DD-450 U.S.S. O’BANNON
War Diary and Action Reports November 1942,
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. O'BANNON (DD-450)
From 1 November to 30 November 1942
Original to Chief of Naval Operations
(Office of Naval Records and Library)
Copy to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
November 1, 1942 - Sunday
Steaming in company with Task Unit 62.4.5 composed of O'BANNON as
escort and BELLATRIX (towing PAB Barge #6) and BOBOLINK enroute
Ringbolt from Button speed of advance 9.5 knots, in accordance with
Commander Task Unit 62.4.4's Movement Order No. 5-42 of October 30,
1942 (Copy attached). Course set passing east and north of San
Cristobal. No unusual incidents.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 2, 1942 - Monday
Numerous contacts reported, all plane contacts were observed as
friendly, unable to develop one fair sound contact.
At 1200 stood into Sealark Channel. At 1350 BELLATRIX was relieved of
her tow and stood into Tulagi harbor. At 1730 BELLATRIX stood out of
harbor and we retired to Eastward upon receiving information that
numerous enemy ships were enroute. Upon receipt of despatch from
C.T.F. 62 set course to south to pass Sea Cristobal to west and south,
Task Unit ordered to return to Button at best speed. Nothing
developed.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 3, 1942 - Tuesday
Reversed course and proceeded to return to Ringbolt. At 0930 joined
ALCHIBA, HOPKINS and WOODWORTH and stood into Sealark Channel at 1230.
At 1330 task units parted company; BELLATRIX stood into Tulagi Harbor
and anchored. Patrolled entrance until 1800 then stood into Tulagi
Harbor and anchored. Standing by in all respects.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 4, 1942 - Wednesday
At 0533 underway, stood out of Tulagi Harbor and commenced patrolling
off entrance. At 1150 air raid warning received from Cactus, all
hands called to general quarters. At 1340 secured from general
quarters. At 1530 BELLATRIX stood out of harbor enroute White Poppy
via Sealark Channel, took station as escort, patrolling ahead.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 5, 1942 - Thursday
Steaming on course 180° T at standard speed of 15 knots, zig-zagging.
No unusual incidents. At 1900 changed base course to 193° T.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 6, 1942 - Friday
Steaming as before on course193° T at 15 knots, zig-zagging. At 2043
changed base course to 145° T. No unusual incidents.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 7, 1942 - Saturday
At 0405 changed base course to 133° T. Radar contacts made on land
and friendly planes. At 1014 all hands called to general quarters and
tested main armament. At 1640 stood in to Bulari Passage. At 1827
moored alongside SS J. C. DONNELL, oil tanker. Received fuel.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 8, 1942 - Sunday
At 0754 underway, stood in to Great Roads and anchored. At 1536
underway proceeding to clear harbor with Task Force 67, composed of
transports, McCAWLEY, PRESIDENT JACKSON, PRESIDENT ADAMS, and CRESCENT
CITY; escorts, O'BANNON, MONSSEN, BARTON, JUNEAU; support group,
PORTLAND AND JUNEAU, enroute White Poppy to Cactus, via west of New
Caledonia. No unusual incidents. Base course 300° T, speed 13.5
knots.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 9, 1942 - Monday
At 0650 changed base course to 328° T and changed standard speed to 13
knots. During forenoon tested armament. During afternoon PORTLAND's
planes made runs for A.A. drill. At 1325 changed base course to 340°
T. At 2300 changed base course to 005° T.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 10, 1942 - Tuesday
At 1250 changed base course to 010° T. At 1520 U.S.S. SHAW joined
formation. At 1812 received guard mail from SHAW. No unusual
incidents.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 11, 1942 - Wednesday
At 0500 all hands called to general quarters. At 0514 sighted Task
Group 67.4. PORTLAND and JUNEAU left formation to join T.G. 67.4. At
0543 changed base course to 330° T. At 0550 secured from general
quarters. At 0947 changed base course to 285° T. At 1147 made radar
contact on plane to west distance 16 miles. Plane closed and was
sighted at 8 miles and indefinitely identified as enemy float plane.
Enemy plane opened range to west and disappeared. At about 1230 a
large twin tail flying boat, believe enemy, was sighted low on horizon
to west about 9 miles. At 1358 SHAW had sound contact and left
formation to develop. Task group 67.4 parted company. At 1430
changed base course to 350° T. At 1830 changed course to 358° T
standing into Indepensible Strait from west of San Cristobal. At 2300
changed base course to 333° T.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 12, 1942 - Thursday
At 0113 O.O.D. reported sighting submarine on surface distance 800
yds, see action report. Fired two shots from 5" guns and stood over
to estimated position and dropped ten depth charges. All hands called
to general quarters. At 0130 secured from general quarters. Stood
into Lango Channel to landing beaches off Kukum point. Task Group
67.4 joined and formed screen around transports. At 1320 received air
raid warning, all hands called to general quarters; transports got
underway; combatant ships formed tight circular screen around
transports at 1500yds. See official action report. At 1407 enemy
torpedo planes attacked. At 1450 all clear sounded. Enemy's attack
was complete failure, all planes except one out of at least 15 were
shot down by ships A.A. fire. No casualties in thins vessel. One
plane struck SAN FRANCISCO's aftermast. At 1835 transports underway
to retire to eastward, this vessel joined Task Group 67.4 which formed
column for battle disposition order as follows: CUSHING, LAFFEY,
STERRETT, O'BANNON, ATLANTA, SAN FRANCISCO, HELENAL, PORTLAND, JUNEAU,
AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, FLETCHER. Proceeded to clear through
Sealark Channel covering retirement of transports. At 2000 all hands
called to general quarters. See action report for account of what
followed during later evening of 12th and early morning of 13th.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 13, 1942 - Friday
See action report for details of what happen during early morning of
13th. At 0408 joined SAN FRANCISCO, HELENA and FLETCHER. Some what
later STERRETT and JUNEAU joined. Standing southeast in Indepensible
Strait. At 0700 transferred Medical Officer and Hospital Corpsmen to
SAN FRANCISCO. At 0800 left the Task Group and set course to eastward
to transmit message for C.T.G. 67.4. At 1017 changed course to rejoin
formation. At 1526 rejoined formation. It was noted that JUNEAU was
missing from formation. Proceeding to Button on base course 135° T at
a speed of 18 knots, zig-zagging. At 2000 changed base course to 110°
T.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 14, 1942 - Saturday
At 0400 changed base course to 125° T. At 0834 sighted transport
group of T.F. 67. Commenced steering various courses proceeding to
Button along eastern coast of Espiritu Santo Island. At 1615 entered
harbor and went alongside TOPPAHANOCK to fuel. Fueled ship remained
alongside all night.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 15, 1942 - Sunday
At 0200 the Commanding Officer was called to a conference with
Comairsopac. At 0603 U.S.S. DALE came alongside and fueled and
cleared at 0730. At 0805 underway and proceeded to anchorage.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 16, 1942 - Monday
At 1000 underway went alongside NICHOLAS and moored. Filled allowance
of ammunition and depth charges but not torpedoes. At 1423 NICHOLAS
underway and stood out.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 17, 1942 - Tuesday
At 0550 underway proceeding out of harbor in company with SOUTHHARD
acting as escort for transports enroute Button to White Poppy.
Commander Task Force 62 in McCAWLEY O.T.C. Transports present:
PRESIDENT JACKSON, PRESIDENT ADAMS, CRESCENT CITY and McCAWLEY. Set
course through New Hebrides Island and then to eastward and southward
of New Caledonia, at speed of 13 knots. At 1327 went ahead full speed
to investigate strange ship observed hull down on port hand.
Investigated small island schooner, Free French colors. Nothing
suspicious observed rejoined formation. No other incidents.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 18, 1942 - Wednesday
Exercised all batteries and tested main and automatic armament. At
2305 changed base course to 247° T. Sighted two friendly ships, MEADE
and GAUDALUPE.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 19, 1942 - Thursday
At 1052 anchored in Dumbea Bay, Noumea, New Caledonia. No unusual
incidents.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 20, 1942 - Friday
At 0540 underway and stood into Drydock ARD-2 to check repair if
possible hull damage received during engagement of 13th. (See War
Damage Report) original submitted to Bureau of Ships. Wire brushed
and painted bottom.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 21, 1942 - Saturday
At 1030 underway from Drydock; made test runs in Dumbea Bay, results
satisfactory. At 1135 moored alongside GWIN in nest alongside
WHITNEY. At 1405 Admiral Halsey was received aboard. The tender
commenced making minor war damage repairs to right barrel No.1 torpedo
mount, rangefinder elevation gear, and gun captains hatch on gun No.1.
No unusual incidents.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 22, 1942 - Sunday
Nested outboard of GWIN alongside WHITNEY, effecting minor repairs.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 23, 1942 - Monday
Undergoing tender repairs. Transferred 1000 gals potable water to
Y.M.S. 99.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 24, 1942 - Tuesday
Fueled from WHITNEY.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 25, 1942 - Wednesday
Availability completed. At 0732 underway, proceeding to anchorage in
Great Roads.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 26 and 27, 1942 - Thursday and Friday
At anchor in Great Roads, Noumea, New Caledonia. Ship's personnel
taking opportunity of some recreation.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 28, 1942 - Saturday
At 1522 underway proceeding out of harbor as an escort in company with
SOUTHARD, HOVEY, and STACK, patrolling ahead of sortie of HUNTER
LIGGETT, KENMORE and JOSEPH TEAL. Task Unit 62.4.7 enroute White
Poppy to Cactus-Ringbolt area, via west of New Caledonia. Set base
course 230° T, ahead at standard speed 11.5 knots, zig-zagging. At
1822 changed base course to 280° T. At 2020 changed base course to
300° T.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 29, 1942- Sunday
All hands called to general quarters, tested armament. At 0931
changed base course to 327° T. At 1923 changed base course to 315° T,
at speed of 11.5 knots, zig-zagging, making good 90%.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
November 30, 1942 - Monday
At 0812 changed base course to 017° T. At 1800 changed base course to
350° T. After dark called all hands to general quarters and conducted
tracking exercises. At 2020 changed base course to 022° T. SOUTHARD
reported sound contact but was unable to develop.
D. J. MacDonald,
Lieut-Comdr., U.S. Navy
Approved:
E. R. WILKINSON,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.
DD450/A16 U.S.S. O'BANNON (DD450)
Care of Postmaster,
San Francisco, California,
November 17, 1942.
From: The Commanding Officer.
to : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HELENA (Senior Officer,
Task Force 67.4)
The Commander South Pacific Force.
Subject: Report of engagement with Japanese units on morning of
November 13, 1942.
Enclosures: (A) Track Chart.
(B) Radar PPI Diagrams (1), (2) and (3).
(C) Report of Executive Officer.
1. The following is a report of the engagement with units of the Japanese
fleet in the waters surrounded by Guadalcanal, Savo, Florida, and
Tulagi Island in the early morning of November 13, 1942.
PRELIMINARY PHASE
Our force steaming in column order as follows: CUSHING, LAFFEY,
STERETT, O'BANNON, ATLANTA, SAN FRANCISCO, HELENA, PORTLAND, JUNEAU,
AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, FLETCHER, entered the east end of Lengo
Channel at about 0000 November 13, 1942, steaming on course 270°,
speed 18 knots.
At 0030 the report was received from the director control that a
torpedo wake was sighted ahead passing from starboard to port. This
wake could not be seen by Conn. No offensive action could be taken by
any ship at this time, therefore, no report was made of this probable
torpedo. At this time the sky was quite dark, moon had become hidden
behind dark clouds, a limited number of stars were visible, and there
was a slight breeze from north northeast. The sea was smooth. The
ship was in Condition of Readiness I and Material Condition ZED.
At 0100 course was changed to 280° True.
ENGAGEMENT PHASE
At 0130 radar contact was made with enemy units being reported
directly ahead and on starboard bow. The formation course was
immediately changed to 310° True.
At 0137 course was changed to 000° True. At about this time this
vessel's radar screen showed contacts as noted on Enclosure (B-1).
Targets were reported by TBS to be on port bow also.
At 0143 course was changed back to 310° True.
At 0144 torpedo battery and gun battery were ordered to stand by for
action starboard.
At 0145 three to five ships were visible on starboard beam, distance
about 4000 yards. Three units were heading on an opposite and
parallel course at slow speed. See enclosure (B-2).
At 0148 order was received over TBS from O.T.C., "Odd ships fire to
starboard, even ships to port". At this time the column was jamming
up due to the turn to 310° True. This vessel was making many rudder
and engine changes to avoid collision with ship ahead. The gun
battery was given "Action Port". The enemy unit which had been
visible on the starboard bow could not now be seen and the torpedo
battery was ordered to stand by for action port.
At 0149 enemy vessel on port bow opened searchlight on CUSHING and
commenced fire. Fire from our units was commenced immediately
thereafter. Guns were ordered to shoot at the searchlight on port
bow. It is believed that this searchlight was shot away by our fire
for shortly thereafter several blazes were noted on enemy vessel under
fire and the searchlight went out. Our tracers were definitely seen
hitting the forward superstructure. The target's gunfire became
sporadic. This target was thought to be a heavy cruiser.
At 0153 turned hard right and hard left to avoid collision with ship
ahead (STERETT), then resumed course approximately 270° True to rejoin
column astern of LAFFEY. At this time it was observed that CUSHING
and LAFFEY were receiving many hits from cross-fire on port and
starboard bows. Rejoined column shortly thereafter and continued fire
on a target which now had been identified as a Kongo type battleship.
The identification is considered certain because at this time there
was a flaming enemy unit on the opposite side along our line of fire
which silhouetted this battleship sharply. My impression at this time
is that there were light enemy units drawing ahead to starboard.
At 0154 order was received over TBS to cease fire. This order was not
authenticated. Check fire was given and the order given "pick up
target on starboard bow". At about this time the two ships ahead,
CUSHING and LAFFEY, were lost to sight to starboard, the LAFFEY
apparently sinking. This vessel was then about 1800 yards from the
battleship and in the lead of our column.
At 0155 there was heavy gun fire to starboard. No targets were
visible to Conn but control said there were several vessels to
starboard on westerly course, one of which could be identified as a
three-funnel Tenryu class cruiser. Gun fire was opened on this
cruiser. See Enclosure (B-3).
At 0156 the range to the Kongo type battleship on the port bow had
closed to 1200 yards. There were numerous fires on this battleship
and its gunfire had slackened. Its fire was all passing over this
vessel. Two aimed torpedoes were fired deliberately at this
battleship on the port bow. Each of these torpedoes were fired to
hit, no spread. Before firing the remainder of torpedo salvo it was
intended to await the results of shots 1 and 2. It was then decided
to fire the remainder of a torpedo salvo. Just as the third torpedo
was fired, a tremendous explosion was noted and the battleship was
enveloped from bow to stern in a great sheet of flame. Burning
particles fell on this vessel's forecastle. It was decided not to
fire more torpedoes at this time, it being considered killed by these
three torpedo hits. Torpedo five was checked.
At 0159 gun targets were lost to starboard. Fire was ceased and ship
was swung right to reverse course to about 090° True. At this time
there were five burning and exploding vessels on the starboard quarter
and one explosion was noted at a long range off forward of the port
quarter. Control reported that no definite targets could be picked
up, Conn could see nothing.
At 0201 the ship was swung hard left to avoid the sinking bow of what
is now believed to be the LAFFEY. Many personnel were sighted in the
water and about 50 life jackets were thrown over from this ship.
Shortly thereafter, torpedo wakes, at least two, were seen to pass
ahead. This vessel swung hard left.
At 0203 experienced a heavy underwater explosion which seemed to be
close aboard on the port beam. This may have been depth charges from
LAFFEY but since it was a single sharp explosion it is believed that,
rather then depth charges, it may have a torpedo detonating at end of
run. All light and power was lost. Light and power was regained very
quickly but many electrical circuits had been ruptured. The gun and
torpedo controls were reported available in local control.
LAST PHASE
This ship then broke off action at approximately 0204 and headed
southeast attempting to locate either definite targets or definite
friends.
At about 0215 a smoking vessel was sighted on the port bow. This
vessel could not be identified. Torpedo battery was ordered to stand
by for action. This vessel apparently was drawing away to northeast.
Although this vessel could not be identified, torpedo fire was
withheld. (From subsequent tracking by radar this smoking vessel was
later identified as SAN FRANCISCO with HELENA close by). From its
size and indistinct outline the vessel was believed to be a transport.
Thinking that transports may have gotten in, this vessel turned to the
south and investigated the coast line about two miles west of Lungi
Point where a light was visible on the beach. No transports were
seen. At about this time the HELENA was heard on the TBS and
information received that HELENA and SAN FRANCISCO were standing out
Sea Lark Channel. This vessel then stood out Lengo Channel and joined
as escort with HELENA and SAN FRANCISCO at 0415.
2. There were no personnel casualties:
Damage sustained:
(a) Large fragment of 8" shell hit right barrel of forward
torpedo mount.
(b) Vibration of port engine believed misalignment or propeller
damage due to underwater explosion or to passing through
wreckage.
Damage observed:
(a) Own forces:
(1) Sinking of LAFFEY (0154-0201) (Lat. 09° -15.6' S., Long.
159°-54' E.)
(2) Many hits on CUSHING, practically cutting her down to the
waterline.
(b) To enemy forces:
(1) Fire throughout and heavy explosions in one Kongo type
battleship. Location of this burning ship was
approximately Lat. 09°-16.3' S., Long. 159° -54' E. It
is believed that this battleship sunk. Several witnesses
state that it was "sagged in the middle and going down".
No witnesses can say it disappeared below the water
surface.
(2) Small fie aft in Tenryu type cruiser fired upon by this
vessel.
(3) At least five other burning vessels, one to the west and
four to the southwest of above location.
(4) Two burning vessels, one to the north and one to the
north northeast of above location.
3. Impressions of Commanding Officer and various personnel:
(a) There were heavy guns firing from long range, 10-16000 yards,
from between Savo and Florida Islands, all during the
engagement. This firing appeared slow and deliberately
controlled. The Air Defense Officer and the Gunnery Officer
both reported observing this fire and watching the tracers
pass overhead.
(b) Aircraft flares were believed used by the enemy. Many flares
were observed between 0205 and 0215 for which there was no
corresponding gunfire. Some of these flares were dropped
directly over this vessel and the gunfire noted above was
believed at this time to be directed at this vessel as a hail
of shorts and overs were noted.
(c) That the enemy units were not surprised in the main, although
the enemy units that passed astern to starboard and then
returned passing ahead to starboard, at high speed, were
firing very few guns.
(d) That the enemy illuminated and opened fire first.
(e) That the enemy fire was extremely accurate and rapid in the
very early stages of the action but that accuracy and volume
decreased materially within a matter of 2-3 minutes from open
fire.
(f) That in the latter stages of the action the enemy's center
and left groups were firing at each other.
(g) That the use of searchlights for illumination and gun control
is an invitation for accurate fire concentration and that
tracer control is sufficiently accurate not to warrant use of
searchlights.
(h) That SG radar is invaluable to the OTC and each individual
ship for early and continued information of disposition of
own and opposing forces.
4. The officer and men of this vessel handled the ship and
themselves excellently. No praise can be too high for the expected
manner in which they remained unflinching and steadfast at their posts
with shells from all sides falling short and over. It is believed a
tribute to the spirit and indoctrination of the Naval Service that a
group of American men and boys, many of them never having seen a ship,
could be welded into an organization that would stand up so calmly
under fire in the short period of this vessel's official life, June 26
to November 13. The officers and men of this crew, each and everyone,
handled themselves like veterans and are greatly deserving of all
meritorious considerations.
E. R. WILKINSON.
Copy to:
CincPacFlt
Comdespacflt
Comtaskfor 62 (CTF-67)
FIRST ENDORSEMENT U.S.S. HELENA 10-S
CL50/A16-3
November 21, 1942.
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HELENA (Senior Officer Task Force 67.4).
To: The Commander South Pacific Force.
1. Forwarded.
GILBERT C. HOOVER
ENCLOSURE (C)
November 16, 1942
From: Executive Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report of personal impressions and recollections of the night
Action with Japanese units in Guadalcanal - Florida Island Area,
November 13, 1942.
Reference: (a) Article 712, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
1. In accordance with reference (a) the following report and resume
of my own personal impressions, recollections and recommendations
of the subject battle are submitted.
FIRST PHASE
(A) All hands were called to general quarters at 2003, November 12,
1942. At general quarters, I believed the officer-of-the-deck
and remained on the bridge assisting at Conn in order to free the
Captain of the responsibility of keeping station. The ship took
station fourth in column order as follows: CUSHING, LAFFEY,
STERRET, O'BANNON, ATLANTA, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND, HELENA, JUNEAU,
AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, and FLETCHER. This group of 13 vessels
formed what was called Battle Disposition I, simply a column with 4
destroyers, 5 cruisers and 4 destroyers.
(B) This task group was covering the retirement of another task group
composed of 4 transports, 2 auxiliary vessels, and their destroyer
escort which were clearing Guadalcanal Area via Lengo Channel. Our
task group cleared Sea Lark Channel, stood east into Indispensible
Strait, then southeast and reversed course to due west proceeding to
entrance of Lengo Channel. The sea was clam, there was no moon, the
ceiling being completely overcast.
SECOND PHASE
(A) At 2400 November 12, 1942, our task group was off Taivui Point
proceeding through Lengo Channel, at a speed of 15 knots. My task at
this time was to keep the ship in position in column. At 0103,
November 13, 1942, we cleared Lengo Channel and changed course to
280°, going ahead at 18 knots. While steaming on this course a bright
light was observed sharp on the port bow; this light appeared to be
located on the beach; at approximately this same time word was
received over the loud speaker that there was a air raid warning on at
Cactus; also word was received from our lookouts that unidentified
planes showing running lights were overhead. At 0130 Commander Task
Group 67.4 ordered course changed to 310° true by a column movement.
It was while on this courses that information began to be received
regarding radar contacts on our starboard hand. The JUNEAU reported
radar contacts on the TBS.
At 0137 Commander Task Group 67.4 ordered the course changed to north
by another column movement. While steaming on this course Commander
Destroyer Division 10 in the CUSHING reported over TBS, ships on his
starboard bow and also ships on his port hand. Commander Task Group
67.4 then ordered course changed by column movement to 310°. There
was considerable congestion at this turn, the leading ships were
falling back, we became bunched. The O'BANNON turned inside to avoid
a collision with the STERRET, later easing out into column. The
ATLANTA closed in close on our port quarter.
THIRD PHASE
(A) The leading ships had just gotten on course 310° when word was
received over TBS to attack with torpedoes. At practically the same
instant searchlight from enemy units were seen on port bow and on the
starboard bow, illuminating our leading ships. Initially our guns
were trained to starboard and were prepared to fire on this side when
an order was received over TBS for even ships to fire to port and odd
ships to starboard. There was a delay of possibly 30 seconds in
getting our guns trained out on the target to port. Firing was
commenced by both our own forces and the enemy at practically the same
instant. Our forward guns were trained on the searchlight on our port
hand. Shortly after we had commenced fire something behind a Kongo
class battleship was hit causing the battleship to be beautifully
silhouetted at a range of not more than four thousand yards, this ship
appeared to be on course approximately north. At the same time I
observed on our starboard bow an enemy three-stack cruiser (Tenyru
Class) on course about 270°, distance approximately 3000 yards. This
cruiser appeared to be firing at the CUSHING and LAFFEY. Aircraft
overhead dropped flares when the firing first started which lit up the
whole area so that our leading ships must have been clearly visible to
the enemy.
(B) During this period, I was conning the ship, from an amidships position
at the forward bridge port; gun fire was evident coming from ships on
our starboard bow, distant 10 to 12 thousand yards, as the flashes
appeared as coming from low down in the water. While we were firing
at the Kongo class battleship, I could distinctly see our bullets
hitting her superstructure, flashes, and sparks were coming out of her
pagoda tower. Enormous flames began to appear in and around this
ship, her fire ceased and the ship appeared to be dead in the water.
About this time I noticed two flashes on the STERRET's stern as if her
after guns were hit. It was shortly after this, that the STERRET
stopped in front of us and turned left. We closed up vary rapidly,
orders were given as follows: hard right and emergency full astern.
We just cleared the STERRET's stern by about 30 feet. After passing
the STERRET we again came back to course 310° and went ahead full. At
this time I could only see the Kongo class battleship on our port bow.
There was firing on our starboard bow but I could not make out what it
was; the Japanese cruiser was not visible nor was the LAFFEY or the
CUSHING.
My first thought then was to remain at full speed and cross ahead of
the battleship which seemed to be drawing ever closer. It was time
the word was received over the TBS to cease fire. It was carried out
in this ship. The Commanding Officer ordered torpedoes fire at the
battleship on our port bow. At about 0157 our course was changed to
the right, while making this turn I was concerned at the proximity of
the battleship and thought that we would not be able to turn clear of
her, so gave the following orders: hard right and emergency full
astern; when it was evident that we would clear safely, all engines
were ordered ahead full, and course changed to 090°. The battleship
at this time was not firing and was enveloped in tremendous flames.
While in course 090° we were illuminated by searchlights and heavy
fire was going overhead, coming from the north. Directly ahead I saw
the bow of a ship, I can distinctly remember seeing white numbers on
the bow, rudder was ordered to avoid this wreck and we unintentionally
passed through a number of survivors who were swimming on the surface.
They were screaming something. I now think it was "LAFFEY"; a number
of our personnel threw life jackets, to them. The firing still seemed
to be heavy from the north so that course was changed to southeast,
the general direction of the channel. At about 0205 the ship was
shaken violently by an underwater explosion which virtually lifted the
stern out of the water. I was looking out the front port at the time
and the airport came down hitting me on the head. I thought the ship
had been hit somewhere about midships. Word was sent down to the
repair parties and enginerooms to inspect immediately and report what
damage had been done. Reports were promptly received that there was
no apparent damage but the after engine room reported a rumbling in
the port reduction gear and requested that we slow down. The engines
were slowed to two thirds speed. Considerable firing was still going
on and it appeared as though Japanese after we had ceased fire were
firing at themselves. Two black objects were observed on the port bow
at approximately 3000 yards, from one great clouds of black smoke were
pouring. These black objects later turned out to be the HELENA, and
SAN FRANCISCO. Course was then changed toward the beach and we made a
sweep in the bight just west of Kukaum. Upon completion of this
circle an approach was made to clear through Lengo channel.
FOURTH PHASE
(A) With the use of the fathometer and by staying close to the shore line
our position as finally established. We then proceeded through Lengo
Channel at approximately 18 knots.
(B) During the passage through Lengo Channel information was received from
the radar personnel that there was a vessel hugging the shore line her
approximate bearing was on our starboard beam; three or four vessels
could be seen in Sea Lark Channel. During our passage through Lengo
Channel, the Commanding Officer definitely established the identity of
HELENA, SAN FRANCISCO and FLETCHER over the TBS as being the ships
observed in Sea Lark Channel. The ship on our starboard beam
apparently came visible well up on our starboard bow after she had
passed Taivui Point, this vessel after daylight was identified as the
JUNEAU. At 0358 after clearing Lengo Channel we proceeded northeast
to join Task Group 67.4.
2. COMMENTS:
(A) It was quite evident that the enemy were not surprised at our
appearance. No doubt one Task Group of theirs was preparing to
bombard Cactus; they had aircraft overhead to provide the necessary
illumination. The fragment which hit our ship was from an 8"
bombardment projectile. The Kongo class battleship with which we
engaged appeared to be screening a contemplated landing operation in
or near Tassafaronga. I believe that the light cruiser which was
observed on our starboard bow was the outer screen of the bombardment
force coming down the northeast, the main force of which was 12000to
14000 yards away when the firing commenced. It is further believe
that the Japanese operations for this night had been well and
strategically planned in their entirety, and that we completely upset
their plans. A submarine had been sighted off Koli Point according to
a report which we had received aboard (prior) to midnight of the 12th.
It is quite possible that this submarine was covering the channel and
inflicted some damage to the ships at the rear of our column.
(B) During our approach to the battle area and while still in Lengo
Channel a report was received on the bridge from the gunnery officer
that we had just passed over the track of a torpedo wake. This was
not observed by me although I was watching the water very carefully.
3. DAMAGE:
Friendly: I saw two large flashes appear around the after guns in the
STERRET. The CUSHING and LAFFEY were observed to be under a cross
fire from the battleship on the port bow and the cruiser on the
starboard bow. Both of whom were hitting our ships and tearing them
down gradually. Heavy explosions were felt and heard throughout the
engagement.
Enemy:
I did not see any enemy ships blow up and sink but I did observe great
fires coming from something in behind the battleship on our port bow
and the later huge flames envelope the battleship. Several ships on
our starboard hand were on fire but it was impossible to observe who
they were.
4. The following recommendations are submitted:
(A) That less use of the TBS be made during the approach to an engagement.
Further more it is not completely reliable with all the noise that is
created during an action.
(B) That the PPI on the SG radar have a duplicate repeater on the bridge.
5. COMMENDATIONS.
I recommend that the following officers and men be commened for their
performance of duty far and beyond that expected of them in the normal
line of duty:
Lieutenant George Philip, Jr., USN, for his maintaining strict
And controlled discipline over his battery and personnel during
the entire engagement; for being able to take the enemy under
rapid and continuous fire; and for his assistance in the
destruction of one enemy battleship and possibly one enemy
cruiser.
Lieutenant Carl Ferdinand Pfeifer, USN, for the efficient
operation of the entire engineering plant during the emergencies
which required at two different times, emergency full speed
astern, immediately followed by full speed ahead; and after
receiving an underwater explosion which caused the vessel to lose
light and power was able to make 24 knots.
Richard Nelson Lanham, QM3c, USN, who was the helmsman during
entire action and who obeyed accurately every order which was
given to the wheel, through all the noise which was caused by gun
fire and explosions, telephone talkers and wind blowing through
the ports. His work was so well done that in my mind if he had
not acted correctly and quickly we would have two collisions, one
with the STERRET and one with the wreck of the LAFFEY.
James Homer Joiner, EM2c, USN, who had the intelligence and
presence of mind when this vessel was shaken violently by a heavy
underwater explosion causing the ship to lose light and power, to
quickly go behind the distribution board and throw in the
switches which had tripped, when everyone else in the engineroom
thought that the engineroom had been hit.
That all hands are to be commended for their excellent performance of
duty while under the severe strain of continuous enemy fire and the
close fire of our own vessels for a period of about 40 minutes.
D.J. MacDonald.
A16-3
Serial 0270a
CONFIDENTIAL
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO USS O'BANNON Conf.Ltr.
DD450/A16 Serial 0134 of
November 17, 1942
From: The Commander South Pacific Area and
South Pacific Force.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Report of engagement with Japanese units on
morning of November 13, 1942.
1. Forwarded.
2. The O'BANNON gave excellent account of herself. The ship was
exceptionally well handled under the most trying conditions. The
employment of both the five-inch and torpedo batteries left little to be
desired.
3. Concur in Executive Officer's recommendation that PPI repeaters be
installed on navigating bridge of destroyers.
W. F. HALSEY
Copy to:
Comtaskfor 62 (CTF-67)
Comdespacflt
CO USS O'BANNON
Sail George Radar PPI screen at time approximately 0140.
November 13, 1942.
Count of pips at I and II is not definite.
Counts of pips at III is 3.
Best count of total pips is 11
Back.
Sail George Radar PPI screen at time approximately 0145.
November 13, 1942
Count of pips at I and II is not dinite, although operator’s
impression is more than counted in these two groups at 0140.
Count of pips at III is 3 to 5.
New pips as shown at IV, count as shown, 1 single, 1 double.
Total pip count is 16.
Back
Sail George Radar PPI screen at time approximately 0155.
November 13, 1942.
Count of pips at I,II, and III is confused, grouping was
lost.
Count of pips at IV is as shown, 1 single, 1 double.
Back
Information U.S.S. O'BANNON
DICTIONARY OF FIGHTING SHIPS
History of the U.S.S. O'BANNON DD-450
O'Bannon DD-450
The second O'Bannon (DD-450) was laid down by Bath Iron Works Corp., Bath,
Me., 3 March 1941 Launched 19 February 1942; sponsored by Mrs. E. F. Kennedy,
descendent of Lieutenant O'Bannon; and commissioned at Boston 26 June 1942,
Comdr. E. R. Wilkinson in command.
O'Bannon briefly trained for war in the Caribbean and sailed from Boston 29
August 1942 for the Southwest Pacific where the long and arduous battle for
Guadalcanal had just begun. For over a year the Navy, stretched thin to cover
its world-wide commitments at a period when new ships were just beginning to
join the fleet in any number, was to fight and fight again in the Solomons in
one of the most bitterly contested campaigns of history, wresting air and sea
control from the Japanese, and providing the Marine Corps and the Army with
every possible support as they gained ground inch by inch on the myriad
islands. O'Bannon played a valiant part in these endeavors, it was to win her
a Presidential Unit Citation.
Based at Noumea, New Caledonia O'Bannon first escorted Copahee (CVE-12) on a
run to Guadalcanal where on 9 October, twenty Marines flew their Wildcats off
Copahee's decks, desperately needed as reinforcements at beleaguered
Henderson Field. Through the remainder of the month O'Bannon sailed the New
Hebrides and southern Solomons on escort duty. On 7 November at Noumea, she
joined Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan's Support Group, ready to sail with a
convoy carrying critical reinforcements, replacements food, ammunition, and
aviation material.
On the approach to Guadalcanal, O'Bannon sighted and fired on a surfaced
enemy submarine holding it down while the convoy passed safely. On the
evening of 12 November, the partially un-laden transports were attacked by
fifteen enemy torpedo bombers, all but one was shot down. O'Bannon fired on
four of the downed enemy planes. Now came word that the Japanese were moving
south in force. Two battleships a light cruiser and 14 destroyers were bound
to destroy Henderson Field by bombardment, to break up the American
reinforcement mission, and to cover reinforcement movements of their own.
O'Bannon and the other ships of the Support Force, two heavy and three light
cruisers, and eight destroyers, confronted the greatly superior enemy early
13 November in Ironbottom Sound, so named for the number of ships on both
sides sunk there during the Guadalcanal campaign. O'Bannon boldly attacked
the Japanese battleship Hiei, closing so near that the battleship could not
depress her guns far enough to fire on the gallant destroyer. O'Bannon's
gunfire, in combination with the attacks of the rest of the force, damaged
Hiei so badly that she was a sitting duck for the air attack which sank her
next day. This Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was long and desperate, two
American light cruisers, in one of which Admiral Callaghan lost his life, and
four destroyers were lost, while two Japanese destroyers were sunk and Hiei
prepared for her doom. Above all, the Japanese were turned back, and
Henderson Field saved from destruction. The importance of this success is
illustrated by the fact that next day Henderson aviators sank eleven enemy
troop transports attempting to reinforce the island.
Through October 1943, O'Bannon protected landings, carried out escort duties
from Noumea and Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal and Tulagi, joined in
bombardments at Guadalcanal, Munda, Kolombangara, and shouldered her share of
the nightly patrols up the "Slot" between the Solomons, guarding against
Japanese reinforcements. Retiring from such a run early 5 April, O'Bannon
sighted on the surface and fired on Japanese submarine RO-34. During this
period she also splashed at least two enemy aircraft in various attacks.
This duty was tense and demanded the best of men and their ships. In-port
time was minimal a few hours to fuel and reprovision, and the ships were off
again. O'Bannon fought in many surface actions. The Battle of Kula Gulf (6
July) in which O'Bannon fought with three cruisers and three otter destroyers
against ten Japanese destroyers, swept the enemy from the area, though an
American cruiser was lost. But a week later, a second battle had to be fought
in the same waters against a Japanese cruiser, five destroyers and four
destroyer escorts. The same American force sank the Japanese cruiser and
turned the smaller ships away, losing none themselves.
For the next two months, O'Bannon spent most of her time in Vella Gulf,
guarding landings, intercepting Japanese troop convoys and their covering
escorts, and fighting off air attacks. With the aid of sister destroyers, she
sank a number of barges, two submarine chasers, an armed boat, and a gun boat
on various patrols. The climax of operations in the area was the Battle of
Vella Lavella, 6 October, brought on by Japanese attempts to evacuate their
troops from that island. With Selfridge (DD-357) and Chevalier (DD-451),
O'Bannon made the first attack on the evacuation force, a group of nine or
ten destroyers and smaller armed craft. The three American ships contacted
six enemy destroyers, shrugged at the odds, and raced at 33 knots to launch
torpedoes and open gunfire. Japanese destroyer Yugumo was turned into a
blazing hulk but both Selfridge and Chevalier took torpedo hits. O'Bannon was
close on Chevalier's stern when the latter was struck, and the most radical
maneuvers could not keep her from swinging into her sister's side. The enemy
retired with three newly arrived American destroyers in pursuit, while
O'Bannon guarded her stricken sisters, rescuing the survivors of Chevalier.
O'Bannon made battle repairs at Tulagi, then sailed to the west coast for
overhaul. By 18 March 1944 she was back in the Solomons, ready for her part
in the series of westward-moving amphibious assaults which won New Guinea.
Again, it was escort and bombardment repeatedly until 18 October, when
O'Bannon cleared Hollandia to escort reinforcements for the invasion of
Leyte. The convoy was brought in safely 24 October, the eve of the Battle for
Leyte Gulf. O'Bannon guarded the Northern Transport area and patrolled the
entrances to Leyte Gulf during the battle, coming under air attack. Thus she
played her part in the definitive destruction of the Japanese Navy.
Through June 1945 O'Bannon operated primarily in the Philippines, serving in
the escort or assault force for the long roll call of invasions: Ormoc,
Mindoro, Lingayen, Bataan, Corregidor, Palawan, Zamboanga, Cebu, Caraboa. Air
attacks were frequent in the early period, and O'Bannon splashed several
raiders. During the Lingayen offensive, 31 January 1945, O'Bannon, with three
other destroyers, attacked and sank an enemy submarine, Japanese records
studied after the war indicate it was most likely RO-115. At the end of April
and early in May, O'Bannon interrupted her Philippine operations to give fire
support at Tarakan, Borneo and cover minesweeping operations there.
O'Bannon rendezvoused with a group of escort carriers off Okinawa 17 June,
and guarded them as they struck against Sakashima Gunto. In July it was the
large carriers that she protected as they flew strikes on northern Honshu and
Hokkaido. With the close of the war, O'Bannon patrolled the coast of Honshu
until 27 August, when she joined two other destroyers to escort Missouri (BB-
63) into Tokyo Bay There she patrolled until 1 September. She then sailed to
San Francisco and San Diego, where she decommissioned after overhaul 21 May
1946.
Between 17 January 1949 and 10 February 1950, O'Bannon was converted to an
escort destroyer at Long Beach Naval Shipyard. She was re-designated DDE 450,
26 March 1949.
O'Bannon re-commissioned 19 February 1951 to serve out of Pearl Harbor. She
sailed for her first tour of duty with the United Nations forces repelling
Communist aggression in Korea 19 November, and during the next seven months
she guarded carriers at sea as their air groups struck targets in Korea;
served as flagship for the Wonsan Element, East Coast Blockade and Escort
Group; fired on enemy gun emplacements, road and rail supply routes,
ammunition depots, and troop concentrations, and protected convoys moving
between Korea and Japan.
A training period out of Pearl Harbor began upon her return home 20 June
1952, and she took part in AEC operations off Eniwetok. O'Bannon cleared
Pearl Harbor late in April 1953 for the Far East where her primary mission
was screening carriers. Thereafter she served on the Taiwan Patrol and in
exercises off Japan and Okinawa.
Between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, O'Bannon took her part in the
intricately planned schedule which assures the United States that its 7th
Fleet is always composed of ships and men whose readiness for any emergency
is at its keenest. For O'Bannon this has meant an alternation of roughly six-
month deployments to the Far East and periods spent in training operations
and necessary overhauls at Pearl Harbor. While in the Far East, she visited
ports in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand, with
brief, welcome recreation calls at Hong Kong. She was often in either New
Zealand or Australia for the annual commemoration of the Battle of the Coral
Sea, a time of national rejoicing in those countries at which Americans are
particularly welcome. She conducted combined operations training with the
SEATO allies as well as exercising with Marines at Okinawa and taking part in
exercises preparing for any conceivable demand that might be made on the 7th
Fleet. While at Pearl Harbor she often aided in training reservists in
addition to her own training, and at various times sailed down-range for
space orbits and missile shots. In the summer and fall of 1962, she took part
in atomic tests at Johnston Island.
O'Bannon first closed the coast of Vietnam during her 1964-5 deployment, when
on 26 December she left Hong Kong to patrol and conduct hydrographic surveys.
Much of her 1966 tour was spent as plane guard for Kitty Hawk (CVA-63). While
the carrier's jets struck targets in South and North Vietnam to lessen
Communist ability to wage war in the South. For a week each in May and June
O'Bannon fired shore bombardments, destroying Vietcong base camps, troop
concentrations, and small craft.
The veteran destroyer returned via Yokosuka to Pearl Harbor 30 July. During
operations out of homeport, she trained for Apollo space craft recovery
operations in August and was a member of the contingency recovery force for
the Gemini 11 space flight early in September. She visited Guam in the spring
of 1967 and returned home early in July to prepare for another Far Eastern
deployment.
O'Bannon got under way for Japan 28 September, reached Yokosuka 7 October and
Subic Bay on the 15th. She returned to the war zone with Constellation (CVA-
64) and operated as plane guard on Yankee Station through 4 November. After a
fortnight's respite at Subic Bay and Hong Kong O'Bannon sailed to Da Nang for
shore bombardment. She visited Taiwan early in December but returned to the
fighting on the 15th to provide gunfire support just south of the DMZ. Two
days later she helped to rescue the crew of an American plane which had been
hit over the DMZ and had managed to crash just off shore. An enemy battery
shelled the destroyer during the operation but failed to score. As 1967 ended
O'Bannon was still on the gun line supporting allied ground forces
O'Bannon received the Presidential Unit Citation and 11 battle stars for
World War II service, and 3 battle stars for Korean War Service.
FLETCHER Class
Completed - 1939 - 40
Dimensions:
Displacement:
2,050 tons (stand)
2,700 tons (Mean War Service)
Length: 376' (oa)
Beam: 40'
Draft: 15' (max)
Armament:
5 5"/38 DP
4-5 40mm twins
6-11 20mm
2 DC tracks; 2 track extensions
4-6 DC projectors
2 21" TT (quads)
Propulsion:
Speed: 37 knots (max)
Max. Cruising radius:
2,500 miles @ 25 knots
4,400 miles @ 15 knots
Horsepower: 60,0000 (shaft)
Drive: 2 screws; geared turbine
Fuel: 556 tons oil (max)
In the FLETCHER Class, the U.S. Navy definitely
abandoned the medium-sized destroyer, and adopted
new standards for size sea-keeping ability and
sustained speed. A new basic destroyer design
was introduced, to which all succeeding classes
have been built. Salient features of this design
are: increased beam, reversion to the flush-deck
hull, but with a conventional destroyer stern, and
the retention of the BENSON's boiler and engine
room arrangement. The FLETCHER's have proven
themselves one of the most successful destroyer
classes ever built for the Navy.
War losses include: CHEVALIIER (DD 451), STRONG (DD 467),
DEHAVEN (DD 469), PRINGLE (DD 477), BROWNSON (DD 518),
ABNER READ (DD 526), BUSH (DD 529), HOEL (DD 533),
JOHNSTON (DD 557), HALLIGAN (DD 584), COLHOUN (DD 801),
and LITTLE (DD 803).
DD 445 - FLETCHER DD 446 - RADFORD
DD 447 - JENKINS DD 448 - LAVALLETTE
DD 449 - NICHOLAS DD 450 - O'BANNON
DD 452 - PERCIVAL DD 465 - SAUFLEY
DD 466 - WALKER DD 468 - TAYLOR
DD 470 - BACHE DD 471 - BEALE
DD 472 - GUSET DD 473 - BENNETT
DD 474 - FULLAM DD 475 - HUDSON
DD 476 - HUTCHINS DD 478 - STANLY
DD 479 - STEVENS DD 480 - HALFORD
DD 481 - LUEUTZE DD 482 - WATSON
DD 498 - PHILIP DD 499 - RENSHAW
DD 500 - RINGOLD DD 501 - SCHROEDER
DD 502 - SIGSBEE DD 507 - CONWAY
DD 508 - CONY DD 509 - CONVERSE
DD 510 - EATON DD 511 - FOOTE
DD 513 - TERRY DD 514 - THATCHER
DD 515 - ANTHONY DD 516 - WADSWORTH
DD 517 - WALKER DD 519 - DALY
DD 520 - ISHERWOOD DD 521 - KIMBERLY
DD 527 - AMMEN DD 528 - MULLANY
DD 530 - TRATHEN DD 531 - HAZELWOOD
DD 532 - HEERMANN DD 534 - McCORD
DD 535 - MILLER DD 536 - OWEN
DD 537 - THE SULLIVANS DD 538 - STEPHEN POTTER
DD 539 - TINGEY DD 540 - TWINING
DD 541 - YARNALL DD 544 - BOYD
DD 545 - BRADFORD DD 546 - BROWN
DD 547 - COWELL DD 550 - CAPPS
DD 551 - DAVID W. TAYLOR DD 552 - EVANS
DD 553 - JOHN D. HENLEY DD 554 - FRANKS
DD 555 - HAGGARD DD 556 - HAILEY
DD 558 - LAWS DD 561 - PRICHETT
DD 562 - ROBINSON DD 563 - ROSS
DD 564 - ROWE DD 565 - SMALLEY
DD 566 - STODDARD DD 567 - WATTS
DD 568 - WREN DD 569 - AULICK
DD 570 - CHARLES AUSBURNE DD 571 - CLAXTON
DD 572 - DYSON DD 573 - HARRISON
DD 574 - JOHN RODGERS DD 575 - McKEE
DD 576 - MURRAY DD 577 - SPROSTON
DD 578 - WICKES DD 580 - YOUNG
DD 581 - CHARRETTE DD 582 - CONNER
DD 583 - HALL DD 585 - HARDEN
DD 586 - NEWCOMB DD 587 - BELL
DD 588 - BURNS DD 589 - IZARD
DD 590 - PAUL HAMILTON DD 592 - HOWORTH
DD 593 - KILLENS DD 594 - HART
DD 595 - METCALF DD 596 - SHIELDS
DD 597 - WILEY DD 629 - ABBOT
DD 630 - BRAINE DD 631 - ERBEN
DD 642 - HALE DD 643 - SIGOURNEY
DD 644 - STEMBEL DD 649 - ALBERT W. GRANT
DD 650 - CAPERTON DD 651 - COGSWELL
DD 652 - INGERSOIL DD 653 - KNAPP
DD 654 - BREARS DD 655 - JOHN HOOD
DD 656 - VAN VALKENBURGH DD 657 - CHARLES J. BADGER
DD 658 - COLAHAN DD 659 - DASHIELL
DD 660 - BULLARD DD 661 - KIDD
DD 662 - BENNION DD 663 - HEYWOOD L EDWARDS
DD 664 - RICHARD P. LEARY DD 665 - BRYANT
DD 666 - BLACK DD 667 - CHAUNCEY
DD 668 - CLARENCE K. BRONSON DD 669 - COTTON
DD 670 - DORTCH DD 671 - GATLING
DD 672 - HEALY DD 673 - HICKOX
DD 674 - HUNT DD 675 - LEWIS HANCOCK
DD 676 - MARSHALL DD 677 - McDERMUT
DD 678 - McGOWAN DD 679 - McNAIR
DD 680 - MELVIN DD 681 - HOPEWELL
DD 682 - PORTERFIELD DD 683 - STOCKHAM
DD 684 - WEDDERBURN DD 685 - PICKING
DD 686 - HALSEY POWELL DD 687 - UHLMANN
DD 688 - REMEY DD 689 - WADLEIGH
DD 690 - NORMAN SCOTT DD 691 - MERTZ
DD 792 - CALLAGHAN DD 793 - CASSIN YOUNG
DD 794 - IRWIN DD 795 - PRESTON
DD 796 - BENHAM DD 797 - CUSHING
DD 798 - MONSSEN DD 799 - JARVIS
DD 800 - PORTER DD 802 - GREGORY
DD 804 - ROOKS
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U.S.S. O'BANNON DD-450
To learn more about the U.S.S. O'BANNON Please visit these
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