA swinging past 250° T.
0153 Changed course to right to 000° T. Rudder hard right
own course 000° T. Speed 17 knots.
0153 Ceased firing.
0154 Changed speed to full (18 knots).
0155 Large explosion (off port bow). Considered target
fired at by HELENA and sunk.
0156 Planes reported overhead (/) 355° T,
0157 Hard right rudder to avoid ship which passed from
starboard to port at right angles. Ship either ATLANTA or
JUNEAU. (Believed ATLANTA). Very close call.
0158 Changed course to 000° T.
0159 More gunfire reported {Where?).
0200 Ship ahead of HELENA illuminating.
0201 Heavy cruiser (believed PORTLAND) turning to right.
0202 Large explosion to starboard.
0203 Changed course to left to 290° T. HELENA making 16 knots.
0204 Commenced firing. Opened fire at range 9200 yards.
0206 Ceased firing.
0206.5 "6 enemy ships over 5000 yards on starboard side."
0207 Changed course to left. Hard left rudder. HELENA making
20 knots.
0210 Changed course to right. JUNEAU or ATLANTA (believe
ATLANTA) on fire on starboard beam (by 160°T).
0211 Changed course to left to 120° T. HELENA making 15 knots.
0212 "Enemy cruiser on starboard bow."
0213 Hard right rudder.
0214 Took position astern of PORTLAND(?).
0215 Commenced firing. HELENA on course 115° T. "Hard right rudder".
Opened fire at 16,300 yards bearing approximately 1100 rel.
Enemy course 330° T. Enemy speed 17.
0216 Ceased firing; changed course to right to 230° T. HELENA
making 10 knots.
0217 Changed course to left to 092° T,
HELENA increased speed to full.
0218 PORTLAND lost steering control.
0220 HELENA making 18 knots.
0221 HELENA streeing course 092° T.
0224 HELENA illuminated by srewach light.
0226 Changed speed to flank (28 knots).
0027 Small boat reported off starboard bow.
0230 Changed couirse t oleft to 090° T.
0231 Received message from PROTLAND requesting tow.
0232 HELENA on course 050°
0234 HELENA on course 090°
0237 HELENA on course 100°, speed 27 knots.
0238 Changed speed to 17 knots.
0239 HELENA making 20 knots on course 090° T.
0240 SAN FRANCISCO on port bow.
0240 SAN FRANCISCO told this vessel to take charge.
0244 Changed course to right to 100° T.
0249 Changed speed to 25 knots,
0255 Changed course to left to 080° T. HELENA making 20 knots.
0259 Changed speed to 15 knots.
0300 Changed course to 090° T. Speed 10 knots,
0301 Changed speed to 20 knots. HELENA on course 090° T.
0302 Changed right to 098° T.
0307 Changed speed to 10 knots.
0310 HELENA on course 098° T. Speed 15 knots,
0312 Changed speed to 15 knots. Large explosion bearing about 278° T.
0318 Changed course left to 075° T.
0321 Changed course right to 080° T.
0325 Changed course right to 090° T.
0332 Changed course left to 081° T.
0344 Changed speed to full (20 knots).
0345 Passed clear of Sealark Channel.
0354 Changed course right to 110° T.
0422 Changed speed to 15 knots.
0430 Changed course to 135° T.
0432 Changed speed to 20 knots.
0458 Changed couree to 100° T
0520 Changed course to 145° T.
0523 Changed course to 130° T.
(4-a) Reference (e) gives an estimate of enemy forces
involved and their losses. Three groups definitely existed as shown by
Enclosure (D). The center group appeared as four or five large ships
(BB's, CA's or Battle Cruisers) and perhaps two transports or smaller
ships a distance astern, The left (nearest) and right hand groups
contained from five to eight ships each, and were in the nature of a
screen having destroyers and two or more cruisers in each.
(4-d) Illuminated and opened fire before we did. Only search
light noted was the first one opening on the HELENA. It soon went out
or was turned off. Starshells and possibly flares were in the sky.
Enemy planes were overhead and may have dropped flares. Some of our
destroyers and the SAN FRANCISOO are known to have fired starahella
which appeared well placed.
Bombardment ammunition used by the enemy is believed to
have reduced their effectiveness.
(4-e) See reference (e) and RDO Guadalcanal NPM 416 - 130428.
(5-a)(1) Performance of the batteries. The performance of all
batteries is considered to have been excellent. There were no material
casualties which in any way affected the firing except two and possibly
three misfires in turret one, both of which were immediately fired by
percussion, and the failure of the center gun of turret four to return
to battery after a hit sustained on the face plate of that turret.
Fire was continued by the wing guns of this turret. Damage to search
lights resulted in one light being put out of commission and one
operative by local control only. However there was never any need for
the use of searchlights. Damage to wiring to forward FC antenna level
control did not affect the operation of the radar since automatic level
was not being used during the action.
(5-a)(2) A very high degree of fire discipline was imperative
throughout the action due to rapid and frequent maneuvers and close
proximity of own vessels which frequently blanketed line of fire.
There was also the necessity frequently to point the batteries on ships
believed to be our own as a precautionary measure before attempting to
identify by challenge or recognition. The fire discipline maintained
throughout was most gratifying and there is complete confidence felt
that at no time was a friendly ship fired upon. In the opinion of the
Gunnery Officer this action has again demonstrated that with our
present equipment illumination of the target by searchlight or star
shell is not necessary and that the use of searchlights serves to draw
enemy fire.
(5-b) The effectiveness of tie radar installation and its
performance cannot be praised too highly. Everything said in reference
(k) was doubly confirmed again in this Night Action.
(5-c) Summary of damage - location cause, effect. (Include
photographs.
Five hits were sustained during the engagement, details
as follows: (Hits numbered from forward aft).
No. l. - One major caliber (assumed to be 14 inch) hit
waterway lip at frame 29 and main-deck over pyrotechnic locker and
officers' suitcase room. The shall presumably exploded after hitting
deck, scattering fragments over face of No. 1 turret, which was
pointing about 150° relative, and various deck fittings. The wooden
deck was splintered 8' x 4' across run of deck planking. The steel
deck was torn-and folded down 6' x 1 ½". Watertight bulkhead, frame 27,
starboard, upper quarter torn out and cracked.
The pyrotechnic locker sprinkling system broken.
Number one turret gas send punctured over an arc of about 60
degrees (about 25 feet) by fragments. Although fragments
punctured at intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees
rather than intermittent patching. Pointer's check sight port out and
jammed by fragment. Check sight itself broken. Bloomer of left gun,
turret one out and torn. Steel bloomer securing rim broken. Many
gouges on face it plate.
Effect: Rendered pyrotechnic locker untenable as such; dumped
small remaining supply of pyrotechnics overboard. Turret one continued
firing without difficulty.
No. 2 - Hit on port forward part of forward stack, penetrating,
and exploding while going through after part, tearing out a section of
the steam exhaust pipe and diesel exhaust pipe. Fragments also damaged
the searchlight platform n follows:
Radio Direction Finder loop punctured
Power cable FE-176-DO feeder to #4 searchlight
punctured.
Ventilating motors of $1 and 4 36" searchlights slightly
damaged.
Lenses on #2 and 3 searchlights cracked.
Various lighting boxes and cable destroyed.
Searchlight control cable GE- 32 partly damaged.
Individual leads may be spliced to repair.
Various holes in searchlight platform, and radio
direction finder.
Effect: Broke 14 searchlight power supply. Broke remote controls
of #2 and 3 searchlights. Rendered Radio direction finder useless.
No. 3 - Major caliber hit (assumed 8" or larger) in port after
legs of searchlight platform. Angle bar supporting #2 40MM director
stand torn away. After stack punctured by fragments. One piece, base
plug of shell, pierced stack and hit starboard forward section of
secondary conn tearing out a section about 12" long and 5" wide. The
fragment hit the steering control stand, puncturing the case and
breaking electrical leads. Port boat crane structure pierced by
numerous fragments; wire cable broken by fragment. #1 motor launch and
#1 motor whaleboat hulls punctured. The two stack guys from the after
stack leading forward were out and broken by fragments, The port
forward mainmast guy was likewise broken.
Effect: Rendered two boats useless until patched; boat crane out
of commission. Secondary conn steering telegraph and rudder angle
indicator useless.
No. 4 - Hit on face plate of turret four, 9 inches directly
below center gun port. At the point of impact the face plate is dished
in 11/64 inch; area of dished surface about 12 inches in diameter. On
back of face plate a crack 4 inches long has been noted 5 1/2 inches above
point of impact Paint cracked and weld apparently broken around entire
periphery of face plate both inside and out (water leaking through
gives evidence of such a crack). Securing weld cracked on bolts
holding angle iron to face plate on inside under center gun. Rivets
securing face plate to top of turret appear to be loose. The gas seal
protector guard demolished throughout, arc subtended by face plate
(about 5 feet). Gas seal itself twisted and torn. Three gun bloomers
demolished and retaining rime twisted and torn. Numerous deck fittings
such as ventilator cowls and #3 20mm gun gunshield pierced by fragments.
Three fire hoses out up by fragments.
Effect: Other than damage to guns, no effect other than a light
inconvenience caused by hit. Turret face plate damage may, in time, be
serious but does not impair military efficiency at present.
No., 5 - A section of the starboard brace of aviation crane
pierced by direct hit of 5 to 8 inch shell. Shell exploded after
hitting; no fragmentation damage.
Effect: Rendered aviation crane useless.
Damage sustained to guns during action.
1. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 10.
Lower side of chase, five minor gouges about half inch diameter,
maximum depth .062 inches,
2. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 11.
Lower side. of chase, eight gouges over area ten by thirteen
inches, depths vary .125. to .375 inches.
3. 6"/47 cal, Gun No, 12,
Lower side of chase, twelve superficial gouges plus three of
about one inch diameter, maximum depth .125 inches,
4. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 3.
Lower side of chase, two gouges, each about one inch diameter,
depths .125 inches.
5. 5"/3S cal. Gun No. 1.
One gouge 100 inches from muzzle, 1/2 inch by 2 1/2 inch, depth .375
Inch.
6. Face plate turret four dented about two feet below center
gun, dent about 3 inch diameter. Maximum depth about .125 inches.
7. Slide bushing 6"/47 Gun No. 11, deeply scored and grooved on
recoil. subsequent to gouging of gun.
(5-d) The following casualties incurred as a result of
actions:
(a) Number killed 1
(b) Number requiring hospitalization (stretcher) 2
(c) Number remaining on board for treatment 20
total casualties 23
(6} Once more the performance of all officers and men has
been magnificent and inspiring without exception. Of particular note
should be the most courageous performance of our searchlight crews,
many of whom, though wounded, stayed at their stations and maintained
their lights ready for instant use, Several men of the 40mm crews,
though wounded, did likewise. Following the hit on turret four a small
fire was started among life jackets, etc, at No. 7 20mm mount.
ROBINSON, E. C., AOMM, USN, and MULLER, P.L., AMM1c, USN, proceed to
the spot and, extinguished the fire although turret four was at the
time trained out over this mount ready to fire. The steersman STEWART,
E. L., QM1c, USN, has performed in exemplary fashion in both the Night
Action of 11-12 October and 12-13 November, being of enormous
assistance in con-ning the ship under most difficult conditions while
under fire at night.
The following officers are especially worthy of commend
action for their performance of duty during this and the previous Night
Action of 11-12 October:
Lieut. Cmdr. Elmer C. Buerkle,. USN - Ship's Material Officer
Lieut. Comdr. Rodman D. Smith, USN. - Gunnery Officer.
Lieut. Comdr. Charles L. Carpenter, USN. - Navigator.
Lieut. Comdr. John L. Chew, USN. - Assistant Gunnery Officer.
Lieutenant Michael T. Tyng, USN - Communication Officer.
Lieut. (jg) Russell W. Gash, USNR - Radar Officer.
Lieut. (jg) William D. Fisher, USNR - Signal Officer.
There are probably many more instances of exemplary action on the port
of our personnel and the above is indicative of the performance of the
entire crew.
(7) Attention is invited to reference (k) paragraph 7. Every
statement made in this paragraph was confirmed in this action. Commenting
by paragraphs as used in the reference.
(a) The first enemy ship opened a searchlight and was
hit and destroyed.
(b) The HELENA faced the decisions as to opening fire.
(c) Fully confirmed as SAN FRANCISCO was again flagship
and had no S.G. Radar.
(d) Ships were injured and no instructions to those as-
tern furnished or possible.
(e) Fighting lights were again used. The SAN FRANCISCO
and STERETT away at once, and again how establish
identity? It was finally done by challenge and
blinker.
GILBERT C. HOOVER
Distribution:
CincPac (original and 1)
Cominch
ComSoPac
War Diary
U. S. S. HELENA
TBS TRAFFIC FROM 1400 to 1800
12 NOVEMBER 1942, TIMES ALL GCT
1400 No signals
1405 ComDesDiv 10 V Course 275 acknowledge
San Francisco
---- V 10 Wilco
1408 TF 67.4 V CTF Keep will close up report any contacts
1410 10 V CTF Execute immediately course 280 acknow.
---- V 10 Wilco
1422 CTF V 10 Light 7 degrees on port bow
1426 10 V CTF Execute speed 18
1430 CTF V Helena 2 contacts bearing 310 distance 31,900
---- V CTF R
1432 V 10 Wilco
1435 TF Cactus reports condition red planes 26 miles
000 degrees. Do not ans.
---- Helena V CTF How is she doing
1436 CTF V Helena Now three targets bearing 312 dist 26,000
---- V CTF R
---- CTF V Helena Their course 107 speed possibly 23
---- 10 V CTF Course 000
1440 Arnold to Lee (Transfer of operators, several transmissions
not in log including one from Helena that tar-
gets also to port
1441 All ships V -- 3 Unidentified ships port bow
(page 1)
---- CTF V HELENA We have four in line fan shaped like cruising
disposition.
---- O'Bannon V CTF What is the range.
1445 CTF V Helena Dist 3400
---- Helena V CTF Repeat
---- CFT V Helena Closing dist 3400
---- CFT V Cushing Ships dead ahead on port bow
---- Helena V CTF ----
---- V 10 4,000 or 5,000 yds maximum, ship crossing our
bow
---- 10 V CTF What do you make of it now
---- V Helena We have a total of ten targets
---- 10 V CTF Have you come around
---- 10 V Shall I let them have a couple of fish
1443 V CFT Do so
---- V 10 Wilco
---- V CTF What is bearing
---- HELENA Do you have targets to port
---- V Helena Affirmative
1445 TF V CTF Enemy is on our starboard bow and there are ships
to port. Stand by to open fire
---- Atlanta
V CTF What are you doing
---- CTF V Atlanta Avoiding our own DD
---- 10 V CTF What have you now to starboard
---- 10 V CTF Are you back on course
---- 10 V Juneau Two to starboard several to port
(page 2)
---- CTF V10 I am coming back on course
1454 All ships Hold course 0000
---- All ships Cease firing, are ships cease firing our ships
cease firing our ships cease ect.
---- CTF V Portland What is the dope
---- CTF V Portland Did you order cease firing, authenticate,
authenticate
---- All ships Take 0000
1458 CTF V Helena Authenticate that
---- TF V CTF Speed 18 course 000 stand by to open fire when
ordered enemy all around us battleship on star-
board bow and DD's all around him other targets
too
---- V Portland What is true bearing of battleship
---- CTF V Portland We are ready
---- Portland V CTF Give her hell
1500 Portland V CTF Acknowledge
---- 10 V Laffey Testing
---- Laffey V 10 Receive you ok
---- CTF V Helena Four ships in column bearing 060
---- V CTF What distance
---- V Sterrett We have jammed rudder. Would like recognition
signals
---- Laffey Turn on your lights for three seconds
---- Portland V CTF Do you have the battleship
---- CTF V Helena Can we open fire if we have targets
---- V CTF Advise type of targets we want the big ones
---- Portland V CTF Do you have the BB we have him 100
(page 3)
---- Portland V CTF Go ahead
---- Helena V CTF Affirmative on your last request
1507 CTF V Helena What is your course
---- CTF V Helena Request course
1512 Portland V What is course
Helena
---- Any ship V Can you hear me
Helena
---- V Monssen Go ahead
1513 V Helena R
1514 Portland, CTF Request course
Juneau, Atlanta
V Helena
1514 Lee to Nugent (change of operators)
1517 Portland V Answer please
Helena
1524 Portland, CTF Answer please
Juneau, Atlanta,
V Helena
1526 All ships V Form 18 course 092 speed 18 don't answer
Helena
1528 Nugent to Lee (change of operators)
---- CTF V O'Bannon Repeat course please
---- O'Bannon and Unable raise other big boys from 18 course
all ships V 092 speed 18
Helena
1529 V O'Bannon R
1532 All ships V Form 18 course 092 speed 20 sealark (all coed)
Helena
---- CTF or Helena Am on your starboard bow going ahead of you
V Fletcher
1535 ASP V Helena Show fighting lights momentarily execute
(page 4)
1539 Fletcher V Show fighting lights
Helena
---- V Fletcher Am complying
1540 V Helena R
1541 CTF V Helena Answer
1542 ASP V Helena My course 100
1545 Lee to Nugent (Change of operators)
1548 ASP V Helena Course 090 speed 20 Fletcher answer
---- V Fletcher R We are well ahead of you
1549 Fletcher V Close up
Helena
1550 Helena V Poist sealark (coded) speed 5
Fletcher
---- V Helena R
1552 ASP V Helena Course 100 speed 25
---- ASP V Helena In channel two ships on starboard bow close to
shore Fletcher answer
---- V Fletcher Just a second
---- Helena V Time (coded) accomplishment of present mission
O'Bannon
1555 O'B V Helena Your coded part not understood
1556 Helena V O'B (Code) Change that wait
1558 Helena V O'B No strangers near us
---- Helena V O'B Does the following code make sense
---- O'B Helena Your code understood
V
1600 V Fletcher R
1602 ASP v Helena Course 180 speed 20 don't answer
1603 ASP V Helena Show fighting lights
(page 5)
1604 ASP V Helena Cancel my last course. Course now 090
1607 O'B V Helena Retire sealark (coded)
1609 Helena V O'B Am proceeding Lengo (coded) about midway will
join to eastward keep me advised your course
1614 O'B V Fletcher My nugu (coded) my course 90 acknowledge
---- O'B V Helena Acknowledge
---- V O'Bannon R
1615 Nugent to Lee
1621 Helena V Fletcher We are ahead of you and will flash light
1622 V Helena R
---- Helena V I have taken lower one have made temporary
Sterrett hookup on this I have no recognition lights a
Bad fire aft but now under control
1623 V Helena R
---- Helena V O'B Have you someone with you if so whom
1624 V Helena Wait
1628 O'B V Helena As far as we can tell San Francisco astern
Fletcher ahead Sterrett in vicinity. S.F.
Can't talk on this
1629 Helena V O'B I think I have you bearing 135 can you check me
1630 V Helena Wait
---- O'B V Fletcher If you are in position as indicated by last
message there is another ship ahead of you not
yet visable to you
1632 V Sterrett I am astern of that
1635 Sterrett V Have you reduced speed
Helena
---- O'B V Helena Believe your message on your location to be
correct
(page 6)
1636 V O'Bannon R
1637 V O'Bannon Will join immediately
--- V Helena R
1639 O'B V Helena My course 081 my speed 15 still going through
be careful
1640 V O'Bannon R
---- Helena V My bearing 078 distance 10,500 from you speed
Fletcher 5 course 90
1642 V Helena R
---- O'Ba V Fletcher Can you identify that one on your starboard bow
1643 V O'Bannon No
1644 Lee to Nugent
1649 ASP V Helena My speed 20 O'Bannon acknowledge
---- V O'Bannon R
1650 ASP V Helena At 0425 rendezvous lat 9-22 long 60-35 Fletcher
O'B anon acknowledge (above coded)
---- Helena V O'B Have you Atlanta or Juneau with you
1652 V Helena Negative
---- Fletcher V Take station on port bow acknowledge
Helena
---- O'Bannon V Take station on starboard bow acknow.
---- V Fletcher R
---- V O'Bannon R
1655 Fletcher O'B Acknowledge for encoded message
V Helena
---- V Fletcher Understood
1659 Helena V We have you in sight now and are moving out to
take station
1701 ASP V Helena My course 110 Fletcher acknowledge
(page 7)
---- V Fletcher R
---- O'B V Helena Expedite taking station
---- V O'Bannon I can not hear you repeat
1705 O'B V Helena Expedite taking station
1706 Sterrett V Join screen
Helena
1707 Ster. V Helena Answer
1711 Ster. V Helena Answer
1713 Nugent to Lee
---- Ster. V Helena Are you on our starboard beam
1720 Helena V O'B Am on your starboard side am limping a little
on one that is why I am not getting into position
faster
1723 S.F. V Helena Answer
---- Helena V ? Think something has happen to S.F. he is
turning
1726 V Helena My speed 15
---- ASP V Helena Senior DD officer take charge screen
---- Helena V Ster Request your latitude course as well
1732 Sterrett V Wait
---- ASP V Helena At 0430 course 135 (coded) Fletcher acknowledge
---- V Fletcher R
V O'Bannon R
---- Helena V Is that Sterrett ahead of you
Fletcher
1735 V HELENA Believe so
---- ASP V Helena Speed 20
(page 8)
1737 ASP V Helena Execute speed 20
1749 Lee to Nugent
---- Sterrett V Believe you bearing 140 from me my course 315
Helena my speed 15
1740 V Sterrett R
1749 Lee to Nugent (actually)
1755 Helena V Ster Ship on your port beam looks more like Juneau
than any other ship
---- V Helena R
1800 Helena V Surface radar contact (signal) bearing 203
Fletcher distance 12,000
1801 Fletcher I did not get your last transmission but you
Sterrett see me do you not
1802 ASP V Helena Course 100 don't acknowledge
Helena
---- V Fletcher R
1818 Helena V Believe that ship on port side id either Atlanta
Fletcher or Juneau
---- Flet V Helena Establish that identity and investigate
1819 Juneau V Answer
Helena
1815 Nugent to Lee
1822 Fletcher When you establish identity tell him to join
Helena us
1823 ASP V Helena My course 145
1824 ASP V Helena Execute course 145
1826 Helena V Flet Juneau ordered to join us
(page 9)
---- Helena V Flet Do you see that one stacker coming up astern
of you
1827 V Helena Wait
1828 ASP V Helena Execute to follow course 135
---- ASP V Helena Execute course 135
---- Flet V Helena Your last message affirmative
1830 ASP V Helena Execute to follow zig zag plan eight
---- Flet V Helena Pass course and speed on to Juneau
1831 V Fletcher R
1833 ASP V Helena Execute zig zag plan eight
(page 10)
U.S.S. HELENA November 14, 1942.
From: Radar Officer.
To : Commanding Officer.
Subject: Radar Report of the Night Action of November 13,
1942.
1. Radar Plot's report of the battle of the morning
of November 13, 1942, as seen by observations of the PPI scope
of the HELENA's Sail George Radar.
A. Picture at the time of contact. (0124). ENCLOSURE (E)
2. Our force was steaming on course 280, speed 18.
3. At 0124 (zone time) we sighted enemy forces in
three groups bearing 312, distance 27,100, bearing 310, distance
28,000, bearing 310, distance 32,000.
4. The two nearer groups gave weak radar signals, where-
as the more distant groups gave a strong signal. This indicated
a large force of ships with large units being screened by
two groups of smaller units.
5. Radar Plot commenced tracking the enemy and at 0129
determined the enemy to be on course 134, speed 20.
6. By 0142 our force had come to course 000.
7. The enemy force was now on course 120, speed 20.
8. At 0142 our forces started a column movement to the
left midway between the two forward groups of enemy ships.
9. Our column steadied on course 280.
10. At 0146 our leading destroyers were in the center
of the enemy force and seemed to be attacking the enemies heavy
units.
11. A t0148 we commenced firing at the enemy ships
on our port bow.
12. At 0149 the HELENA followed the PORTLAND around
in column with the other ships to course 280.
13. Our formation now commenced breaking up from our
column in all directions as did the enemy formation from its
former formation.
14. The SAN FRANSCISCO sheered to the right and headed
toward the enemy ships on our starboard beam placing the
enemies heavy forces on her port beam.
15. The enemy forces on our port side reversed course
and joined her heavy ships in a ragged column formation.
16. The enemy forces now almost surrounded our forces
with the bulk of her power to the northward.
17. At about 0215 the enemy broke into two groups and
retreated to the north in a very disorderly manner. It was not
possible to determine accurately the exact number of enemy ships
at this time but they seemed to have noticeably decreased in
number.
18. At 0230 Radar Plot commenced using the Sail George
radar for navigational purposes to determine the correct course
to take to retire through Sealark Channel.
19. At 0248 the HELENA, two destroyers and a cruiser
made an orderly withdrawal from the scene of action and retired
through Sealark Channel.
R. W. GASH,
Lieut. (jg). USNR.
Radar Officer,
U.S.S. HELENA
ENCLOSURE (E)
B. Picture at the time of Commence Firing. (0148)
C. Picture at about 0200 at the height of the battle.
CL50/A16-3 U.S.S. HELENA 10-s
At sea,
14 November, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Submarine Torpedo Attack on Task Unit and Sinking
Of U.S.S. JUNEAU, report of.
Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 16 CL-42
dated March 19, 1942.
(b) Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 24 CL-42
dated June 21, 1942.
(c) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Art. 712.
Enclosures: (A) Sketch of Action.
(B) Report of A.A. Automatic Weapons Watch.
1. Forwarded herewith is a report of a torpedo attack on
task unit and sinking of U.S.S. JUNEAU November 13, 1942. Time of
attack 1101 zone minus eleven, latitude 10°-34'-06" south; longitude
161°-04'00" east, base course 180° T, speed 18 knots, zigzag plan
No. 8.
2. Circumstances at the time of the attck:
(a) Employment of ship steaming on base course 180° T.
Order in column: USS HELENA, (Guide) USS SAN FRANCISCO, USS JUNEAU
on stbd quarter SAN FRANCISCO distant about 800 yards as requested
by JUNEAU due to difficulty inn maneuvering on one screw. Anti-
submarine screen provided by USS STERRETT on port bow and USS FLETCHER
on starboard bow. Ships zigzagging in accordance with plan number
eight, speed 18 knots.
(b) Weather. Late morning, partly cloudy, alto cumulus
clouds, seventy percent, surface visibility unlimited
(c) Sea smooth, wind 095° True 10 knots.
(d) Special circumstances.
(1). Condition of JUNEAU: Following despatch report
of battle damage to JUNEAU morning of 13 November re-
ceived:
"From: JUNEAU DATE/TIME 121840
To : HELENA
Torpedo hit flooded forward engine room and fire
room x down by head four feet x estimate 18 knots speed
x flooding under control x all forward fire rooms
personnel lost x TBS No ECM expect gyro in com-
mission later.
(2) Following dispatch received concerning station
in formation answered with "AFFRIMATIVE".
"From: JUNEAU
To : HELENA date/time 122145
Would like to remain on your starboard hand to
give mutual AA support and to turn quickly to starboard
in view of saving only one screw and one uncertain
gyro x will keep well clear.
3. Summary and description of attack:
At 1100 formation was steaming at 18 knots on base course
180° T zigzagging according to plan number eight. The plan called
for a 15° turn to right to 195° T at 1100 and the formation was in
the process of doing this when JUNEAU was hit. JUNEAU was steaming
on starboard quarter of SAN FRANCISCO (see sketch). A few seconds
after 1100 USS HELENA 20 MM gun #6 (located - aft Mount 4-5") reported
to sky control "disturbance in water, 260° (relative) just inside of
destroyer wake." Talker reported disturbance looked like usual
eruption made by porpoise. Surface lookout mount four - 40 MM (loca-
ted - port quarter) saw fine wake of torpedo and vertical fin as it
passed through water. Reported torpedo headed for SAN FRANCISCO.
Director operator mount #1 - 40 MM (located - starboard side amid-
Ships on searchlight platform) saw torpedo wake as it passed astern
Of ship. JUNEAU was turning to right during this time. Torpedo
Believed hit port side of fantail as she was turning.
4. When torpedo hit there was a large single explosion and
the air was filled with debris, much of it in large pieces. There
appeared to be no distinct series of small explosions and the whole
ship disappeared in a large cloud of black, yellow black, and brown
smoke. Debris showered down among ships of the formation for several
minutes after the explosion to such an extent as to indicate erron-
eously a high level bombing attack.
5. On receiving word of torpedo sighted ships increased
speed to maximum and commenced maneuvering radically to clear area.
No sight or sound contact was made on the submarine. Due to but
two screening destroyers, crippled ships, and complete disappearance
of JUNEAU, no search was made but area cleared at once. At 1121 cir-
cumstances were reported to a B-17 which was contacted visually for
forwarding to Commander South Pacific Force.
6. Summary of damage - JUNEAU completely destroyed.
GILBERT C. HOOVER
Copy to: CTF 67
ComSoPac
CincPac
War Diary
REPORT OF ANTI AIRCRAFT AUTOMATIC WEAPONS WATCH
1. Gun6 reported to Sky Control: "Disturbance in water,
260, just inside of destroyer wake." Salet talker said this dis-
tubance looked like the usual eruption of water made by a porpoise.
2. Surface lookout on Mount 4 saw the very fine wake of
the torpedo and the vertical fin of the torpedo as it passed through
the water. He thought the torpedo was going to hit the SAN FRANCISCO.
He made this report to Sky Control.
3. Director Operator Mount 1 saw the torpedo's fin and fine
wake as it passed the HELENA's stern. The JUNEAU turned to star-
board. The torpedo hit directly on the port side of the fantail as
the ship was turning. Director Operator Mount 1 reported this tor-
pedo to Sky Control.
CL50/A16-3 U.S.S. HELENA 10-s
November 19,1942.
From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Air Attack, Afternoon of November 12, 1942; report of.
References: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 24CL-42 of June 21, 1942.
(b) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 16CL-42 of March 19, 1942.
(c) U.S. Navy Regulations 1920, Art. 712.
1. In order that no details of interest may be omitted,
the information required by the special report form of enclosure (A)
to reference (b) is submitted in amplified form, followed by a nar-
rative of the action.
2. Information required by enclosure (A) to reference (b);
(1) The attack was not a surprise. Warning of about forty
five minutes was given which was ample to get the convoy underway
and form the screen.
(2) Planes were picked up by binoculars, radar and naked eye
as they approached over Florida Island. Type Radar "FD" and
"SC-1".
(3) Planes were picked up about twenty miles away. Visibil-
ity in direction of the attack being excellent.
(4) Twenty one planes were counted I groups of 7, 9, and 5.
(5) Planes were believed to be MITSUBISHI type 98 heavy
bombers, used as torpedo planes.
(6) Planes approached at a speed of about 160 m.p.h. at low
altitude (intermediate and low).
(7) (a) Batteries firing:
6"/47 cal. Turrets I and II.
5"/38 cal. 4 twin AA mounts
40 MM 4 quadruple mounts.
20 MM 12 guns.
(b) Control and spotting:
6"/47 battery - pointer fire.
5"/38 battery - Direct type, Director method,
direct spotting.
40 MM battery - Initial burst barrage followed by
direct control, spotting by tracer.
20 MM battery - Tracer control.
(8) Ammunition expended:
a - 6"/47 21 rounds common
b - 5"/38 192 rounds AA common
c - 40 MM 567 rounds
d - 20 MM 1188 rounds.
(9) Percent service allowance expended:
a - 6"/47 0.6%
b - 5"/38 14.1%
c - 40 MM 1.5%
d - 20 MM 1.6%
(10) Approximate time of tracking to first shot -
3 minutes.
(11) Approximate time of first hits:
Initial bursts were very close and were believed to
Have hit.
(12) Approximate time first shot to last -
4 minutes.
(13) Approximate position angle - 1° - 1½°
(14) Approximate position cease fire - 3° to 5°
(15) Approximate bearing first shot - 135° relative.
(16) Approximate bearing last shot -
Last shot were fired on starboard bow by automatic
Weapons, and on port bow by 5" battery.
(17) Approximate range first shot - 14,000 yards.
(18) Approximate range last shot - 12,000 yards.
(19) Torpedo released height was between 50 and 150 feet.
(20) Approximate range of torpedo release:
Attempts were made to drop at close range, but the
fire of the formation was so heavy that a few drops were
observed. Size of torpedo unknown.
(21) No hits on ship. Ship not strafed.
(22) No near misses; no casualties.
(23) Planes shot down:
5'/28 Cal. - 1 sure.
40 MM - 2 sure.
20 MM - 1 sure.
Total 4 sure.
(24) The planes shot down by the 5" fire seemed to be liter-
ally hammered down. Those shot down by 40 MM and 20 MM
appeared to be hit in gas tanks and burst into flames.
(25) The performance of all ammunition was excellent.
(26) Pattern size 5" was small. Grouping of 40 MM and 20 MM
was good with still the majority of the shots low and
behind.
3. Narrative.
The attack began on schedule, as warning had been re-
ceived that enemy planes would arrive at 1415. At 1414 planes were
sighted approaching over and around Florida Island flying low. The
attack consisted of three flights of twin engine MITSUBISHI bombers
operation as torpedo planes. One group of seven attacked from the
starboard bow of the formation. The HELENA did not fire on these
planes. Two of the group were seen shot down by other ships anti-
aircraft fire. Two groups, the first of approximately nine planes,
and the second of approximately five planes attacked from the star-
board quarter, flying low and fanned out slightly. Sky Aft, control-
ling the starboard 5" battery, opened fire at a range of approximately
14,000 yards. 40 MM Mount 3 opened fire shortly thereafter in order
to build up a barrage in front of the attacking planes. One plane
was attacked by two F-4-Fs and crashed on the beach crossing far
astern of the HELENA. The initial fire was believed effective, as
the formations were seen to waver and break up. Some of the planes
crossed astern of the ship and diverged off to port. The port 40M
and 20 MM battery opened fire on one of these planes and it was seen
to be hit in the belly and shot down. Sky Forward, controlling the
port battery, took one plane under fire at about 5000 yards and
finally shot it down on the port beam, range about 12,000 yard.
Fighters attacked the remaining planes as they passed out of range.
Two planes passed to starboard of the ship about 600 yards distant,
Between the ship and convoy. The leading plane was hit by the
forward 20 MM guns and crashed in flames. The second plane was
fired on by the entire starboard automatic weapon battery, was hit
squarely and crashed in flames. Owing to the position of the trans-
ports on our starboard beam fire of the battery was restricted after
the attacking planes passed forward of the quarter. Fortunately a
good clear shot was offered as they came in on the quarter, and after
they had passed ahead. The main battery fired five salvos from turret
No. 2 and two salvos from turret No. 1 as the planes passed from
starboard to port bow. No hits were observed.
4.(a) The performance of the batteries was excellent. The
fire of 5" mount 2 was interrupted temporarily by jammed case in the
right gun. The case was extracted, thrown overboard and fire resumed
No other casualties occurred.
(b) There were no casualties affecting the fire of the 40
MM battery. However, power drive failures were numerous and the
mounts were controlled in local or hand except Mount 1, which had no
casualties. Some of the 20 MM gunners failed to observe the lower
limit of elevation of their guns and fired into ship's structure.
This was due to the fact that the planes were flying very low and
the gunners were excited at their first plane attack. Bad burns
were suffered by the crew of gun No. 9 when they shot into the star-
board smoke screen generator and were sprayed with FS mixture.
5. The firing of the main battery against low flying planes
is not considered generally advisable inasmuch as the fire is inef-
fective and to a certain extent reduces the efficiency of the auto-
matic weapons battery as well as the 5" because of blast and smoke.
(6) The fire control radars 9FD) were not effective during
the attack owning to the myriad signals on the screen and the inability
to determine the proper target. The problem was further complicated
by land signals and signals from the convoy.
Distribution:
CINCPAC (orig & 1)
Cominch GILBERT C. HOOVER
Ctf 62
War Diary
Information on the U.S.S. HELENA CL-50
DICTIONARY OF FIGHTING SHIPS
U.S.S. Helena CL-50
The second HELENA (CL-50), was launched 27 August 1939
by the New York Navy Yard; sponsored by Miss Elinor Carlyle
Gudger, granddaughter of Senator Thomas J. Welch of Montana;
and commissioned 18 September 1939, Captain Max B. Demott in
command.
HELENA, assigned to the Pacific Fleet, was at Pearl
Harbor on 7 December 1941, when the Japanese attacked. She
was moored at 1010 Dock Navy Yard on the east side of the
harbor, outboard was minesweeper OGLALA (CM-4). By chance,
HELENA was in the berth normally assigned to PENNSYLVANIA
(BB-38) and thus became a prime target for the Japanese
planes.
Within 3 minutes of the time the first bomb of the
attack fell on Ford Island, a lone torpedo plane launched a
torpedo that passed under OGLALA and hit HELENA on the
starboard side almost amidships, just as the crew raced to
battle stations. One engine room and one boiler room were
flooded. Wiring to the main and 5-inch batteries was
severed, but prompt action brought the forward diesel
generator up within 2 minutes, making power available to all
mounts. Immediately, they sent up a heavy fire that keep
her free of further damage. Outstanding damage control
work, and the fact that watertight integrity was promptly
insured by the closing of the doors and hatches throughout
the ship, kept HELENA afloat. Many times, later she gave the
Japanese occasion to regret their failure to sink her that
first day of the war.
After preliminary overhaul at Pearl Harbor, HELENA
steamed to Mare Island Navy Yard for permanent repairs. In
1942, she sailed to enter action, escorting a detachment of
SeaBees and an aircraft carrier rushing planes to the South
Pacific. She made two quick dashes from Espiritu Santo to
Guadalcanal, where the long and bloody battle for the island
was then beginning, and having completed these missions,
joined the Task Force formed around WASP (CV-7).
This Task Force steamed in distant support of six
transports carrying Marine reinforcements to Guadalcanal.
On 15 September 1942, in mid-afternoon, WASP was suddenly
hit by three Japanese torpedoes. Almost at once, she became
an inferno. HELENA, her guns blazing, stood by to rescue
nearly 400 of WASP's officers and men, whom she took to
Espiritu Santo.
HELENA's next action was near Rennell Island, again in
support of a movement of transports into Guadalcanal. Air
attacks from Henderson Field had slowed down the Tokyo
Express for several days, so on 11 October 1942 the Japanese
poured everything they could deliver against the airstrip,
hoping to neutralize air operations long enough to bring
heavy troop reinforcements during the night. The Japanese
fleet closed and by 1810 was less than 100 miles from Savo
Island.
HELENA, equipped with superior radar, was first to
contact the enemy and first to open fire at 2346. When
firing had ceased in this Battle of Cape Esperance in Iron
Bottom Sound, HELENA had sunk cruiser FURUTAKA and destroyer
FUBUKI.
HELENA was next under attack on the night of 20
October, while patrolling between Espiritu Santo and San
Cristobal. Several torpedoes exploded near her but she was
not hit.
HELENA saw the climatic Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
from its beginning when she was assigned the job of
escorting a supply echelon from Espiritu Santo to
Guadalcanal. The ship made rendezvous with the convoy of
transports off San Cristobal 11 November and brought it
safely into Guadalcanal. During the afternoon of 12
November, word came from a coast watcher "enemy aircraft
approaching." Immediately suspending unloading operation,
all ships stood out to form an antiaircraft disposition.
When the attack came, superb maneuvering of the force, and
its own antiaircraft fire, broke up the first attack but the
second damaged two ships. HELENA came through without a
scratch, and the task group brought down eight enemy planes
in the 8-minute action.
As unloading resumed, an increasing stream of reports
flowed in from patrolling aircraft. Ominously, the Japanese
forces sighted contained no transports, and their intention
was thus read as one of being pure offense. HELENA, still
steaming with Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan's Support Group,
aided in shepherding the transports away from Guadalcanal,
then reversed course to fateful "Ironbottom Sound." The
night of Friday, 13 November, HELENA's radar first located
the enemy. In the action that followed, the tropical night
was lit again and again by the flashes of her big guns. She
received only minor damage to her superstructure during the
action. Daylight found a tragic scene in the grisly slot.
The weaker American fleet had achieved the goal at heavy
cost. Great valor had turned back the enemy and prevented
the heavy attack that would have been disastrous to the
Marine troops ashore.
HELENA found a measure of revenge when she was assigned
to the several bombardments of Japanese positions on New
Georgia during January 1943. Her guns rocked the enemy at
Munda and Vila Stanmore, leveling vital supply
concentrations and gun emplacements. Continuing on patrol
and escort in support of the bitter Guadalcanal operation
through February, one of her float planes shared in the
sinking of Japanese submarine RO-102, 11 February 1943.
After overhaul in Sydney, Australia, she was back at
Espiritu Santo in March to participate in bombardments of
New Georgia, soon to be invaded. The first goal on New
Georgia proper, was Rice Anchorage. In the force escorting
the transports carrying the initial landing parties, HELENA
moved into Kula Gulf just before midnight 4 July, and
shortly after midnight on the 5th, her big guns opened up in
her last shore bombardment.
The landing of troops was completed successfully by
dawn, but in the afternoon of 5 July, word came that the
Tokyo Express was ready to roar down once more and the
escort group turned north to meet it. By midnight 5 July,
HELENA's group was off the northwest corner of New Georgia,
three cruisers and four destroyers composing the group.
Racing down to face them were three groups of Japanese
destroyers, a total of ten enemy ships. Four of them peeled
off to accomplish their mission of landing troops. By 0157,
HELENA began blasting away with a fire so rapid and intense
that the Japanese later announced in all solemnity that she
must have been armed with 6-inch machine guns. Ironically,
HELENA made a perfect target when lit by the flashes of her
own guns. Seven minutes after she opened fire, she was hit
by a torpedo; within the next 3 minutes, she was struck by
two more. Almost at once, she began to jackknife. Below,
she was flooding rapidly even before she broke up. In a
well-drilled manner, HELENA's men went over the side.
HELENA's history closes with the almost incredible
story of what happened to her men in the hours and days that
followed. When her bow rose into the air after the sinking,
many of them clustered around it, only to be fired on there.
About a half hour after she sank, two American destroyers
came to the rescue.
At daylight, the enemy was in range once more, and
again, the destroyers NICHOLAS (DD-449) and RADFORD (DD-446),
broke off their rescue operations to pursue. Anticipating
an air attack, the destroyers withdrew for Tulagi, carrying
with them all but about 275 of the survivors. To those who
remained they left four boats, manned by volunteers from the
destroyers' crews. Captain C. P. Cecil, HELENA's commanding
officer, organized a small flotilla of three motor
whaleboats, each towing a life raft, carrying 88 men to a
small island about 7 miles from Rice Anchorage after a
laborious all-day passage. This group was rescued the next
morning by GWIN (DD-433) and WOODWORTH (DD-460).
For the second group of nearly 200, the bow of HELENA
was their life raft, but it was slowly sinking. Disaster was
staved off by a Navy Liberator that dropped lifejackets and
four rubber lifeboats. The wounded were placed aboard the
lifeboats, while the able-bodied surround the boats and did
their best to propel themselves toward nearby Kolombaranga.
But wind and current carried them ever further into enemy
waters. Through the torturous day that followed, many of
the wounded died. American search planes missed the tragic
little fleet, and Kolombaranga gradually faded away to
leeward. Another night passed, and in the morning the
island of Vella Lavella loomed ahead. It seemed the last
chance for HELENA's men and so they headed for it. By dawn,
survivors in all three remaining boats observed land a mile
distant and all who were left were safely landed. Two
Coastwatchers and loyal natives cared for the survivors as
best they could, and radioed news of them to Guadalcanal.
The 166 sailors then took to the jungle to evade Japanese
patrols.
Surface vessels were chosen for the final rescue,
NICHOLAS and RADFORD, augmented by JENKINS (DD-447) and
O'BANNON (DD-450) set off 15 July 1943 to sail further up
the Slot than ever before, screening the movement of two
destroyer-transports and four other destroyers. During the
night of 16 July, the rescue force brought out the 165
HELENA men, along with 16 Chinese who had been in hiding on
the island. Of HELENA's nearly 900 men, 168 had perished.
HELENA was the first ship to receive the Navy Unit
Commendation. Her actions in the Battles of Cape Esperance,
Guadalcanal, and Kula Gulf were named in the citation.
HELENA also earned the Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign medal
with seven stars.
ARCTURUS Class
Completed - 1939
AKA-1 Arcturus
AKA-6 Alchiba
AKA-7 Alcyone
AKA-8 Algorab
AKA-11 Betelgeuse (AK-28)
Dimensions
Displacement:
13,875 (Full load)
Length: 459' (oa)
Beam: 63'
Draft: 26' (max)
Armament
1 5"/ 38 DP
4 40mm twins
14 20mm twins
Carrying capacity
Cargo DWT: 5,120
8 LCM (3)
10 LCVP
Propulsion
Speed: 11 knots (econ)
Horsepower: 6,0000 (shaft)
Drive: 1 screws; Diesel
Fuel: 1,202 tons oil (max)
Links to other web-sites with information on the
U.S.S. HELENA
To learn more about the U.S.S. HELENA Please visit these
Web-site
Naval
Historical Center Has info. and photos of the
U.S.S. HELENA
NavSource
Online Has photos of CL-50
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