November 1921-Febuary 1922
Washington
Naval Treaty:
April 1930
The London Naval
Treaty:
MAY 1932
The Japanese Prime Minister
Inukai is assassinated:
September 1931
The incident at Mukden on
the South Manchurian Railroad:
January-March 1932
Shanghai:
February 1932
Manchuria:
March 1933
Japan announces
that it intends to leave the League of Nations:
December 1934
Japanese abrogate the Washington Naval
Treaty:
April 1935
The
United States passed the Neutrality Act:
February 1936
A plot by a group of younger officers to
seize power in Japan fails:
November 1936
The Anti-Comintern Pact is
concluded by Germany and Japan:
December 1937
The air attack on the U.S. Gunboat
Panay:
November 1938
The Japanese announce the establishment
of the New Order for East Asia:
July 1939
The U.S. announces it's intention to withdraw
from the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan:
The Roosevelt administration withdrew from the trade pact of 1911 with Japan in an effort to maintain
the status quo in the Far East. Trade between the two countries would be conducted on a day-to-day basis
and the Roosevelt administration wanted to apply economic pressure on the Japanese to modify Japanese policies in China.
23 September 1939
Japan, Politics:
Admiral Nomura becomes
foreign minister in General Abe's recently appointed government. Between now and
their fall in January 1940 some conciliatory moves are made toward the United
States. These are not reciprocated and this strengthens the beliefs and standing
of the more militant Japanese politicians.
14 January 1940
Japan, Politics:
Prime Minister Abe and all
his Cabinet resign and Admiral Mittsumasa Yonai is chosen to form a new
government.
1 February 1940
Japan, Politics:
A record budget
is presented to the Japanese Diet. Almost half is to be devoted to military
expenditure.
31 May 1940
United States, Politics:
President
Roosevelt introduces a "billion-dollar defense program" which is designed to
boost the United States military strength significantly.
13 June 1940
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt
signs a new $1,300,000,000 Navy bill providing for much extra construction.
15 June 1940
United States, Politics:
Another Navy
bill passes into law. This provides for a much expanded air corps, with 10,000
planes and 16,000 more aircrew.
27 June 1940
Diplomatic Relations:
A confidential
meeting is held between British and Australian representatives and the United
States Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The British and Australians ask for help
in standing up to Japan. They wish the USA to take economic measures or to move
more units of the fleet to Malaysian and Philippine waters or to offer to
mediate between China and Japan. Hull is unable to agree to of these moves which
would involve a more active foreign policy than the American public is prepared
to contemplate at this time.
1 July 1940
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt
signs a further Navy bill providing for the construction of 45 more ships and
providing $550,000,000 to finance these and other projects.
16 July 1940
Japan, Politics:
Prime Minister Yonai
resigns because of military pressure and on 17 July a new Cabinet headed by
Prince Konoye is
appointed. Matsuoka is the new Foreign Minister and will be very influential.
The Cabinet also includes a number of supporters of a more aggressive policy.
The most important is General Tojo who
becomes Minister of War.
19 July 1940
Unites States, Politics:
President
Roosevelt signs the "Two-Ocean Navy Expansion Act". This order construction of
1,325,000 tons of warships and 15,000 naval planes. Including the existing
ships, the fleet will comprise 35 battleships, 20 carriers and 88 cruisers.
25 July 1940
United States Policy:
The United
States prohibits the export of oil and metal products in certain categories,
unless under license, to countries outside the Americas generally and to
Britain. This move is seen as an anti-Japanese measure, particularly because of
Japan's needs for foreign oil. From this time Japanese fuel stocks begin to
decline. There are similar problems with other raw materials. Japanese attention
is, therefore, drawn south from China to the resources of the Netherlands East
Indies, and Malaysia.
26 July 1940
Japan, Policy:
The Japanese
government formally adopts policy documents giving top priority to solving their
China problem by blocking supplies reaching the Chinese through Indochina and to
securing their own raw materials by a more aggressive stance in the Dutch East
Indies.
1 August 1940
Japan, Politics:
A public policy
declaration is made concerning Japan's support for a "New Order" in East
Asia.
4 September 1940
United States, Policy: The United States
warns the Japanese government against making aggressive moves in Indochina.
9 September 1940
United States, Politics:
A new
$5,500,000,000 appropriations bill becomes law in the United States. Contracts
are placed for 210 new vessels for he navy, including seven battleships and 12
carriers.
22 September 1940
Indochina:
The
Japanese enter Indochina after concluding a long period of negotiation with the
Vichy government. The Japanese aim is to prevent aid reaching the Chinese
through Indochina. There are to be 6,000 troops stationed in the country and
they are to have transit rights.
26 September 1940
United States, Policy:
An
embargo is imposed on the export of all scrap iron and steel to Japan.
27 September 1940
Axis
Diplomacy:
Germany, Italy and Japan sign an agreement promising that
each will declare war on any third party which joins the war against one of the
three. It is stated that this agreement dose not affect either Germany's or
Japan's relations with the USSR. This treaty is known as the Tripartite Pact.
All the signatories hope that the pact will deter the United States from joining
the war in Europe or taking a more active line in the Far East.
5 October 1940
United States, Politics:
The
Tripartite Pact is condemned by Navy Secretary Knox and he announces that he is
calling up some of the naval reserve.
16 October
1940
United States, Home Front:
Registration begins for
the draft according to the provisions of the Selective Service Act. The first
drafts will be balloted on 29 October.
16-19 October 1940
Diplomatic Affairs:
There are
discussions between the Japanese and the authorities in the Dutch East Indies
concerning the supply of oil. It is agreed to supply the Japanese with 40
percent of the production for the next six months. There are British attempts to
block this agreement.
12-13 November 1940
Dutch East
Indies:
Agreement are concluded between the Japanese and the
principal oil companies whereby the Japanese are to receive 1,800,000 tons of
oil annually from the Dutch East Indies.
30 November 1940
China,
Politics:
Japan officially recognizes the puppet Nanking government
led by President Wang Ching-wei.
10 December 1940
United States, Policy:
Roosevelt
announces an extension of the export-license system. Iron, ore, pig iron and
many important iron and steel manufactures are brought within the system. Like
pervious measures this is aimed at Japan. The changes come into effect at the
end of the year.
29 January-27 March 1941
Allied Planning:
There
are secret staff talks in Washington between British and American
representatives. They produce conclusions code named ABC1 which states that
Allied policy in the event of war with Germany and Japan should be to put the
defeat of Germany first. In March an American mission visits Britain to select
sites for bases for naval and air forces in case of war with Germany.
Preliminary work to equip these bases will begin later in the year. The talks
mark an important stage in the development of cooperation between the US and
Britain. As well as their important decision they accustom the staffs to working
with each other.
1 February 1941
United States, Command:
There is a
major reorganization of the US Navy. It is now to be formed in three fleets, the
Atlantic, the Pacific and the Asiatic. Admiral King is appointed to command the
new Atlantic Fleet. There is to be a significant strengthening of the forces in
the Atlantic.
Japan, Home Front:
Japan announces that it will
be necessary to introduce rice rationing.
13 April 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
The
USSR and Japan sign a five year Neutrality Agreement. For Stalin this is an
invaluable piece of diplomacy which, backed by secret information from Soviet
spies in Tokyo, will allow him to transfer forces from Siberia to face a
possible German attack. These move begin now and will be particularly important
during the final German advance on Moscow later in the year.
The agreement
represents a complete change in Japanese policy and marks the growing concerns
of the Japanese military leaders and statesmen to look south to the resources of
the East Indies. The agreement has been negotiated almost alone by Foreign
Minister Matsuoka, in Moscow on the way back from a European visit. Although it
conform well to the other Japanese leaders' idea, they are upset at Matsuoka's
brash and independent attitude.
5 June 1941
United States, Politics:
The US Army
Bill for 1942 is introduced in to Congress. It calls for appropriations
amounting to $10,400,000,000. It will be passed on 28 June.
2 July 1941
Japan, Policy:
An Imperial Conference
(a meeting of Japanese government and military leaders and the Emperor to
explain policy to the Emperor and nominally to take important decision - in fact
these are already taken at the Liaison Conferences between the politicians and
the military leaders) records the decision that attempts should be made to take
bases in Indochina even at risk of war. The US authorities very soon know of
this determination through their code- breaking service which has managed to
work out the key to the major Japanese diplomatic code and some other minor
operational codes. The information gained from the diplomatic code is circulated
under the code name Magic.
10 July 1941
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt
submits new appropriations measure to Congress. He asks for $4,770,000,000. for
the army. On 11 July he asks for $3,323,000,000. for the navy and the Maritime
Commission.
16-18 July 1941
Japan, Politics:
In order to
remove Matsuoka from the Foreign Ministry, Prince Konoye resigns on the 16 July
and re-forms his Cabinet on 18 July with Baron Hiranuma as deputy prime minister
and Admiral Toyoda as foreign minister. Already personally unpopular, Matsuoka
is removed because he has been urging that the Neutrality Agreement with the
Soviets should be abandoned and that Japan should join with Germany in the
attack on the USSR. The other Japanese leaders do not wish to take such a
decisive step, and have decided that without Matsuoka and his known liking for
Hitler they have a better chance of reaching an agreement with the US over the
pressing problem of the oil resources.
21 July 1941
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt
asks Congress to extend the draft period from one year to 30 months and to make
similar increases in the terms of service for the National Guard. These measures
pass the Senate on 7 August and the House on 12 August only after considerable
debate. Indeed, the Bill is only passed by one vote (203-202) in the House, so
it would wrong to say that American political opinion is strongly in favor of a
more militant policy at this stage.
24 July 1941
Japanese Policy:
In line with the
Imperial Conference decision of 2 July, the Japanese presented an ultimatum to
the representatives of the Vichy government on the 19th demanding bases in
southern Indochina. This demand is now conceded. The Japanese forces begin to
occupy the bases on the 28th. It is very clear that the main use for such bases
would be in an invasion of Malaya, the East Indies or the Philippines.
26 July 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
Japanese assets
in the United States and Britain are frozen. On 28 July Japan retaliates with
similar measures. Also on 28 July Japanese assets in the Dutch East Indies are
frozen and oil deals cancelled. On 29 July Japan freezes Dutch assets. This
means that almost 75 percent of Japan's foreign trade is at a standstill and
that 90 percent of its oil supplies have
cut-off.
Philippines:
Roosevelt orders that the Philippine army
be entirely incorporated in to the US Army for the duration of the tension with
Japan. General MacArthur, who has been leading the Filipino forces, is appointed
to command the US forces in the area as well.
30 July 1941
China:
The US gunboat Tutiula is
damaged by an attack by Japanese bombers in Chungking. Japan apologizes for the
incident but it dose nothing to ease the strained relations between the two
countries.
1 August 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
President
Roosevelt forbids the export of oil and aviation fuel from the United States
except to Britain, the British Empire and the countries of the Western
Hemisphere. This decision hits very hard indeed against Japan because Japan has
no oil of her own and is left with only strictly limited stocks. The position is
such that Japan must either change her foreign policy very radically or decide
very quickly to go to war and try to gain access to the oil of the East Indies.
Roosevelt's decision confirms the steps taken recently when Japanese assets were
frozen.
6 August 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
Konoye's
government presents proposals involving some concessions in China and Indochina
to the US, asking in return for the freeze on Japanese assets. The proposals are
not acceptable to the US and when the rejection is made known to the Japanese
they propose that Konoye and Roosevelt meet to discuss the issues at stake. This
question is not resolved until after Roosevelt and Churchill meet at Placentia
Bay.
9-12 August 1941
Allied Diplomacy:
Churchill and
Roosevelt meet at Placentia Bay in Newfoundland. Both are accompanied by their
military staffs. The discussions cover the situation in Europe and the Far East.
It is agreed to send strong warnings to the Japanese and it is understood that
America will almost certainly enter the war if Japan attacks British or Dutch
possessions in the East Indies or Malaya. A message is also sent to Stalin,
proposing a meeting in Moscow to make formal arrangements for the provision of
supplies to the Soviet Union. The conference is the best remembered for the
agreement later called the Atlantic Charter. This is a statement of the
principles governing the policies of Britain and America and states that all
countries should have the right to hold free elections and be free from foreign
pressure.
Although its noble intentions will have comparetively little
influence on the course of the war it is important as setting out the reason why
the United States might go to war and as a description of the aims of such a
war.
The conference is important also because of the opportunity it gives the
British and American staffs to get to know each other and to work together.
2 September 1941
Naval Policy:
Adm. Yamamto
unveiled his plans to attack Pearl Harbor.
An interesting note to this
plan.
General Marshall was convinced from his visit to Oahu the previous year
that with "adequate air defenses" as he put it in a May 41 report to the
President, "enemy carriers and escorts and transports will begin to come under
air attack at a distance of 750 miles." He therefore concluded that a major
attack against Oahu is considered impractical. This one of the reason that this
man couldn't write his memoirs. He didn't know a damn thing about the
Pacific.
6 September 1941
Japan, Policy:
Konoye gives in to
military pressure and an Imperial Conference decides that, in view of the
declining oil stocks, war preparations should be completed by mid-October and
that if no agreement is reached by then that the decision to go to war should be
taken. Konoye continues to make some conciliatory proposals to the US but is
judged insincere despite the advice of Grew, the Ambassador in Tokyo, that if no
agreement is reached the moderate Konoye may be replaced by a military
dictatorship.
15 September 1941
United States, Politics:
The
Attorney General rules that the Neutrality Act does not prevent US ships from
carrying war material to British possessions in the Near and Far East or in the
Western Hemisphere.
16 October 1941
Japan,
Politics:
Prime Minister Konoye resigns and is replaced by War
Minister Tojo. Tojo himself takes the offices of prime minister, war minister
and home affairs minister. Shigenori Togo is foreign minister and Admiral
Shimada is navy minister. These changes mark the increasing ascendency of the
party which intends to go to war. The decision to go to war has not yet finally
been taken, and it has been suggested that Tojo has taken the Home Affairs
Ministry himself in order to be able to prevent any violent opposition if a
decision for peace is reached.
25 October1941
War at Sea:
The British battleship
Prince of Wales leaves the Clyde for the Far East. Admiral Phillips is aboard on
the way to take command of the new Far East Fleet which is to be created around
Prince of Wales. On 28 November Prince of Wales and Repulse both arrive at
Colombo. The carrier Indomitable is intended to join them, but will be
accidentally damaged on 3 November in the West Indies while training.
November 5 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
After
discussion the Japanese decide to make further peace attempts, setting their
deadline for the end of any negotiations at the end of November. The terms they
offer are rejected by the United States because they contain no repudiatio of
the Tripartie Pact and because the Japanese intend to maintain bases in some
parts of China. The outcome of the Japanese discussions and their diplomatic
plans continue to be intercepted by the US code-breaking service
November 7 1941
Pearl Harbor Strike Force:
After
dress rehearsal of Operation Z by the 350 aircraft flown from the 6 carriers of
the Combined Fleet's "Strike Force," Admiral Yamamoto issued "Operation Order
No.2" setting December 8 as Y Day for the attack on Oahu (December 7 Hawaiian
time).
November 10 1941
Washington:
Ambassador Nomura
arrived at the White House to present the "A" Proposal for a comprehensive
settlement. Knowing that the "modus vivendi" would be Japan's next move,
Secretary of State Hull stalled. The President rejected an immediate reply by
telling Nomura, "Natioons must think one hundred years ahead."
World
Affairs:
In a public speech Churchill announces that 'should the United
States become involved in war with Japan, a British declaration of war will
follow within the hour.'
November 14 1941
Washington:
Secretary of State
Hull rejected Tokyo's "A" Proposal. He insisted on the evacuation of all
Japanese troops from China. This was a blow to Nomura, who had already
mistakenly reported to Tokyo that the United States was "not entirely
unreceptive". Now he had to explain they were making a demand that would be
entirely unacceptable to the military, who had fought a four-year war at the
cost of 1 million lives to settle the national interest on the mainland.
November 15 1941
Washington:
Bishop Walsh's effort
to mediate was dismissed by the State Department as "naive." Hull concluded
after meeting Kurusu that the new envoy was "deceitful." Magic intercepted
Tokyo's message to Consul Kita in Honolulu ordering him to make a "ship in
harbor" report twice weekly. (But this clue was not passed on to Pearl
Harbor.)
November 16 1941
Pearl Harbor Strike
Force:
Concealed by strict radio silence, the carriers sailed from the
Inland Sea to avert suspicion--their destinaton remote Tankan Bay in the Kurile
Islands. To camouflage their movements, Yamamoto ordered their radio call signs
transferred to destroyers.
Washington:
Magic intercepted a
cable from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura advising him: "Fate of the Empire hangs by
a sheer thread. . . please fight harder!"
November 18 1941
Pacific:
A force of 11 Japanese
submarines leaves their home ports to go to take up stations off Hawaii or to
take part in other scouting missions. A further nine vessels sail toward Hawaii
from Kwajalein.
November 20 1941
Washington:
Ambassador Nomura
presented Tokyo's "B" proposal for a "modus vivendi" as "absolutely final." The
preemptive Magic translation had already persuaded the Secretary of State to
regard it as "an ultimatum." The President, however, told him to give it
"sympathetic study."
Diplomatic Affairs:
The Japanese make
proposals for an interim settlement with the United States. The proposal are
unacceptable but Secretary Hull prepares a negotiating reply. this is not
delivered because Chiang Kai-shek's government are successful in making the
British and Dutch worried about the concessions offered to the Japanese in
China.
November 21 1941
London:
The British Joint
Intelligence Committee transmitted to its Far Eastern Command the assessment
that if negotiation broke down, Japan would not attack Siberia or try to cut the
Burma Road or invade Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies because of the danger
of precipitating an all-out war; only a limited invasion of Thailand was
anticipated. (The War Department, which was breaking the British codes as well
as the Japanese, circulated a copy of this intelligence.
November 22 1941
Washington:
Magic intercepted
Tokyo's message to Nomura that the deadline for negotiation had been extended
four days, to November 29. "After that things are automatically going to
happen."
Pearl Harbor Strike Force:
Waiting at Tankan Bay,
Admiral Nagumo received orders to sail on November 26. (The signal was
intercepted but in the JN25 code that could not be broken by U.S. Naval
Intelligence.)
November 24, 1941
Washintgton:
Magic intercepted
Tokyo's clarification to Nomura that as a precondition to any agreement, America
must cease aid to Chiang Kai-shek and lift the oil embargo. Hull, seeing this as
a hardening of Japan's position, told Roosevelt that the outlook was "critical
and virtually hopeless." The President informed his cabnet: "We are likely to be
attacked next Monday for the Japs are notorious for attacking without warning."
He then cabled Churchill: "We must all prepare for real trouble, possibly
soon."
Manila and Hawaii:
The Chief of Naval Operations flashed
warning of "SURPRISE AND AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENTS" by Japan.
November 25, 1941
Washington:
The President's War
Council approved the three month "modus vivendi" despite Roosevelt's concern
about how to "maneuver Japan" into firing the first shot.
November 26, 1941
Pearl Harbor Strike Froce:
At
dawn Admiral Nagumo's fleet put to sea, his final instruction from Yamamoto
being: "In case negotiation with the United States reach a successful
conclusion, the task force will immediately put about and return to the
homeland."
Washington:
Intelligence reports that troop convoys
had been sighted south of Formosa, apparently steaming for Indochina, were taken
by the President as "evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese."
Roosevelt, new evidence indicates, was actually acting on receipt of a secret
leak of Japan's war plan. Hull accordingly was told to drop the State
Department's counter- proposal for a "modus vivendi." to resume oil supplies "on
a monthly basis for cilvilian needs." That afternoon the Secretary of State
formally rejected Tokyo's "B" proposal for a temporary resolution of the crisis.
Instead, Hull submitted a strongly worded document tying any relaxation of the
oil embargo to the Japanese government's acceptance of ten specific conditions.
These were a reiteration of the Open Door doctrine, which required the
"withdrawal of all military, naval, air and police forces from China and
Indochina."
Tokyo:
"This is an ultimatum," Prime Minister Tojo
told his cabinet, having assumed the ten conditions to indicate that the
American government was "unyielding and unbending." He saw "no glimmer of hope."
Japanese consulates and embassies worldwide were warned that codes were to be
destroyed when the war imminent signal was broadcast, hidden in the weather
forecast. NIGASHI NO KESAME (EAST WIND RAIN) would indicate hostilities
with the Unites States.
November 27,1941
Washington:
The Secretary of
State received Hornbeck's assessment: "the Japanese Government dose not desire
or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States."
Hwe put "Odds of five to one that the United States will not be at 'war' on or
before December 15." However, Hull knew otherwise, telling the Secretary of War
he had washed his hands of it, and that it was now "in the hands of you and
Knox- the Army and the Navy." But in an unprecedented move, Marshall and Stark
jointly submitted a memorandum to the President: "If the current negotiations
end without agreement, Japan may attack the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the
Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces. . .
The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time.
Considerable Army and Navy reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines
but the desirable strength has not yet been reached." Magic monitoring of the
weather warning code prompted an alert radioed to all commands: "Negotiations
with Japan appear terminated. . . Japanese future action unpredictable but
hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities CANNOT repeat
CANNOT be avoided the United States desires Japan commit the first
act."
Hawaii:
Garrison Commander General Short received the
alert with the additional instructions: "Measures should be carried out so as
not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." He therefore
interpreted the whole message as a sabotage warning. Pacific Fleet Commander in
Chief Admiral Kimmel received the specific alert: "This dispatch is to be
considered a war warning. . Aggressive action expested by Japan in the next few
days." He too believed that Hawaii was under no immediate threat because of the
appended intelligence summary indicating that Japan's strike was expected to hit
"Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or
Borneo."
Manila:
Appended to MacArthur's order was the
instruction: "Should hostilties occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in
revised RAINBOW 5." This called for him "to conduct air raids against enemy
forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases. .
."
December 1, 1941
London:
The Admiralty ordered the
battlecruiser Repulse, on passage with Prince of Wales to Singapore, to divert
to Darwin, "to disconcert the Japanese and at the same time increase
security."
Tokyo:
"Matters have reached the point where Japan
must begin WAR with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands to
preserve her Empire." Prime Minister Tojo reluctantly advised an Imperial
Conference. The Emperor did not dissent. To protect Operation Z, the Foreign
Ministry agreed to present its formal rejection of America's conditions
precisely half an hour before Pearl Harbor was due to be attacked. The code
signals for war were flashed out: HINODE YAMAGATA To the Southern Army
instructed the invasion fleets to be ready to sail on the planned schedule
against Malaya and the Philippines. NIITAKA YAMA NOBORE (Climb Mount Niitaka)
unleashed the Pearl Harbor Strike Force.
Washington:
Roosevelt
summoned the British ambassador and informed him that U.S. Intelligence
anticipated Malaya and Siam would be invaded. He assured Lord Halifax that with
any attack on British or Dutch possessions, "we should all be in it together."
December 2,1941
Hawaii:
The Pacific Fleet Combat
Intelligence Unit discovered that all Japanese warship call signs had been
changed again. A big operation appeared imminent, but radio traffic and
direction analysis of the unbroken Japanese fleet codes indicated that the
Combined Fleet was still in the Inland Sea with only a single carrier as far
east as the Marshall Islands. "Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond
Head and you wouldn't know about it?" Admiral Kimmel asked, after examining his
fleet intelligence officer's report. "I would hope they could be sighted before
that," Captain Edwin T. Layton replied.
December 3,1941
Singapore:
H.M.S. Prince of Wales
docked at the Changi naval base and carefully censored headlines welcome the
"powerful naval force" defending Malaya.
Hainan Island:
The 14
Japanese transports and escorting warships of the Malayan invasion force sailed
from Samah Bay, Hainan for the four-day crossing the Gulf of
Thailand.
Hawaii:
Admiral Kimmel received "highly reliable
information" from Naval Intelligence in Washington that Magic had intercepted
messages the day before instructing all Japanese embassies to begin destruction
of codes and sensitive documents. He had not, however, been forwarded two even
more vital bits of evidence clearly indicating Japanese interest in Hawaii: the
October 9 intercept (decoded on November 24) instructing the Japanese Consulate
to make detailed reports by dividing up the Pearl Harbor into alphabetically
coded areas; and the November 15 signal, decoded that very day: "As relations
between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor
report irregular, but at the rate of twice a week. Although you are already no
doubt aware, please take care to maintain secrecy."
December 4,1941
Guam:
The U.S. Naval Governor was
ordered to destroy all classified material.
Washington:
The
Navy's listening post at Cheltenham Maryland picked up what the operator
reported as the EAST WIND RAIN war warning message. It was apparently passed on
by Commander Safford, but no action was taken and all copies subsequently
disappeared. The grim news from the Pacific was temporarily eclipsed by the
sensational exposure by the isolationist Chicago Tribune of what purported to be
a U.S. "Victory Plan" to invade Germany in 1943.
Pearl Harbor Strike
Force:
Less than 1,000 miles due north of Midway and shrouded by thick
weather fronts, Admiral Nagumo ordered refueling before his course was set
southeast for the run to Hawaii.
December 5,1941
Hawaii:
The carrier LEXINGTON put
to sea to ferry Marine aircraft to reinforce Midway for the bomber flight due in
two days' time.
Manila: Admiral Sir Tom Phillips flew in from
Singapore to ask General MacArthur and Admiral Hart for American air and warship
support for his proposed foray by Force Z "against Japanese movements in the
South China Sea." Next day, news that RAF patrols from Malaya had sighted a
large Japanese invasion convoy heading across the Gulf of Siam sent Phillips
flying back to Singapore "to be there when the war
starts."
Tokyo:
Newspapers crackled with belligerent headlines:
"Scandalous Encirclement of Japan," "Trampling on Japan's Peaceful Intentions,"
"Four Nations Simultaneously Start Military
Preparations."
Washington:
The Japanese envoys summoned to
State Department could not explain why large convoys were moving across South
China Sea. The President and the Chiefs of Staff then accepted Army Intelligence
estimates Japan would not attack the United States and that "the most probable
line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand."
Sophocles, over twenty three centuries ago in his tragedy of the siege of
Troy, placed in the mouth of Ajax:
December 6,1941
Malayan Invasion Force:
South of
Cape Cambodia, nineteen Japanese transports escorted by cruisers and destroyers
were sighted through a cloudbreak by a Royal Australian Air Force Hudson
patrolling from Kota Bharu on the northern Malayan coast. The pilot radioed that
the convoy was heading east, apparently toward Thailand, before he was shot
down.
London:
Churchill summoned the Chiefs of Staff for a
crisis meeting. From the latest intelligence on the Japanese convoys they
concluded: "It is not possible to tell whether they were going to Bangkok, to
the Kra Peninsula, or whether they were just cruising round as a bluff." The
code "Raffles" had been radioed out to put the entire Far East Command on war
alert.
Singapore:
General Percival and his Commander in Chief
spent most of the day debating whether to launch "Operation Matador" to send the
11th Indian Division across the border into Thailand and forestall an invasion
of the strategic ports of Singora and Patani. Air Marshal Brooke-Popham
hesitated after receiving the cables advice of the British minister in Bangkok
not to preemptively cross the frontier and give Japan an excuse to attack.
Advance troops were therefore ordered only to begin moving up to the border,
even through that evening an RAF patrol reported that the Japanese convoy was
now less than 100 miles from Singora.
Pearl Harbor Strike
Force:
By afternoon some 600 miles northwest of Hawaii, all hands cheered
Admiral Yamamoto's Nelsonian signal: "The Rise or Fall of the Empire Depends
Upon this Battle everyone will do his Duty with Utmost Efforts." Pearl Harbor
was confirmed as the target for the next morning's attack, after the Japanese
reconnaissance submarine I17 reported that the Lahaina anchorage on the
northwest of Oahu was empty. Consul Kita's latest Hawaiian intelligence report,
relayed from Tokyo, was that all eight battleships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, as
well as three cruisers and sixteen destroyers, were in harbor, only the two
carriers were still at sea. There was little air activity, indicating that "now
would be a good opportunity to attack."
Washington:
The latest
intelligence at 9 P.M. indicated that the Japanese invasion convoys were on
course for Thailand. Roosevelt sent off a personal telegram asking the Emperor,
"FOR THE SAKE OF HUMANITY," to intervene "TO PREVENT FURTHER DEATH AND
DESTRUCTION IN THE WORLD." He told Eleanor wryly, "This son of man has just sent
his final message to the son of God." He was back with his stamp collection,
chatting with Harry Hopkins half an hour later when Lieutenant Commander Kramer
arrived with the pouch containing the latest Magic intercepts of Japan's formal
rejection of the American ten-point proposals. The President handed it to his
aide with the comment: "THIS MEANS WAR." He rejected Hopkin's suggestion that
America strike first. "No, we can't do that," Roosevelt reacted. "We are a
democracy and a peaceful people. But we have a good record."
He tried to
reach Admiral Stark by telephone, only to learn that he was at a National
Theater performance of The Student Prince. The President realized that there was
after all nothing very new in th efirst thirteen parts of Tokyo's final
communique to warrent alarming the audience by paging the Chief of Naval
Operations. It was the same conclusion reached by Chief of Army Intelligence,
who decided there was "no reason for alerting or waking up" General
Marshall.
Formosa:
Late in the Afternoon the twenty-seven
transports put out from the Formosan port of Takao with the 48th Division of the
Imperial Army, to head south for the Philippines. The pilots of the four hundred
aircraft of the Imperial Navy's 11th Air Fleet were briefed for the massive air
assault next day to wipe out the American B-17 bombers on Luzon.
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